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RISK, PLACE AND OIL AND GAS POLICY PREFERENCES AMONG COLORADOANS 
 
Unconventional oil and gas extraction, primarily via hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), 
has changed the energy landscape in the United States. The policy regime currently governing 
fracking is a complex patchwork in which state regulators have the primary authority. Social 
scientists have thoroughly documented general beliefs and risk perceptions related to fracking 
there is a lack of policy-related research. This dissertation examined public policy preferences 
for fracking regulation using a survey data from a statewide sample of Coloradoans. 
Theoretically, it was hypothesized that policy support hinged upon factors like risk perceptions, 
benefit perceptions, place attachment, community economic identity and political ideology. 
Overall, risk perceptions and political ideology emerged as relatively consistent and powerful 
predictors of support for unconventional oil and gas regulatory policy. On the other hand, several 
possible predictors had little to no role. Benefit perceptions had little effect on any policy 
dependent variable. Further, community economic identity and place attachment played very 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to understand what policies the public supports to 
regulate hydraulic fracturing and to develop a theoretical understanding of the forces that drive 
people to support oil and gas policies. I used survey data to accomplish this task. The present 
chapter reviewed the topic of unconventional oil and gas development, introduced the theories 
that informed the analysis, detailed the research questions, and described the data.  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 The United States has recently experienced a boom in domestic oil and gas production as 
the combination of hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling has allowed for access to 
previously unreachable oil and gas deposits. Using data from the Energy Information Agency 
(EIA), I constructed Figures 1.1 and 1.2 to show trends in oil and gas production. Figure 1.1 
shows domestic gas production since 1995, indicating a dramatic increase in which total natural 
gas production has nearly doubled in the past decade or so. Figure 1.2 shows that oil production 
has nearly doubled since 2010. Unconventional drilling technologies, like fracking, are a 
significant cause of this increase in domestic oil and gas production (Krupnick et. al. 2014; 






Figure 1.1 Natural Gas Production 
 
Figure 1.2 Oil Production 
















 The explosion in fracking holds both promise and risk. With respect to promise, oil and 
gas development could provide much-needed jobs and tax revenue—particularly for 
underdeveloped rural areas (Lee 2015 Newell and Raimi 2015; Paredes, Komarek and Loveridge 
2015; Weber 2013). However, early estimates of the job growth provided by fracking—
particularly estimates from industry groups—were drastically over-stated and the actual amount 
of jobs is likely rather modest (Kinnoman 2011; Weber 2013). In addition, few jobs actually go 
to local rural populations because highly specialized skills are needed to operate the machinery 
used in oil and gas extraction (particularly fracking) and thus, many direct jobs go to outsiders 
(Hardy and Kelsey 2015). While recent research examining a short time period has found a 
positive effect on job growth and economic development, a well-established “res arch curse” 
line of scholarship indicates that long-run specialization in extractive industries leads to 
economic underdevelopment (Haggerty et. al. 2014; James and Aadland 2011). Thus, the 
fracking boom has had some short-run positive impact on economic development but it is 
unclear if this is sustainable long-term.  
 With respect to risks, there is preliminary evidence of human health impacts from 
fracking. Hill (2013) found adverse birth outcomes near drilling sites in Colorado and 
Pennsylvania. People who live near fracking tend report more skin and respiratory problems 
(Rabinowitz et. al. 2015), hospital utilization is higher near oil and gas drilling (Jamielta et. al. 
2015), and traffic accidents are more common (Rahm, Fields and Farmer 2014). Chemicals used 
in fracking could cause several ailments related to respiratory problems and endocrine disruption 
(Colborn et. al. 2011; Kassotosis et. al. 2013). Still, this health impact research is in its infancy 
and more sophisticated research designs (e.g., case control, quasi-experiments) and richer data 




 In addition to human health effects, residents of communities experiencing resource 
booms often report negative impacts on quality of life, and fracking is no different. For example, 
these quality of life impacts may include increased crime, traffic or noise (Komarek 2014; 
Theodori 2009) and problems related to community cohesion (Boudet et. al. 2014).  
 There are also potential risks for the environment. For example, natural gas may have 
significant benefits in terms of climate change as it produces far less CO2 than coal when used to 
generate electricity (Hultman et. al. 2011). Indeed, natural gas is often described as a “transition 
fuel” that can provide affordable energy as the U.S. electricity sector moves away from coal 
towards renewables (Yergin 2011). However, there is emerging evidence that fugitive methane 
emissions may attenuate any potential climatic benefits of abundant natural gas development 
(Bouman et. al. 2014; Howarth 2014; O’Sullivan and Paltsev 2012). 
Sociologists and related scholars have exhaustively documented risk and benefit 
perceptions related to fracking (e.g. Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 2015; Jacquet 2012; Schaft, 
Borlu and Glenna 2013) and qualitative research has examined in depth how individuals and 
communities have responded to oil and gas development (Crowe and Silva 2014; Ladd 2013; 
Malin 2013). The risks and benefits outlined above are of interest as they may relate to public 
support of energy development generally and regulatory policies more specifically. However, we 
know relatively little about what types of policies the public might support to regulate fracking. 
This dissertation represents the first comprehensive assessment of public policy attitudes towards 
fracking. Thus, it addresses both a significant gap in scholarly knowledge and may help inform 
better policy formation.  
Theoretically, this dissertation applies diverse theories from the risk perception, place and 




to be a particularly robust predictor of a range of policy preferences. While social scientists have 
articulated sophisticated theoretical frameworks to explain the emergence of risk perceptions 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Beck 1992), the policy consequences of risk perception are 
generally under-theorized. One implication of the empirical results of this dissertation is that 
behavioral and policy responses to risk perception need further theorization—that is, we need 
theories that better articulate how and why risk perceptions lead people to endorse ameliorative 
policies or take action. Further, place-based factors like community economic identity (Bell and 
York 2010) and place attachment (Devine-Wright 2005, 2009; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010) 
have received much theoretical elaboration, but have rarely been connected to policy outcomes. 
Generally, the operationalizations of these variables produced modest effects in the models 
reported in the empirical chapters. However, place certainly matters for unconventional oil and 
gas policy, but this relationship needs further elaboration. Ideally, the empirical results presented 
here could inform greater theorizing at the intersection of risk and policy and place and policy.  
STUDY BACKGROUND 
 Social scientists have long been interested in the social dimensions of energy 
development. Here, I will briefly discuss major theoretical and empirical traditions in the 
literature and consider how this literature can be applied to fracking.  
 The classic “boomtown” literature documented negative social impacts from rapid energy 
development (Cortese and Jones 1977; Gilmore 1976; Kohrs 1974). The early works in this 
literature have been critiqued for their ad-hoc nature and methodological limitations (Wilkinson 
et. al. 1982; Wilkinson et. al. 1984). Still, these works provided an important grounding for later 
research that showed that communities recover from boom and bust cycles in the long-run 




 However, it is unclear if the boomtown framework can be readily applied in the case of 
hydraulic fracturing. Jacquet and Kay (2014) point out several possible reasons why insights 
from the boomtown literature cannot necessarily be generalized to the case of fracking. For one, 
scholars portrayed boomtowns as extremely rural and isolated. Yet unconventional drilling 
techniques have changed the spatial dimension of extraction as they allow for drilling to occur 
much more diffusely and on a larger scale than previously possible. Hence, unconventional oil 
and gas extraction is not confined to rural, isolated areas but often occurs proximate to suburban 
areas. Jacquet and Kay (2014) also explain that fracking is unlikely to produce large scale cycles 
of boom and bust. Rather, the diffuse nature of fracking suggests that micro booms and busts will 
occur contemporaneously across different drilling locations. Hence, the underlying assumptions 
of the boomtown model limits its applicability to the case of fracking.  
 The environmental justice and environmental inequality literature have long documented 
how vulnerable population—typically non-white or lower socio-economic status groups—are 
more likely to be exposed to environmental harms (e.g. Bullard 1999; Downey 2003; Downey et. 
al. 2008; Ard 2015). Critical scholars writing in this area argue that our economic system relies 
on externalizing environmental costs to disenfranchised populations (Hornborg 1998). Yet it is 
unclear if there is also a similar calculus of goods and bads from fracking. Castelli (2015) argued 
that the rural poor shoulder an unjust burden of the environmental and health impacts of fracking 
but are not likely to receive royalty payments or industry jobs. Currently, little is known about 
the social distribution of the costs and benefits of fracking but there are reasons to question if 
fracking has the same environmental justice consequences as other types of energy development. 




not likely to be confined among a single population group. That is, unconventional technologies 
allow for drilling to occur in many places and not just among marginalized communities.  
 Rural sociologists and related scholars have long considered the problem of natural 
resource dependence. Natural resource dependence is a k y contributor to seemingly intractable 
rural poverty (Humphrey et. al. 1993; for related papers see Peluso et. al. 1994; Nord and Luloff 
1993 and Freudenberg and Grambling 1994). Further, the resource curse or “paradox of plenty” 
literature from economics suggests that, at least in the long run, economies based around 
extractive industries experience slower growth and generally worsened socio-ec nomic 
outcomes than others (Deller and Schrieber 2012; Partridge, Betz and Laboa 2013).  There are a 
few proposed mechanisms by which specialization in extractive industries lead to stagnation. 
Internationally, extractive economies are associated with autocracies (Robinson, Torvik and 
Verdier 2006; Tsui 2011; Ulfelder 2007; Wright, Frantz and Geddess 2013) and in the U.S. 
natural resource dependence is associated with a lack of political competition at the local level 
(Goldberg, Wibbels, and Mvukiyehe 2008). Hence, extractive economies may lead to low quality 
institutions and a lack of democracy. Extractive economies typically have lower levels of human 
capital as there is less need for companies to invest in education and training (Kurtz and Brooks 
2011; Papyrakis and Gerlaugh 2004).  
 Weber (2014) finds no evidence for a resource curse from the current boom in 
unconventional oil and gas extraction. A resource curse may be unlikely to emerge around 
fracking for a few reasons. As explained above, one of the primary mechanisms that drives the 
resource curse is a lack of human capital—extractive economies tend to have low investment in 
education and skill building. However, modern oil and gas extraction involves a great deal of 




dependence also emerges because local labor markets become “overadapted” to an industry, 
reducing economic diversity (Freudenberg and Gramling 1992; Freudenberg and Gramling 1993). 
However, fracking creates only modest job growth and few locals have the necessary skills to 
operate the equipment (Weber 2013). Thus, the limited employment and high technical skills 
required for unconventional oil and gas extraction many attenuate the possibility of natural 
resource dependence and the resource curse.  
 There are several rich theoretical perspectives on risk and risk perception, with a great 
deal of research identifying the factors that engender or attenuate risk perceptions. The 
psychometric paradigm—pioneered by Slovic (1987)—highlights how features of a source of 
risk, such as its familiarity, can heighten or reduce risk perception. The Cultural Theory of Risk 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983) is usually operationalized by examining how cultural worldviews 
drive risk perceptions (e.g. Dake 1991). More sociologically, the Beck’s risk society theory 
focusses on how modern societies increasingly generate risks that threaten their very existence 
(Beck 1992). Thus, responding to and managing risks is a central task of modern social 
institutions.  
Generally, the risk and risk perception literature has less to say about how risk 
perceptions might influence the choices people make—such as the policies they chose to support. 
However, other research suggests an implicit rational choice perspective on the relationship 
between risk perceptions and policy support—that is, people will support policies to address 
problems perceived as risky or dangerous (Leiserowitz 2006; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; 
Stoutenborough, Vedlitz and Liu 2015). Thus, the chapters below rely on this rational choice  




 Regarding political identity, I leaned heavily upon social psychological research about 
group social identities (Hogg 2007; Taifel and Turner 1986; Turner et. al. 1994). This research 
typically begins with the assumption that innate drives lead people to affiliate with groups and 
these group affiliations tend to shape individual attitudes (Hornsey 2008). This theoretical 
understanding of social identities has been applied to political ideology were evidence indicates 
that strongly ideological individuals work to reconcile their own viewpoints with those of their 
groups, leading to a relative uniformity of opinion within an ideological community (Cohen 
2003; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Unsworth and Fielding 2014). Further, strongly ideological 
individuals are highly receptive to “elite cues” in which elite members of their groups (e.g. 
media figures, politicians) can shift the opinion of the entire group (Converse 2000; Jost, 
Frederico and Napier 2009; Layman and Carsey 2002; McClosky and Zaller 1984, Jost, 
Frederico and Napier 2009; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1993). Both experimental (Cohen 
2003) and observational (McCright and Dunlap 2011) studies lend support to this perspective. 
An additional implication of this research is that people come to rely on their political ideology 
to inform more than just their policy attitudes. For instance, belief in the mere existence of some 
environmental problems—like climate change—largely hinges upon political ideology 
(McCright and Dunlap 2011).  
 “Place” also seems very important in fracking policy controversies. For example, in 
Colorado, Pennsylvania and Texas, some communities have mobilized to resist the oil and gas 
industry, while others have effectively embraced development. The social scientific literature on 
“place” is vast, spanning multiple disciplines with various strands of research relying upon their 
own set of technical terms and methods. However, two concepts related to place seemed 




The first, “place attachment”, focuses on the connection people have to both the physical and 
social elements of a place (Brehm, Eisenhauer and Krannich 2006; Cross 2016; Flora 1998; 
Forrest and Kearns 2001; Stedman 2003). I hypothesized  that people who are highly attached to 
the natural or social elements of their place might be more apt to seek to regulation of the oil and 
gas industry. 
 I derived the second concept associated with place from the work of Devine-Wright and 
colleagues (Devine-Wright 2005, 2009; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010) who found when a 
sudden change endangers important aspects of a place people engage in “place protective 
action”. For instance, residents of a Scottish town resisted a wind energy project despite their 
pro-environmental attitudes because developers planned the project for a historically significant 
landscape with coastal views. It is feasible that individuals might engage in place-protective 
action in two ways. First, the perceived threat of fracking to important elements of place might 
cause resistance. Secondly, for some individuals support for the oil and gas industry may be a 
type of place protective action. Indeed, some regions have a deep history of extraction and 
perceived or actual reliance on oil and gas development to provide jobs and tax revenue. In these 
communities, more stringent regulation might be seen as a threat to an important element of 
place—the oil and gas industry. Thus, opposition to regulation may also be  a type of place 
protective action.  
Another potential aspect of “place” is “community economic identity” (Bell and York 
2010). Bell and York (2010) were interested in why so many West Virginians rallied in support 
of the coal industry, even though industry provides little direct employment in the state. They 
suggested that aggressive industry public relations, often featuring regional celebrities in tandem 




collective identity around the industry. With this research in mind, I borrow the notion of 
“colliding treadmills” from a case study conducted by Gasteyer and Carrera (2013). The authors 
studied a region of rural Central Illinois with a long history of large-scale agriculture—
particularly soybeans and corn. The area also had a history of coal mining. Residents perceived a 
new mining technique—long-wall mining—as a threat to the region’s industrial agriculture. 
Gasteyer and Carrera suggested that mining and agriculture were irreconcilable growth 
imperatives or “colliding treadmills”. In this case, residents of Central Illinois rallied against the 
coal industry to protect agriculture. Similar dynamics may be at play in states that have a history 
of both industrial agriculture and various types of extractive activity. Some resistance to 
fracking, or efforts to regulate the oil and gas industry, may be the result of perceptions that oil 
and gas represents a threat to agriculture or other industries. 
It’s also important to understand the current regulatory landscape for unconventional oil 
and gas extraction and how it relates to broader societal processes of neoliberalism and devolved 
governance. Definitions of neoliberalism vary in their particulars but it is usually described as a 
process in which centralized regulatory authority is diminished with power being transferred to 
individuals, markets and corporations in the name of efficiency and profitability (Castree 2010; 
Castree 2011). Neoliberalism is contested and uneven, even chaotic. Neoliberalism often occurs 
in tandem with devolution whereby smaller units of government play an increasingly larger role 
in governance (Jonas and Bridge 2003; McCarthy 2004; Prudham 2003).  
 Neoliberalism and devolution are evident in the regulatory regime for unconventional oil 
and gas. Key aspects of oil and gas operations are exempted from pieces of federal 
environmental and health regulations (e.g. the famous “Halliburton Loophole”), leading to 




responsibility for oversite of the oil and gas industry (Davis 2012; Werner and Shapiro 2013; 
Zairians et. al. 2016). These governments may not have adequate capacity to regulate oil and gas 
development, leading to a de facto regime of de-regulation.  
RESEARCH SETTING 
I situate my research in Colorado, as it has been a key state in this latest energy boom 
with roughly 51,000 active oil and gas wells (COGCC 2016). Moreover, this unprecedented 
increase in oil and gas production has presented a challenge to state policy makers. As noted 
above, unconventional oil and gas development is exempted from key aspects of federal 
environmental and health regulations. As a further complication, state regulatory bodies may 
suffer from problems of regulatory capture1 and lack the capacity to enforce existing regulations 
effectively (Opsal and Shelley 2014). 
Another compelling reason to study this issue in Colorado is the conflict between the 
state government and cities. Several cities have passed their own regulations (or outright bans 
and moratoria) on oil and gas development and the state and oil and gas industry have formally 
opposed these efforts with legal action (Enockson 2014; Minor 2014). Though it may seem that 
communities within Colorado are mostly resistant to the spread of fracking there are areas that 
have embraced the industry. For example, in 2013, a state succession movement arose in 
northern Colorado counties with high volumes of oil and gas extraction; the impetus for this 
movement was, at least in part, new oil and gas regulations implemented by the state government 
(Whaley 2013). Hence, the local politics of oil and gas development within Colorado are highly 
contentious.   
                                                          
1 Regulatory capture refers to a situation in which government regulatory agencies are under the sway of special 




RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
 This dissertation investigated the following research questions:  
1) How does the perception of risk and benefits impact public endorsement of restrictive 
fracking policies?  
2) Does community economic identity explain why some people may have embraced the 
oil and gas industry while others seek to regulate the industry further? Further, is 
there evidence of “colliding treadmills” in that the public believes that other 
industries may be threatened by oil and gas development?  
3) Does political ideology act as a type of social identity, influencing not only policy 
preferences but also other variables that predict policy preferences—such as risk 
perception or trust? If so, is the effect of political ideology mediated by intervening 
variables like risk perception and trust?  
4) How does “commensurating” a policy by associating it with economic sacrifice (such 
as increased taxes) influence policy support? Will support of further regulation 
decline as the associated costs rise?  
5) How does “place” and place attachment matter for oil and gas policy preferences?  
 To investigate these research questions, I conducted a stratified random digit-dial survey 
of Colorado residents in the fall of 2014. After thorough pre-testing of the instrument, I designed 
a unique sampling frame in which counties with a high degree of drilling were oversampled. This 
oversampling was done because of the highly unequal spatial distribution of population within 
Colorado; most of the state population lives within the Denver metropolitan area, which has 
relatively little drilling. The oversampling strategy involved ranking Colorado counties by active 




within strata. Survey Sampling International Inc. provided a sample that included both cell 
phones and landlines. The research team conducted interviews in both English and Spanish.  
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
I organized this dissertation in standalone essay format as opposed to a book-style 
“treatise” format. There are four empirical chapters to this dissertation (chapters 2-5), a short 
conclusion (chapter 6), and two appendices. The second chapter examines policy support using 
theories related to place and risk. Here, I measured policy support using a scale constructed of 
different possible fracking regulatory policies. Predictors include risk perceptions, benefit 
perceptions and place-related variables. The third chapter uses contingent valuation 
methodology—seldom employed by sociologists—to understand what drives willingness to pay 
for fracking oversight in the form of more frequent inspections. In doing so, I considered the 
theoretical literature on “commensuration” and the sociology of environmental valuation. This 
chapter also included variables for risk perceptions, benefit perceptions, trust in the oil and gas 
industry, and relevant controls. The fourth chapter considered the problem of governance scale—
that is, what level of government (e.g. federal, state, local) should regulate oil and gas 
development. For predictor variables, I include risk perceptions, benefit perceptions and standard 
controls. The fifth chapter clarifies the role of political ideology in fracking policy preferences. 
Relying on a theoretical understanding of political ideology borrowed from social psychology 
(e.g. Cohen 2003) I tested for the exogeneity of political ideology. More specifically, I 
investigated whether political ideology influences variables that predict policy preferences—
such as risk perceptions or trust in the oil and gas industry—while also having a direct effect on 




























Ard, Kerry. 2015. "Trends in exposure to industrial air toxins for different racial and 
socioeconomic groups: A spatial and temporal examination of environmental inequality 
in the US from 1995 to 2004." Social Science Research 53: 375-390. 
Bamberger, Michelle and Robert E. Oswald. 2012. “Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and 
Animal Health.” New Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health 
policy 22(1):51–77. 
Bamberger, Michelle and Robert E. Oswald. 2015. “Long-Term Impacts of Unconventional 
Drilling Operations on Human and Animal Health.” Journal of Environmental Science 
and Health, Part A 50(5):447–59. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Sage. 
Brown, R.B., Dorins, S.F. and Krannich, R.S. 2005. “The boom‐bust‐recovery cycle: Dynamics 
of change in community satisfaction and social integration in Delta, Utah” Rural 
Sociology, 70(1): 28-49. 
Bullard, Robert D. 1999. "Dismantling environmental racism in the USA." Local Environment 
4(1):5-19. 
Castelli, Matthew. 2015. "Fracking and the Rural Poor: Negative Externalities, Failing 





Colborn, Theo, Carol Kwiatkowski, Kim Schultz, and Mary Bachran. 2011. “Natural Gas 
Operations from a Public Health Perspective.” Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: 
An International Journal 17(5):1039–56. 
Cortese, C. and B. Jones. 1977. “The sociological analysis of boom towns” Western Sociological 
Review 8: 76-90. 
Crowe, Jessica, Ryan Ceresola, and Tony Silva. 2015. “The Influence of Value Orientations, 
Personal Beliefs, and Knowledge about Resource Extraction on Local Leaders’ Positions 
on Shale Development.” Rural Sociology 80(4):397-430. 
Dake, Karl. 1991. "Orienting dispositions in the perception of risk an analysis of contemporary 
worldviews and cultural biases." Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology 22(1): 61-82. 
Darmofal, David. 2005. “Elite Cues and Citizen Disagreement with Expert Opinion.” Political 
Research Quarterly 58(3):381–95. 
Davis, Charles. 2012. “The Politics of ‘fracking’: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Practices in 
Colorado and Texas.” Review of Policy Research 29(2):177–91. 
Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1983. Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of 
Technological and Environmental Dangers. Univ of California Press.  
Downey, Liam. 2003 "Spatial measurement, geography, and urban racial inequality." Social 
Forces 81(3): 937-952. 
Downey, Liam, Summer Dubois, Brian Hawkins, and Michelle Walker. 2008 "Environmental 




Driessen, Paul. 2013. “Fracking Brings Employment 
http://townhall.com/columnists/pauldriessen/2013/07/27/fracking-brings-employment-
and-economic-revival-n1648970/page/full 
Freudenburg, W.R. 1981. “Women and men in an energy boomtown: adjustment, alienation, and 
adaptation” Rural Sociology, 46(2): 220. 
Gilmore, J.S., 1976. “Boom towns may hinder energy resource development” 
Science 191(4227): 535-540. 
Graham, Jove, Jennifer Irving, Xiagon Tang, Stephen Sellers, Joshua Crisp, Daniel Horwitz, 
Lucia Muelenbachs, Alan Krupnick and David Carey 2015. “Increased Traffic Accident 
Rates Associated with Shale Gas Drilling in Pennsylvania.” Accident Analysis & 
Prevention 74:203–9. 
Haggerty, Julia, Patricia H. Gude, Mark Delorey, and Ray Rasker. 2014. “Long-Term Effects of 
Income Specialization in Oil and Gas Extraction: The US West, 1980–2011.” Energy 
Economics 45:186–95. 
Hardy, Kirsten and Timothy W. Kelsey. 2015. “Local Income Related to Marcellus Shale 
Activity in Pennsylvania.” Community Development 46(4):329–40. 
Hill, Elaine. 2014. “Three Essays on The Impacts of Unconventional Drilling on Early Life 
Health.” Retrieved November 13, 2015 from 
<http://www.ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/38804> 
Holzman, David C. 2011. “Methane Found in Well Water near Fracking Sites.” Environmental 




Hornborg, Alf. 1998. "Towards an ecological theory of unequal exchange: articulating world 
system theory and ecological economics." Ecological Economics 25(1):127-136. 
Howarth, Robert W., Renee Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea. 2011. “Methane and the 
Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations.” Climatic Change 
106(4):679–90. 
Hultman, Nathan, Dylan Rebois, Michael Scholten, and Christopher Ramig. 2011. “The 
Greenhouse Impact of Unconventional Gas for Electricity Generation.” Environmental 
Research Letters 6(4):044008. 
Jorgensen, Bradley S. and Richard C. Stedman. 2001. “Sense of Place as an Attitude: Lakeshore 
Owners Attitudes toward Their Properties.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 
21(3):233–48. 
Kassotis, Christopher D., Donald E. Tillitt, J. Wade Davis, Annette M. Hormann, and Susan C. 
Nagel. 2013. “Estrogen and Androgen Receptor Activities of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Chemicals and Surface and Ground Water in a Drilling-Dense Region.” Endocrinology 
155(3):897–907. 
Kinnaman, Thomas C. 2011. “The Economic Impact of Shale Gas Extraction: A Review of 
Existing Studies.” Ecological Economics 70(7):1243–49. 
Komarek, T. J. 2014. “Crime and Natural Resource Booms: Evidence from Unconventional 







Kohrs, E.V. 1974. “Social consequences of boom growth in Wyoming.” Presented at the regional 
meetings of the Rocky Mountain Association for the Advancement of Science, April, 
Laramie, WY. 
Krupnick, Alan, Raymond J. Kopp, Kristen Hayes, and Skyler Roeshot. 2014. “The Natural Gas 
Revolution”. Retrieved December 15, 2016 from <ftp://ftp-
ccu.jrc.it/pub/dentener/Shale/Literature/ShaleGasReports/RFF-Rpt-
NaturalGasRevolution.pdf> 
Ladd, Anthony E. 2014. “Environmental Disputes and Opportunity-Threat Impacts Surrounding 
Natural Gas Fracking in Louisiana.” Social Currents 1(3):293–311. 
Lee, Jim. 2015. “The Regional Economic Impact of Oil and Gas Extraction in Texas.” Energy 
Policy 87:60–71. 
Malin, Stephanie. 2014. “There’s No Real Choice but to Sign: Neoliberalization and 
Normalization of Hydraulic Fracturing on Pennsylvania Farmland.” Journal of 
Environmental Studies and Sciences 4(1):17–27. 
McCright, Aaron M. and Riley E. Dunlap. 2010. “Anti-Reflexivity the American Conservative 
Movement’s Success in Undermining Climate Science and Policy.” Theory, Culture & 
Society 27(2-3):100–133. 
Newell, Richard G. and Daniel Raimi. 2015. Oil and Gas Revenue Allocation to Local 
Governments in Eight States. National Bureau of Economic Research. Retrieved 




Opsal, Tara and Tara O’Connor Shelley. 2014. “Energy Crime, Harm, and Problematic State 
Response in Colorado: A Case of the Fox Guarding the Hen House?” Critical 
Criminology 22(4):561–77. 
O’Sullivan, Francis and Sergey Paltsev. 2012. “Shale Gas Production: Potential versus Actual 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Environmental Research Letters 7(4):044030. 
Perry, Simona L. 2012. “Development, Land Use, and Collective Trauma: The Marcellus Shale 
Gas Boom in Rural Pennsylvania.” Culture, Agriculture, Food and Environment 
34(1):81–92 
Rabinowitz, Peter M., Ilya B. Slizovskiy, Vanessa Lamers, Sally J. Trufan, Theodore R. Holford, 
James D. Dziura, Peter N. Peduzzi, Michael J. Kane,  John S. Reif, Theresa R. Weiss, and 
Meredith H. Stowe.  2015. “Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health Status: 
Results of a Household Survey in Washington County, Pennsylvania.” Environmental 
health perspectives 123(1):21. 
Rahm, Dianne, Billy Fields, and Jayce L. Farmer. 2015. “Transportation Impacts of Fracking in 
the Eagle Ford Shale Development in Rural South Texas: Perceptions of Local 
Government Officials.” Journal of Rural & Community Development 10(2).  
Schafft, Kai A., Yetkin Borlu, and Leland Glenna. 2013. “The Relationship between Marcellus 
Shale Gas Development in Pennsylvania and Local Perceptions of Risk and 
Opportunity.” Rural Sociology 78(2):143–66. 




Smith, M.D., R.S. Krannich, L.M. Hunter. 2001. “Growth, decline, stability, and disruption: A 
longitudinal analysis of social well-being in four Western rural communities.” Rural 
Sociology 66(3): 425-450. 
Silva, Tony J. and Jessica A. Crowe. 2015. “The Hope-Reality Gap: Rural Community Officials’ 
Perceptions of Unconventional Shale Development as a Means to Increase Local 
Population and Revitalize Resource Extraction.” Community Development 46(4):312–28. 
Stephenson, Eleanor, Alexander Doukas, and Karena Shaw. 2012. “Greenwashing Gas: Might a 
‘transition Fuel’label Legitimize Carbon-Intensive Natural Gas Development?” Energy 
Policy 46:452–59. 
Weber, Jeremy G. 2012. “The Effects of a Natural Gas Boom on Employment and Income in 
Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming.” Energy Economics 34(5):1580–88. 
Whaley, Monte. 2013. “Weld  County Floats Secession Plan” Accessed February 15, 2015 from  
 <http://www.denverpost.com/ci_23406235/new-state-weld-county-floats-secession-plan-
northeastern.>  
Wilkinson, K. P., Thompson, J. G., Reynolds, Jr., R. R., Ostresh, L. M. 1982. “Local social 
disruption and western energy development: A critical review”. Pacific Sociological 
Review, 25(3): 275-296. 
Wilkinson, K.P., Reynolds, R.R., Thompson, J.G. and Ostresh, L.M. 1984. “Violent crime in the 





CH. 2 FRACKING POLICY SUPPORT: THE ROLE OF PLACE, RISK AND TRUST  
 
SUMMARY 
 In this chapter, I considerd how place, risk/ benefit perceptions and trust influence 
support for fracking policy among Coloradoans. Results suggested that place-related variables, 
such as place attachments or community economic identity, had relatively little role while risks 
perceptions and trust are important predictors of policy support Further, political ideology was a 
powerful predictor of fracking policy support.  
INTRODUCTION  
Unconventional oil and gas extraction, primarily through a process called hydraulic 
fracturing or “fracking”, has created a boom in U.S. oil and gas production with natural gas 
production increasing by about 30% from 2005 to 2015 (Krupnick et. al. 2014; Silverstein 2014: 
USDA ERS 2016)2. Many have seen the dramatic increase in domestic oil and gas production as 
an economic boon. Unconventional oil and gas extraction has provided jobs and economic 
development in distressed rural areas (Driessen 2013; Energy from Shale 2015; Lee 2015), in 
addition to tax revenue for cash-strapped governments (Newell and Raimi 2015). 
Unconventional oil and gas development could have a large multiplier effect, leading to 
secondary job growth, and, more indirectly, job growth spurred by lower energy prices 
(Krupnick et. al. 2014). Moreover, natural gas burns cleaner than other fossil fuels, possibly 
contributing to lower greenhouse gas emissions and providing a “transition fuel” to cleaner 
                                                          
2 The term “fracking” technically refers to a very specific portion of a larger process of oil and gas development 
involving the injection of water and chemicals at high velocity to shatter rock formations. However, the public often 
uses the term “fracking” to refer to the larger process of unconventional onshore oil and gas development. This 




energy sources (Hultman et. al. 2011; Moniz 2011; Tour, Kittrell and Colvin 2010). However, 
fugitive methane emissions may attenuate many of the environmental benefits of natural gas 
(Bouman, Ramirez and Herwitch 2014; Howarth 2014; O’Sullivan and Paltsev 2012) 
Yet oil and gas extraction via fracking has been associated with negative effects on public 
health and quality of life (Colborn et. al. 2011; Hill 2014; Kassotis et. al. 2013; Perry 2012; 
Rabinowitz et. al. 2015), wildlife and livestock health (Bamberger and Oswald 2012, 2015; 
Kiviat 2013; Latta et. al. 2014), strains on local infrastructure (Graham et. al. 2015;Rahm, Fields 
and Farmer 2015), water contamination (Ferrar et. al. 2013; Holzman 2011; Rozell and Reaven 
2012), air pollution (Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011), employment much lower than 
industry estimates (Kinnamon 2011; Mauro et. al. 2013; Weber 2012), jobs that primarily go to 
outsiders (Hardy and Kelsey 2015), negative effects on housing values (Bennett 2013; 
Muehlenbachs, Spiller and Timmons 2014), and crime (Komarek 2014; Theodori 2009). Critics 
also point out that the volume of extractable natural gas is largely unknown as estimates have 
varied widely and production occasionally falls far short of initial expectations (Smil 2015). 
Moreover, the “transition fuel” label may unintentionally impede efforts to create more energy 
efficiency, conservation, and renewable energy (Stephenson, Doukas and Shaw 2012).  
Several studies have analyzed public attitudes towards unconventional oil and gas, mostly 
focusing on risk and benefit perceptions (Brasier et. al. 2013; Jacquet 2012; Schaft, Borlu and 
Glenna 2013; Silva and Crowe 2015) or general support for fracking (Boudet et. al. 2014; Clarke 
et. al. 2015; Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 2015; Davis and Fisk 2014). Case-study research has 
documented how individuals and communities impacted by fracking have responded to the boom 




fracking regulation— we have little information about what policies the public supports and the 
predictors of said policy support.  
This chapter aimed to address this gap in our knowledge. In the next section, I outlined a 
theoretical background in which I present “place,” risk, and benefit perceptions as key drivers of 
policy support related to hydraulic fracturing. I test this theoretical background using a statewide 
survey of Colorado residents collected in the fall of 2014.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The public response to the fracking boom seems to be highly contingent upon “place”. 
Political leaders in Pennsylvania have largely embraced unconventional oil and gas development 
while neighboring New York has banned fracking statewide (Negro 2012; Simonelli 2014). 
Within Colorado, the public response has varied significantly on an even smaller scale. For 
instance, Weld County, Colorado is home to roughly 21,000 active oil and gas wells. In 2013, a
state succession movement arose in part because of new state oil and gas regulations (Whaley 
2013).3 On the other hand, the nearby towns of Fort Collins, Longmont, and Boulder have passed 
temporary or permanent bans on fracking (Davis 2014; Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz 2014), 
prompting the state government to sue these cities (Gullmann 2015).  
 Social scientists have produced an enormous volume of research on “place” and, not 
surprisingly, no singular theoretical or operational definition of “place” dominates the literature. 
The “place” literature can be roughly divided into theoretical, phenomologically oriented works 
which focus on the experiential nature of place primarily using qualitative methods (Gustafson 
                                                          
3 The state succession movement was largely symbolic and was concerned with more cultural politics issues like gay 
marriage and gun rights. However, the resistance of local leaders to state regulations nderscores the apparently 




2011; Nardi 2014; Thwaites 2001; Tuan 1977) and a more quantitatively-ori nted psychometric 
approach (e.g. Bott 2000; Jorgenson and Stedman 2001; Williams and Vaske 2003; Vorkinn and 
Riese 2001). Among this latter literature, a concept perhaps best called “sense of place” has 
emerged; sense of place is broadly recognized as a multi-dimensional construct (Ardoin, Schuh 
and Gould 2012; Kudryavtev, Stedman and Krasny 2012; Kyle, Graefe and Manning 2005; 
Williams and Vaske 2003). People form bonds with the community and natural aspects of a 
place (Brehm, Eisenhauer and Krannich 2006; Flora 1998; Forrest and Kearns 2001; Stedman 
2003), are functionally or emotionally dependent upon places (Brown and Raymond 2007; 
Manzo 2003; White, Verden and Van Ripper 2008). Further, people work to protect places that 
are culturally, emotionally or socially significant (Brehm and Eisenhauer 2013; Devine-Wright 
2009; Scannell and Gifford 2013). 4  
Critics charge that the sense of place literature lacks a perspective on the political 
economy of place. Ardoin (2006) argued that the political-economic dimension of place has 
received relatively little study, yet “Questions of power and identity, particularly as manifested 
in place-based political movements and economic structures, explore some of the most 
transformative ideas linked to the relationships between people and place” (p. 118). Cheng, 
Kruger and Daniels (2003) observed that “dominant groups in natural resource politics have 
developed a fairly narrow set of place meanings…this relatively narrow set of place meanings 
serves to legitimize the existing power of dominant groups” (p. 101). Hence, while the sense of 
place literature consistently demonstrates that places are emotionally, cognitively, and socially 
                                                          
4 Given the vastness of the place literature in the social sciences, it cannot possibly be exhaustively reviewed here. 
For reviews and theoretical discussion we recommend Scannell and Gifford (2010), Hidalgo and Hernandez (2001), 
Cross (2015), Lewicka (2011), Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996); and Gustafson (2001)The splintered, multi-
disciplinary nature of the sense of place literature have likely hindered it’s theoretical and methodological 




significant for people, it typically lacks a critical perspective on how political and economic 
forces might forge understandings of place.  
Community Economic Identity. The concept of community economic identity (Bell and 
York 2010) provides a window into understanding the political economy of sense of place. 
Studying West Virginia, Bell and York (2010) began their analysis with a puzzle: Why do so 
many West Virginians uncritically support the coal industry and oppose environmental and 
safety regulations when the industry provides relatively marginal economic benefits to the state? 
Bell and York explained that “public acquiescence to the wishes of industry is in part achieved 
by industries’ calculated efforts to reconstruct a bond with the communities they degrade, 
attempting to replace the employment connection between industry and community with a 
constructed ideology of dependency and economic identity” (p. 116). The authors emphasized 
the role of astro-turf organizations like “Friends of Coal” and the use of regional celebrities in 
pro-industry advertisements to construct a “community economic identity” in which coal 
extraction is believed to be of central economic, social, and cultural importance. Thus, the 
meanings people attach to the places and communities in which they live can be a result of 
power relations and deliberate efforts by powerful actors to construct place meanings. 5 
 Bell and York (2010) argued that community economic identity is constructed via top-
down efforts of powerful actors; their model implies a type of “false consciousness” as it relies 
on highly structural Marxist theorizing and presents actors as relatively powerless in the face of 
hegemonic industries. Malin (2015) conducted a relevant study of the siting of a uranium facility 
in rural Colorado. Residents of the effected communities strongly supported the uranium facility 
                                                          
5 Sometimes scholars study community economic identity without invoking the term. In his study of fracking in 
Louisiana  Ladd (2014) notes that: “Louisiana residents have long shown a high degree of comfort with the oil and 





as uranium was a central part of their collective identity. Malin’s research suggested that more 
than just industry public relations drive community economic identity. Rather, community 
economic identity has deep historical antecedents rooted in a community’s sense of self-
determination and justice.6  
Perceptions of the significance of particular industries may be especially important in 
local land use and environmental conflicts as some industries may come into conflict or 
“collide”. Gasteyer and Carrera (2013) provided a relevant case study from rural Illinois. Despite 
the region’s history of coal mining, there was wide spread resistance to a new coal mining 
technique (long wall mining) which was believed to have unusually high environmental impacts. 
However, environmentalist values or abstract environmental concern did not motivate resistance 
to coal. Rather, many residents believed that environmentally destructive coal mining would 
interfere with the region’s robust industrial agricultural economy centered on soybeans and corn. 
In this case, the agricultural aspects of community economic identity trumped the extractive 
aspects of community economic identity. This study suggested that, in addition to considering 
community economic identity related to the oil and gas industry, scholars should consider 
community economic identity related to other industries, as well.  
Place Protective Behavior  
 Sense of place may partially explain other public responses towards local energy projects 
(Devine-Wright 2005; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010; Jacquet and Stedman 2013). Devine-
Wright (2005; 2009) critiqued the notion of NIMBYism (“Not in my back yard”). Chiefly 
focused on wind energy projects, Devine-Wright argued individuals’ “place protective” 
                                                          
6 In addition, economic factors, such as persistent poverty, may increase support for potentially hazardous industries 
(Luloff, Albrecht and Bourke 1998) though the evidence is mixed since it has also been the case that poor people 




orientation could explain local resistance. New industries—such as wind energy projects or 
fracking—may suddenly alter natural or social environments. Thus, energy development might 
disrupt the place as a source of bonding, meaning, and identity. Communities may actively resist 
changes in places that hold cultural or social significance.   
As noted above, the policy response to the fracking boom has varied significantly from 
place to place within Colorado, with some municipalities threatening to secede from the state 
over new oil and gas regulations. Residents of communities that are relatively supportive of oil 
and gas development likely have a community economic identity rooted in the oil and gas 
industry. That is, the oil and gas industry may be an especially significant component of their 
place along historical, cultural and economic lines. As such, efforts to resist regulation of the 
industry are a type of place protective behavior as regulation is often seen as a threat to industry 
(Cabrejas 2012; Freudenberg, O’Leary and Wilson 1999; Peeples et. al. 2014). That is, the state 
succession movement mentioned above is possibly a type of “place protective” mobilization 
because people believed that increased regulations threatened a significant aspect of place.  
Risk and Benefit Perceptions 
In the public mind, fracking is associated with environmental harms, negative effects on 
public health, infrastructure impacts, and quality of life impacts (Jacquet 2012; Jacquet and 
Stedman 2013; Perry 2012; Schaft, Borlu and Glenna 2013; Theodori 2009; Willow 2015).7On 
the other hand, the public also perceives an array of benefits such as job creation, tax revenue, 
energy independence, and reduced carbon dioxide emissions (Anderson and Theodori 2009; 
Ladd 2013; Schaft et. al. 2014). No studies have examined how fracking risk and benefit 
perceptions impact support for specific regulatory policies though perceived economic benefits 
                                                          
7 Typically, in many of these and related studies risk perceptions are the dependent variable; in this chapter, I argue 




may lead people to support fracking in a more general sense (Kriesky et. al. 2014; Malin 2014). 
Risk perceptions about climate change are associated with support for climate change policy 
(Leiserowitz 2006; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; Park and Vedlitz 2013)—suggesting that 
fracking risk perceptions are also likely to increase support for restrictive regulation.  
 There is conflicting evidence about the role of actual proximity to environmental or 
technological hazards in predicting risk perceptions. Some studies have shown that proximity to 
oil and gas operations is associated with increased risk perception (Boudet et. al. 2016; Schaft, 
Borlu and Glenna 2013) while other research suggests that living near dangerous or potentially 
toxic industrial activity can become “normalized” via several complex social processes (e.g. 
Malin 2013; Zavestovski et. al. 2004; Zavestovski et. al. 2002). Thus, in addition to actual, 
objective proximity to oil and gas activity, it is important to consider unwelcome proximity.  
Other Predictors of Policy Support 
  Several other variables affect environmental policy attitudes. Konisky, Milyo and 
Richardson (2008) observe a small effect of trust in government on support for environmental 
policy. Harring (2013) finds a positive association between willingness to make economic 
sacrifices for the environment and political trust; also, the author reports that political corruption 
reduces willingness to sacrifice. Corruption and lack of trust also cause people to believe that 
environmental policy is less effective (Harring 2014).  
Trust in major institutions, such as the oil and gas industry or state regulatory agencies, 
may be especially important in Colorado. The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(COGCC) is the primary regulatory body responsible for oversight of the oil and gas industry. 
Critics have argued that the COGCC employs too many former oil and gas industry employees, 




Shelley (2014) concluded that the COGCC suffers from regulatory capture. Thus, some 
Coloradoans may support stricter regulation on oil and gas extraction, but they believe that 
regulators are too close to the industry, rendering enforcement and punishment inconsistent at 
best and unlikely at worst. Prior research suggests that people do not necessarily trust local 
governments more than state or national governments (Petrzelka, Marquart-Pyatt and Malin 
2013). However, the municipal fracking bans and moratoria imply that, at least on oil and gas 
related issues, Coloradoans may trust their local government more than the state government. In 
addition, trust in the oil and gas industry may reduce risk perceptions, which in turn might reduce 
support for regulatory policy since people who trust the oil and gas industry may not feel that it 
needs regulation from the state.  
Several additional variables that account for environmental policy support—such as 
political ideology, gender, age, education, and income (Flynn, Slovic and Mertz 1994; Pampel 
and Hunter 2012; Stern, Dietz and Kalof 1993; Xiao and McCright 2013). Of these, political 
ideology is one of the more powerful explanatory variables. Self-assessed conservatives and 
Republicans report lower levels of environmental concern (Dietz, Stern and Guagnano 1998; 
Hamilton, Colocousis and Duncan 2010) and are less likely to support environmental policy or 
take environmental action (Gromet, Kunreuther and Larrick 2013; Kotchen, Boyle and 
Leiserowitz 2013). Some environmental issues, such as climate change, have become especially 
polarized over the last few decades (McCright and Dunlap 2011a; 2011b), though it is unclear if 
views about fracking policy are similarly polarized. 
 The reasons why political identification is so strongly associated with both abstract 
environmental views and environmental policy preferences are less clear. Regarding climate 




have been key figures in a “climate denial” movement, which has galvanized conservatives’ 
opposition to climate policy efforts and even to the science of climate change (Elsasser and 
Dunlap 2013; Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010).  
Political ideology has not been a central variable of interest for scholars studying 
unconventional oil and gas. National opinion polls indicate some partisan polarization on general 
perceptions of fracking (Boudet et. al. 2014). However, politicians of varying political stripes 
support unconventional natural gas extraction. Thus, it is unclear how relevant partisan 
identification or political ideology is for local resistance or acquiescence to oil and gas activity. 
Hypotheses  
Following the theories outlined above, I expect that support for fracking policy hinges 
upon place-related variables such as community economic identity as well as risk and benefit 
perceptions. Hence, this chapter tests the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Place attachment is associated with support for restrictive fracking 
regulation.  
Hypothesis 2: Community economic identity around the oil and gas industry reduces 
support for fracking regulation.  
Hypothesis 3: Community economic identity around other industries increases support 
for the regulation of fracking.  
Hypothesis 4: Risk perceptions are positively associated with endorsement of regulation.  
Hypothesis 5: Benefit perceptions are negatively associated with support for regulatory 
policy.  
Hypothesis 6: Actual proximity to oil and gas operations will have no effect on support 




DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS 
Data 
To test these hypotheses, I used unique survey data collected in the fall of 2014. The data 
comes from a random digit dial survey of Colorado residents and the sample includes both 
landlines and cell phones. The spatial distribution of unconventional oil and gas distribution is 
highly unequal within Colorado—of the roughly 55,000 active oil and gas wells, some 21,000 
are in Weld County, and another 10,000 are concentrated in sparsely populated Garfield County. 
A random sample of Colorado residents would produce data that included respondents 
concentrated in the metropolitan Denver area where there is relatively little drilling. To ensure 
that the study represented the opinions of people who live near oil and gas drilling, intensive 
drilling counties were oversampled. I divided Colorado’s counties into strata based upon the 
number of active wells and randomly sampling within those strata.  
I significantly revised the instrument after the research team conducted extensive pre-
testing. Administration of the survey occurred in both English and Spanish. The final response 
rate was 9% using the most conservative response rate formula (AAPOR RR1)—similar research 
has produced roughly the same response rate (Boudet et. al. 2014; Clarke et. al. 2016; Pew 
2014). Using AAPOR RR6, which assumes that cases of no contact are ineligible, the response 
rate was 14%.  I ask that the reader bear in mind that response rates and data quality are two 
distinct issues—is it possible that a survey might have a high response rate yet. al. so contain a 
great deal of bias due to poor design (Groves 2006; Keeter et. al. 2008; Rosen et. al. 2014; 
Wagner 2012). The completion rate was 95%.  
The public tends to use the term “fracking” to describe the entire drilling process, from 




technique used to stimulate wells. Evensen et. al. (2014) found that the term “fracking” elicited 
more negative responses than the term “shale gas development”. However, Stoutenborough, 
Robinson and Vedlitz (2016) find no difference in response between the terms “hydraulic 
fracturing” and “fracking”. To avoid biasing responses, the instrument used the phrase “oil and 
gas activity”.  
Dependent Variable: Policy Scale. The dependent variable was a scale constructed from 
a series of questions that ask about specific regulatory policies for unconventional oil and gas 
extraction. These included requiring oil and gas companies to disclose the chemicals used in 
drilling, stricter setbacks from homes and schools, prohibition of drilling on public land, real 
time monitoring of air and water pollution, regulations on noise pollution, and special taxes to 
pay for problems caused by oil and gas drilling or to fund alternative energy. Respondents could 
“Strongly Support” to “Strongly Oppose” these items. Table 2.1 reports the distribution of each 
question. In general, Coloradoans were supportive of regulations on the oil and gas industry. 
About 87% of respondents indicated “strongly support” or “support” for disclosure rules, while 
that same figure for residential and school setbacks is about 77%. There was somewhat less 
support for restricting drilling on public lands (48%). There was support or strong support for air 
pollution monitoring (80%), water pollution monitoring (86%), noise limits (60%), taxes for 









Table 2.1 Distribution of the Individual Policy Scale Items 
 
Strongly 
Support Support  Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
 % % % % 
Disclosure 44.3 43.04 8.35 4.3 
Residential Setback 33.85 41.1 19.01 5.99 
School Setback 35.2 41.8 17.09 5.87 
Restricting Drilling on Public Land 15.68 32.7 36.22 15.41 
Air Pollution Monitoring 31.61 48.19 16.84 3.37 
Water Pollution Monitoring 40.15 46.21 10.86 2.78 
Noise Limits 17.96 46.41 29.01 6.63 
Tax for problems caused by oil and gas  28.31 47.09 18.25 6.35 
Tax to fund renewable energy  25.59 41.1 21.37 11.87 
 
After calculating a polychoric correlation matrix8 for these items, I performed an 
exploratory factor analysis using the iterated principal factors technique for factor extraction. 
This analysis produced a single factor solution (eigenvalue=5.4, all variables loaded above .4, 
89% of variation accounted for). I then calculated an additive scale using these items that 
produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .89. The combined results of the factor analysis and Cronbach’s 
alpha strongly suggest that a single latent factor underlies these questions.  
Predictor: Community Economic Identity. A novel set of questions in which respondents 
rated the importance of various industries to their area assessed community economic identity.9
These industries included the following: tourism, oil and gas activity, agriculture, colleges and 
universities, hospitals and medicine, wind and solar, high technology (e.g. computers, software, 
or the internet), brewing/distilling, and manufacturing. A strong majority (65%) ranked tourism 
                                                          
8 By default, most software packages use a Pearson correlation matrix for factor analysis. Polychoric correlations are 
specifically designed to estimate the relationship between ordinal variables (Olssson 1978) and are recommended 
for use in factor analysis with ordinal data (Halgoda-Tello 2010). 
9 Blaacker, Woods and Oliver (2012) provide the only other quantitative operationalization of community economic 
identity using a sample of West Virginia college students. I adapted their indicators and found that they pretested 




as “important” or “very important.” The distribution of oil and gas activity is split roughly in half 
between “very important” and “important” and “somewhat important” and “not at all important.” 
76% of respondents rated Agriculture as “very important” or “important”. Colleges and 
universities and hospitals and medicine follow roughly the same distribution; about 70% of 
respondents answered “very important” or “important.” Like oil and gas activity, wind and solar 
was split roughly evenly between “very important” or “important” and “somewhat important” 
and “not important.” A majority (71%) named high technology as “very important” or 
“important.” This same figure for brewing and distilling is only 46%. Manufacturing was rated 
as “very important” or “important” by 55% of respondents.  
 Exploratory factor analysis using a polychoric correlation matrix and iterated principal 
factor extraction was performed on these items. The initial solution was highly ambiguous, with 
very low eigenvalues (e.g. at or below 1.0), and the items cross-loaded on multiple factors. The 
correlation matrix shown in Table 2.2 provides a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between these items.  
Table 2.2. Polychoric Correlations for the Community Economic Identity Items   
 
Tourism Oil and Gas 
Activity 













Tourism 1.000        
Oil and Gas Activity 0.232 1.000       
Agriculture 0.183 0.498 1.000      
Colleges and 
Universities 
0.191 0.126 0.148 1.000     
Hospitals and 
Medicine 
0.108 0.100 0.224 0.719 1.000    
Wind and Solar 0.200 -0.002 0.156 0.400 0.382 1.000   
High Technology 0.175 0.144 0.032 0.413 0.390 0.260 1.000  
Brewing and Distilling 0.217 0.156 -0.011 0.420 0.354 0.267 0.389 1.000 





Generally, correlations between items were very low. However, a few correlations are 
rather strong.  There was a strongly correlation between “Hospitals and Medicine” and “Colleges 
and Universities,” (.719) and both have a moderate correlation with “Wind and Solar” and “High 
Technology”. A separate exploratory factor analysis was run on these items alone, which 
provided evidence of a single factor solution (eigenvalue= 1.9, factor loadings above .55, 88% of 
variance accounted for). More theoretically, these items all relate to white-collar industries that 
involve a high-degree of human capital. An additive scale was created with Cronbach’s alpha= 
.69 where high values are associated with increased importance. 
Further analysis of the correlation matrix reveals that “agriculture” and “oil and gas 
activity” moderately correlated. When combined, these items only produced an alpha coefficient 
of .56, below an acceptable level. Given the theoretical importance of the “oil and gas activity” 
variable, it is used as a stand-alone predictor in the regression models. As with other variables, it 
was reverse coded so that higher values indicate more importance.10  
Predictor: Place Attachment. Several possible place attachment scales pretested poorly.11 
The instrument did not first define a place and proceed to ask respondents about their level of 
attachment to it—the usual strategy in place attachment research.12 Instead, respondents 
considered “your local area and the place that you live.” A strong majority of respondents 
reported high levels of community and natural attachment. I dichotomized these variables were a 
                                                          
10 In unreported models we included Agriculture as a predictor but it had null effects.  
11 For instance, the scale offered by Scannell and Gifford (2010b) was pre-tested. Respondents described several 
questions as “silly” and occasionally laughed. Respondents also complained that the scales were highly repetitive 
and occasionally grew agitated. Motivated by these concerns, I opted for a simpler way of measuring place 
attachment.  
12 For instance, Jorgenson and Stedman (2001) asked respondents about their attachment to their lakeshore 
properties while Ramkisoon, Smith and Weiler (2013) studied sense of place related to a national park. While pre-
defining a place for respondents in a survey instrument was appropriate for these studies, it was deemed 




“1” was given to respondents with community or natural attachment and a “0” was given to those 
with low or no attachment.  
Predictor: Risk and Benefits. Respondents assessd the risks they perceived from 
unconventional oil and gas development including the following: community quality of life, road 
traffic, air or water quality, land use, noise pollution, human health, wildlife/livestock health, and 
real estate values. These items used a likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. Except for “community quality of life,” the distributions of these items are markedly 
similar. For instance, 55% percent of respondents perceive negative impacts on air or water 
quality, and roughly the same number perceive impacts on wildlife or human health. Exploratory 
factor analysis using a polychoric correlation was performed on these items, revealing a single 
factor solution (eigenvalue=6.6, 92% of variance explained, lowest loading on the factor was 
.77). From here I created an additive scale where higher values are associated with more risk 
perception (Cronbach’s alpha=.94).  
 To capture unwanted proximity, respondents were asked if they feel they live too close to 
oil and gas activity (0=no, 1=yes). For actual proximity COGCC data was used to calculate the 
distance to the nearest well for each respondent in miles. Because I did not have actual addresses 
for the respondents, I assigned each respondent to the population centroid of their zip code. 
Respondents varied significantly on this variable from .07 miles to around 28 miles.13  
 Benefits items included community quality of life, job creation, tax revenue, community 
infrastructure, energy independence from foreign oil, the development of clean energy, and 
                                                          
13 A shape file downloaded from the COGCC was scrapped for active oil and gas well latitude and longitude using 
the shp2dta command, and the command user written geonear was then ued to calculated distance to the nearest 
well. The primary disadvantage of this method is that I do not have access to actual addresses for the anonymous 
survey respondents. However, this method is more precise than other op ions, such as using county-level well counts 




reducing household energy bills assessed using a likert type scale (i.e. strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). I conducted exploratory factor analysis using a polychoric correlation matrix 
using iterated principal factors for factor extraction. This produced an unambiguous single factor 
solution with an eigenvalue of 4.6 and factor loadings more than .6 for all variables; indeed, 
several factor loadings exceeded .9. Because the exploratory factor analysis strongly suggested 
that a single latent variable underlies these items, an additive scale with Cronbach’s alpha of .89 
was constructed; in this scale, higher values mean greater perception of benefit.  
Control Variables. I controlled for trust in the two major oil and gas regulatory agencies 
within Colorado — the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) and 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) — and the oil and gas 
industry. These items used four response categories: no trust, very little trust, some trust, and a 
great deal of trust. A minority of respondents reported a “great deal of trust” in the oil and gas 
industry (25%), while the mode is “some trust” (43%). Most respondents have “some trust” in 
the COGCC (63%) and CDPHE (57%).  
 Political ideology was captured using a variable which ranges from 1=very Liberal to 
5=very Conservative. No single group reaches a majority, though over 30% of respondents 
identify as moderate—in national elections Colorado is typically a “swing state” with many 
moderates and unaffiliated voters. A few respondents gave ambiguous responses (e.g. “pissed 
off” or “I hate ‘em all”) which could not be coded into a valid category. Race was a dummy 
variable (1=white and 0=all others) as is sex (0=male and 1=female). I coded age in years. 
Education was recoded slightly as the “less than high school” category was combined with 
“some high school” due to data sparseness; the recoded variable ranged from 1 (less than high 




included (1= $0-$25,000, 6= $150,000 or more). Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for all 
predictors.  
           Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics for all Variables  
  Mean 
Standard 





Political Ideology 3.11 1.21 1 5 -.492 
Education 4.45 1.37 1 6 .171 
Age 51.65 16.25 18 89 -.008 
White 0.82 0.38 0 1 .103 
Female 1.48 0.50 1 2 .131 
Income 3.61 1.63 1 6 -.074 
Trust- Oil and Gas Industry 2.22 0.98 1 4 -.646 
Trust- COGCC  2.19 0.77 1 4 -.171 
Trust- CDPHE 2.14 0.82 1 4 .156 
CEI- Oil and Gas 2.31 1.14 1 4 -.329 
Community Attachment 0.91 0.29 0 1 -,001 
Natural Attachment 0.94 0.24 0 1 -.076 
White Collar 1.64 0.68 0 3 .059 
Risk Scale 1.42 0.67 0 3 .597 
Benefit Scale 2.07 0.63 1 4 -.534 
Distance to nearest well 3.45 4.12 0.07 28.17 .081 
Unwanted proximity 0.11 0.31 0 1 .582 
 
Statistical Models 
I used ordinary least squares regression, which adjusts for the stratified sampling design 
and includes probability weights, to model the influence of the predictor variables on the policy 
support scale. Multicollinearity was not a problem in any of the model (i.e. the highest VIF was 
2.45) and a plot of the residuals against the fitted values suggested a lack of heteroscedasticity. 
 I adopted a stepwise approach to model building. The first model included only control 
variables; the second added the place attachment items; the third added community economic 
identity; and the fourth model included the risk and benefit perceptions. I trimmed variables that 




improvement) from subsequent models for the sake of parsimony. Table 2.4 shows regression 
coefficients, standard errors, p-values and model fit statistics.   
Model 1. Model 1 only included the socio-demographics, political ideology, and trust 
control variables. Political ideology was a strong predictor of policy attitudes; self-identified 
conservatives were less supportive of regulating unconventional oil and gas development. People 
with more education, older residents, and women were more likely to endorse regulations than 
men. Income, on the other hand, has relatively little influence; only two categories are 
significantly different from the reference category. Trust has a more complex impact. Trust in the 
COGCC had almost no effect, while a lack of trust in the oil industry and the CDPHE both 
reduce policy support.  
Model 2. Model 2 added the binary place variables for community attachment and natural 
attachment. Both coefficients are substantively small and neither reach statistical significance. 
Compared to the prior model, political ideology had relatively little influence; only “very 
conservative” is statistically different from “very liberal.” Trust in the oil and gas industry, the 
CDPHE and many of the socio-demographics—such as education, sex, and age— retained 
relatively similar effects as in Model 1. These models excluded trust in the COGCC and income. 
An unreported model included income; none of the categories reaches statistical significance, 
and including these items in model 2 only improves the R2 by .01.14  
Model 3. Model 3 added the community economic identity items. Community economic 
identity around the oil and gas industry had some impact on policy support as the “very 
                                                          
14 The lack of an effect of trust in regulators is worthy of further discussion. One possibility is that some 
respondents, particularly politically conservative respondents, have a general distrust of state regulators, while other 
respondents may distrust because they perceive regulators as corrupt or ine (Opsal and Shelley 2014). To some 




important” category was significantly different from the “not at all important” category; and 
“somewhat important” approaches significance at a conventional alpha level (i.e. p=.05). The 
white collar/ industrial scale, on the other hand, had almost no impact. As in Model 2, there was 
relatively little effect of political ideology or race, while women, older, and education were 
positively associated with support for restrictive regulation. Neither of the place attachment 
variables were included in Model 3, in part because of their lack of effect in model 2, and 
because the R2 is slightly higher in this model if they are not included.  
Model 4. Model 4 added the risk and benefit perception variables (risk scale, benefit 
scale, unwanted proximity, and distance to the nearest well). Risk perceptions increased support 
for unconventional oil and gas regulation while benefit perceptions had a much smaller and not 
statistically significant effect. Proximity to oil and gas operations, either real or unwanted, had 
negligible influence. As in Model 3, political ideology had an effect only at its extremes since 
very conservative persons are significantly different from very liberal persons. Except for sex, 
other socio-demographic variables had roughly the same effect. The role of trust in the oil and 
gas industry and the CDPHE in predicting policy support was robust against the inclusion of the 
risk and benefit variables. I excluded the white collar/industrial scale because it had relatively 
little effect in the prior model—in an unreported model, I included this variable, and the R2 is





Table 2.4 Weighted OLS Models for Policy Support  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 b se p  b se p  b se p  b se p 
Political Ideology (ref very liberal)             
Somewhat liberal -0.194 0.128 0.140  -0.040 0.105 0.704  0.013 0.117 0.914  0.057 0.103 0.586 
Moderate -0.272 0.123 0.035  -0.153 0.117 0.200  -0.146 0.131 0.275  -0.097 0.125 0.443 
Somewhat Cons. -0.280 0.145 0.063  -0.213 0.127 0.103  -0.161 0.144 0.272  -0.104 0.124 0.406 
Very Cons. -0.596 0.125 0.000  -0.451 0.119 0.001  -0.402 0.113 0.001  -0.290 0.090 0.003 
Education (ref less than HS)             
High School 0.282 0.151 0.073  0.251 0.147 0.098  0.270 0.162 0.105  0.227 0.163 0.174 
Trade or Vocational  0.239 0.182 0.198  0.161 0.177 0.372  0.181 0.192 0.355  0.180 0.194 0.362 
Some College 0.512 0.149 0.002  0.453 0.131 0.002  0.444 0.140 0.003  0.435 0.152 0.007 
College  0.314 0.140 0.033  0.301 0.128 0.025  0.292 0.140 0.045  0.285 0.151 0.067 
Post Grad 0.298 0.157 0.069  0.285 0.140 0.050  0.317 0.167 0.067  0.315 0.169 0.071 
Age 0.006 0.002 0.003  0.005 0.002 0.003  0.004 0.001 0.019  0.004 0.001 0.008 
White 0.026 0.084 0.754  0.028 0.090 0.760  0.068 0.080 0.401  0.019 0.079 0.806 
Female 0.084 0.034 0.018  0.065 0.032 0.052  0.076 0.036 0.045  0.051 0.034 0.138 
Income (ref $0-$25,000)             
$26,000-$50,000 0.189 0.075 0.018             
$51,000-$74,000 0.114 0.092 0.226             
$75,000-$100,000 0.094 0.100 0.352             
$101,000-$149,000 0.225 0.114 0.057             
$150,000 or more 0.039 0.090 0.666             
Trust- Oil and Gas Industry (ref great deal of trust) 
            
Some Trust 0.074 0.127 0.563   0.196 0.052 0.001   0.206 0.066 0.004   0.115 0.071 0.114 
Very Little Trust 0.249 0.113 0.036   0.594 0.090 0.000   0.634 0.102 0.000   0.400 0.114 0.001 
No Trust 0.383 0.141 0.011   0.895 0.096 0.000   0.838 0.074 0.000   0.496 0.115 0.000 
Trust- COGCC (ref great deal of trust)             
Some Trust -0.163 0.097 0.104             
Very Little Trust -0.065 0.116 0.577             
No Trust -0.108 0.149 0.474             
Trust- CDPHE (ref great deal of trust)             
Some Trust -0.238 0.108 0.036  -0.108 0.035 0.004  -0.083 0.045 0.075  -0.082 0.046 0.088 
Very Little Trust -0.649 0.099 0.000  -0.268 0.067 0.000  -0.310 0.071 0.000  -0.259 0.082 0.003 




Community Attachment    0.073 0.069 0.300         
Natural Attachment    0.080 0.080 0.325         
White Collar         0.063 0.052 0.230     
CEI- Oil and Gas (ref not important)             
Somewhat Important          -0.089 0.047 0.068  -0.093 0.041 0.029 
Important         -0.098 0.070 0.167  -0.053 0.061 0.391 
Very Important         -0.248 0.095 0.014  -0.164 0.074 0.035 
Risk Scale             0.208 0.030 0.000 
Benefit Scale             0.093 0.057 0.113 
Unwanted 
Proximity             -0.037 0.065 0.579 
Distance to Well                          -0.001 0.005 0.904 
Constant  1.832    1.797    1.803    1.823  






 The purpose of this chapter was to understand how community economic identity, risk (in 
the form of risk perceptions, actual proximity to oil and gas activity, and unwanted proximity), 
benefit perceptions, place attachment, and control variables impact support for fracking 
regulations. I organized this discussion around the six hypotheses listed above at the end of the 
theoretical background section 
 While other research has found that place attachment motivates support for various 
policies or place-protective measures (e.g. Devine-Wright and Howes 2009; Cross et. al. 2011), I 
found that place attachment does not influence fracking policy support—there is no support for 
hypothesis 1. Recall that the measures of place attachment were extremely general, and, perhaps, 
place-specific indicators would have not have produced null results. For example, Devine-
Wright and Howes’ (2009) case study of a wind energy citing controversy involved a landscape 
that was highly significant to the community under study; my indicators, by contrast, asked about 
community and natural attachment in a generic sense. Of course, the highly specific questions 
used in some community-based studies of place attachment (e.g. Bonaiuto et. al. 2002; Cross et. 
al. 2011; Kyle et. al. 2004) are probably not appropriate for a statewide survey.  
 In hypotheses 2 and 3, I suggested that community economic identity might explain 
fracking policy attitudes. Perceived importance of the oil and gas industry had a small, 
downward effect on policy support, lending some support to hypothesis 2. There was no 
evidence for the “colliding treadmills” perspective (hypothesis 3) because community economic 
identity related to industries other than oil and gas did not explain whether people want to 
regulate fracking. Bell and York (2010) use qualitative methods to understand community 




mostly qualitative (Ladd 2014; Malin 2014, 2015). Though the quantitative operationalization of 
community economic identity presented in this analysis had relatively little effect, it is likely that 
community economic identity still matters for oil and gas policy. There is clearly a need for more 
research to develop a richer understanding of community economic identity and build a better 
scale.  
 Moving forward, risk perception was a notable predictor of policy support (hypothesis 4), 
while benefit perceptions had a null effect (hypothesis 5); and both actual proximity (hypothesis 
6a) and unwanted proximity (hypothesis 6b) and were unimportant. Hence, the analysis 
presented here suggests that subjective risk perceptions are an especially important predictor of 
policy attitudes. There is relatively little research that tests how risk perceptions drive policy 
outcomes and this is an especially fruitful area for future research. Earlier I argued that benefit 
perceptions might lead to decreased policy support if regulation is seen as a threat to the oil and 
gas industry. It is possible that respondents did not view the regulations included in the policy 
scale variable as a direct threat to industry, leading to a null effect of benefit perceptions.  
 Some of the control variables warrant further discussion. Political ideology only had an 
effect at its extremes. Political ideology functions as a type of social identity in which highly 
partisan individuals rely on cues from elite members of their in-group to formulate their opinions 
(Damafol 2005; Levendusky 2010; Zaller 1990). Perhaps there is less ideological polarization in 
fracking politics than broader environmental issues like climate change; in other words, 
Coloradoans might not lean on political ideology heavily to inform their views about 
unconventional oil and gas extraction. Trust also proves to be an important factor. In each model, 




the oil and gas industry, while trust in one of the major state regulatory agencies increased 
support for regulation. 
 There are several limitations to this study; early, I described limitations related to 
question wording. Further, this study did not include all the possibly relevant predictors of 
environmental policy attitudes. For instance, I did not assess abstract environmental values (e.g. 
Dunlap et. al. 2000). However, environmental values are probably associated with other 
independent variables, such as conservatism, risk perceptions and trust in the oil and gas 
industry, so their omission is not a fatal flaw of this research. Indeed, it is possible that the 
inclusion of environmental values, while theoretically important, would do little to enhance the 
explanatory power of any of the models presented in this project. There are also several possible 
endogenous relationships not explored here. For instance, I found modest direct effect of 
political ideology, but is it is possible that ideology predicts risk perceptions, which in turn 
predicts policy preferences. Further, the limited resources available for this project limited the 
sample size.  
 Overall, results indicate that the politics of the fracking boom are not contingent upon 
“place;” with “place” being conceptualized as a bundle including community economic identity, 
place attachment, and actual and unwanted proximity to oil and gas activity. These variables had 
little to no influence on policy support, while trust and risk perceptions are especially important. 
Many of the place variables used here probably do not explain the differential response to 
fracking from place to place. Rather, risk perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry 
probably have a differential spatial distribution from community to community, resulting in 
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 This chapter considered support for increasing the frequency of inspections of oil and gas 
operations using the contingent valuation method and logistic regression. I developed insights 
from Bell and York’s concept of “community economic identity” and Gasteyer and Carrera’s 
notion of “colliding treadmills” that suggested people may perceive the oil and gas industry as a 
threat to other locally significant industries or, alternatively, rally in support of the industry if it 
is deemed locally significant. However, I found no support for either of these perspectives. 
Rather, increased taxes to fund more frequent inspections are the most consistent predictor while 
risk perceptions and political ideology are also important predictors of willingness to pay for 
fracking regulations.  
INTRODUCTION  
The depletion of easy to access oil and gas reserves has ushered in a n w era of “tight oil” 
or “tough gas” in which horizontal drilling technologies and hydraulic fracturing (i.e. “fracking”) 
are being used to access previously unreachable oil and gas deposits (Hughes 2013). Since the 
mid-2000s, these unconventional onshore drilling technologies have spread rapidly throughout 
the U.S. and created an unprecedented boom in domestic oil and gas production (Krupnick et. al. 





 The fracking boom has also met with much controversy as it has been tied to negative 
impacts on public health (Colborn et. al. 2011; Hill 2014; Perry 2012; Kassotis et. al. 2013; 
Rabinowitz et. al. 2015) and the environment (Ferrar et. al. 2013; Holzman 2011; Howarth, 
Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011; Rozell and Reaven 2012). Yet, oil and gas development is also a 
source of jobs, economic growth and tax revenue (Driessen 2013; Energy from Shale 2015; Lee 
2015; Newell and Raimi 2015). There has been an extremely divergent political response to 
fracking from place to place; the states of New York and Maryland have banned fracking, while 
other states (e.g. Pennsylvania and Colorado) have largely embraced oil and gas development 
(Simonelli 2012; Ziorgannis et. al. 2016). This fragmentary policy landscape is largely a result of 
selective exemptions from federal environmental and health regulations for oil and gas 
development; many states have struggled to implement an adequate regulatory response to the 
sudden boom in oil and gas production (Werner and Shapiro 2013).  
 Despite the political controversy and policy challenges presented by the fracking boom, 
little research has examined what types of policies the public supports. Social scientists have 
documented perceived threats and opportunities from fracking (Brasier et. al. 2013; Jacquet 
2012; Schaft, Borlu and Glenna 2013; Silva and Crowe 2015) and surveyed general support for 
the process (Boudet et. al. 2014; Kriesky et. al. 2012; Silva, Crowe and Ceresola 2015). 
However, we know surprisingly little about what types of policies the public would like to see in 
place to regulate fracking. Moreover, we do not know what the public is willing to pay in 
exchange for oil and gas regulations in the wake of the current boom.  
 This chapter addressed this gap in the literature using survey data from Colorado, one of 
the key states in the unconventional oil and gas boom. To some degree, Colorado is a macrocosm 




place to place within the state. To account for public policy preferences, I accessed the literature 
on place, risk and benefit perceptions, and other known predictors of policy attitudes. The 
dependent variable was a dichotomous choice contingent valuation question that assessed 
support for additional inspections of oil and gas operations. The next section described the 
theoretical understandings used to inform the subsequent empirical analysis.  
BACKGROUND 
What is “place”? A vast, interdisciplinary literature has unpacked the nature of place. 
Places are more than simply a collection of natural characteristics and human infrastructure. 
Rather, several complex socio-cultural processes give meaning to places (Cross 2015; Massey 
2010). This “sense of place” literature can be roughly organized into more qualitative or 
theoretical works which focus on the experiential nature of place (Gustafon 2011; Nardi 2014; 
Thwaites 2011; Tuan 1975, 1977) and a quantitative literature rooted in psychometrics 
(Jorgenson and Stedman 2006; Stedman 2002; Vaske and Kobrin 2011). People develop deep 
bonds with both the natural and social dimensions of a place (Knez 2005; Trentelman 2009; 
Scannell and Gifford 2010; Lukacs and Ardoin 2014; Hidalgo and Hernandez 2001). Further, 
people are dependent upon places to fulfill emotional, economic and even physical needs (Anton 
and Lawrence 2016; Gibbons and Ruddell 1995; Stedman 2003; Williams et. al. 1992). People 
whom are attached to a place will often engage in “place protective action” to protect meaningful  
places from unwanted changes from perceived threats (Anderson and Schirmer 2015; Devine-
Wright 2005, 2009; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010; Kearns and Collins 2010).  
Places, of course, also contain political and economic institutions. The sense of place 
literature has largely ignored these institutions (Ardoin 2006). However, other literature speaks 




literature. Bell and York (2010) argued that people develop a “community economic identity” 
around industries that are perceived as important to their place. Studying West Virginia, Bell and 
York (2010) observed that coal industry public relations have forged a collective identity around 
the coal industry; the authors called this “community economic identity.” Even though coal 
provides very few jobs and is no longer the economic cornerstone of the state, West Virginians 
remain largely supportive of the industry.  
To some degree, people who rally in support of environmentally or socially harmful 
industries may be engaging in a unique type of “place protective” behavior. That is, if an 
industry is widely perceived as economically, culturally or historically significant to a place, 
people who defend said industry may be doing so because they seek to protect valued aspects of 
their place. Some communities in Colorado have opposed more stringent regulation of the oil 
and gas industry in part because the industry is perceived as economically important and 
historically significant to their area and further regulation is seen as overly onerous—g ing so far 
as to threaten to secede from the state (Stablemore 2013). Hence, community economic identity 
around the oil and gas industry likely impacts willingness to pay to regulate the industry, and this 
chapter tested the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Community economic identity related to the oil and gas industry reduces 
willingness to pay for oil and gas regulation. 
 However, places often contain multiple industries, and, to varying degrees, people may 
develop a collective identity around more than one industry. Gasteyer and Carrera (2013) 
provided a useful case study to understand the multi-dimensional nature of community economic 
identity. Examining central Illinois, the authors argued that both coal mining and large-scale 




economic identity” but argued that residents of central Illinois had a type of collective identity 
around both industries. At the local level, the growth imperatives of big agriculture and coal 
mining acted as “colliding” treadmills of production; the spread of long-wall coal mining was 
widely viewed as a threat to industrial agriculture and ultimately, residents resisted the expansion 
of mining. Thus, community economic identity is likely multi-dimensional, and support for oil 
and gas regulations may be higher if industries other than oil and gas are seen as significant or 
important—especially if oil and gas are perceived as a threat to those other valued industries. 
Following this multi-dimensional understanding of community economic identity, I tested the 
following hypothesis:  
 Hypothesis 2: Community economic identity related to other industries increases 
willingness to pay for oil and gas regulation.  
Risk and benefit perceptions. The public perceives an array of risks from unconventional 
oil and gas extraction such as impacts on public health, the environment, and local roads (Brasier 
et. al. 2013; Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 2015; Jacquet 2012; Schaft, Borlu and Glenna 2013). 
However, people also perceive many benefits including jobs, tax revenue, and energy 
independence from foreign oil (Brasier et. al. 2011; Jacquet and Stedman 2013; Ladd 2014; 
Malin 2013). Researchers have not examined how fracking risk perceptions influence policy 
preferences. However, risk perceptions predict policy support in other areas—such as climate 
change (Leiserowitz 2006; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher1999). To the best of my knowledge, no 
studies have examined how the perception of benefits influences policy attitudes using 
quantitative data. However, qualitative analyses suggest that communities may welcome the 
expansion of unconventional oil and gas extraction because of possible economic development 




perceive regulation as a threat to a beneficial industry. On the other hand, perceived risks are 
likely to increase support for regulations. This chapter tests two hypotheses regarding risk and 
benefits:  
Hypothesis 3: Colorado residents who perceive more risk related to unconventional oil 
and gas development are more willing to pay for regulation.. 
Hypothesis 4: Perceptions of benefits from unconventional oil and gas will reduce 
willingness to pay for additional regulation.  
  While it may seem rational that proximity to a source of risk or hazard will heighten risk 
perceptions or support for policies to address said risk there is limited support for this position in 
the literature. A range of social factors— uch as the framing of risk by media and local political 
leaders—determine the public response to a source of risk (Kasperson et. al. 1988; Masuda and 
Garvin 2006; Renn et. al. 1992; Zavestoski et. al. 2002; 2004). Malin (2013) showed that 
Pennsylvania farmers who sign leases with the oil and gas industry see the expansion of drilling 
as an inevitable, market-driven process, thereby blunting any community resistance. Thus, living 
in a toxic environment can become “normalized” (Auyero and Swinstun 2008). Hence, proximity 
to a source of risk will not necessarily lead to a response—such as policy support or social 
movement mobilization. Rather, unwelcome proximity or unfamiliarity is more likely to lead 
people towards efforts to ameliorate a source of risk (Bickerstaff 2004; Song and Schwartz 
2009). Informed by this literature, this chapter tests the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 5: Actual proximity to oil and gas drilling will have no effect on willingness 




Hypothesis 6: Unwanted proximity will increase willingness to pay for additional 
regulation. 
Environmental Valuation  
While sociologists have developed an impressive understanding of the individual and 
contextual factors that contribute to support for environmental policy, they are less apt to 
consider how features of a policy affect public support. Environmental and ecological 
economists, on the other hand, employ an array of techniques that uncover how characteristics of 
a policy influence whether people support it. A central question for environmental economics is 
environmental valuation, often in terms of what the public is willing to pay for a non-market 
good, such as environmental protection or environmental policy.  
 Some scholars critique the valuation of environmental protection as the “neoliberalization 
of nature;” the criticism is that by placing a dollar value on environmental protection, we are 
implicitly saying that environmental quality should be for sale as a type of consumer good. 
However, there are reasons to question whether environmental valuation leads to a cheapening of 
the environment. Fourcade (2011) studied the public response to large oil tanker spills in France 
and the U.S. She concluded that because the U.S. government employed valuation techniques, 
the punitive response to the oil industry for catastrophic accidents was much harsher than in 
France. Fourcade suggested that, from a Durkheimian perspective, environmental valuation 
“sacrilizes” the environmental as something worth being “set apart” (Fourcade 2011 p. 1770).  
 Environmental valuation can be understood as a larger part of a social process of 
commensuration; this is the process by which unlike items are increasingly compared with a 




Verschraegen 2014). This common metric is often, but not always, money (Dalsgaard 2013; 
Stephan 2012). To some degree, commensuration theory echoes the arguments of Simmel in the 
Philosophy of Money; Simmel argued that money increasingly underpins a relativistic 
understanding of the world (Simmel and Frisby 2004). Sociologists have already theoretically 
wrestled with questions of valuation and commensuration. Developing an empirical, sociological 
understanding of willingness to pay for environmental policy is a logical next step. To achieve 
this aim, I used the contingent valuation method (CVM), described further below. Regarding 
willingness to pay, I investigated the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 7: As the personal economic sacrifice increases, support for additional 
regulations will decline. 
DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS 
Data  
A random digit dial survey of Colorado residents gathered in the latter half of 2014 
provides the data used in this analysis. The sample included both landline and cell phones to 
guard against coverage bias. To represent residents of rural, high drilling areas I ranked 
Colorado’s counties by the number of active wells and I then created strata based upon that 
ordering. Next, I randomly sampled households within those strata. Roughly 400 respondents 
completed the survey for a 5% margin of error.  Using the most conservative response rate 
(AAPOR RR1), the response rate was 9%—this response rate is like that of other studies on 
energy and environmental issues (e.g. Clarke et. al. 2015; Pew 2014a, 2014b). A more inclusive 
response rate—AAPOR RR6—was 14%. While a greater response rate would have been ideal in 
that it would have resulted in a larger sample the current consensus among survey 




low response rates per se (Groves 2006; Keeter et. al. 2008; Rosen et. al. 2014; Wagner 2012). 
95% of respondents who began the survey completed it.  
The term “fracking” may elicit more visceral, negative responses than terms that are more 
neutral like “shale gas development” (Evensen et. al. 2014). However, Stoutenborough, 
Robinson and Vedlitz (2016) found no differences b tween “fracking” and “hydraulic 
fracturing”. As a further complication, the term “fracking” technically refers to a rather short-
term stage in the drilling process in which high volumes of water and chemicals shatter rock and 
trapped oil and gas. However, the public tends to use “fracking” to refer to the entire process of 
onshore, unconventional oil and gas development from exploration to the disposal of waste after 
drilling has ended. To avoid biasing the results, the survey instrument used the phrase “oil and 
gas activity” which was defined at the beginning of the survey as follows:   
“‘Oil and gas activity’ could refer to exploration, drilling using hydraulic fracturing or 
‘fracking,’ the transfer of oil and gas, and the storage of byproducts and waste.” 
Ideally, the definition provided at the onset of the survey will militate against the biases 
created by a stronger and less precise term like “fracking” while also being more specific than 
“development”. Throughout this chapter, I have used the term “fracking” as a useful short hand 
that reflects public understanding of the term. 
What is CVM?  
Bowen (1943) and Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) provided the groundwork for CVM. Both 
were concerned with how to price non-market goods such as land capes and soil quality. 
Separately, each advocated for the use of surveys to elicit preferences for public goods— 




based methodology whose purpose is to quantify the value that the public is willing to pay for an 
“unpriced,” non-market good like a natural amenity, ecosystem service, environmental policy, or 
biological diversity. The aim of a CVM study is to approximate the “price-taking” behavior of 
consumers in a market for more typical goods. The “contingent” in “contingent valuation” refers 
to the style of survey question used. Typically, a respondent is given a certain situation, a non-
market good, and a value for that non-market good. This type of instrument facilitates the 
calculation of willingness to pay (hereafter “WTP”) in explicit dollar terms. Aggregating WTP 
estimates, if the sample is representative, can give an estimate of public willingness to pay for a 
non-market good. Most often, CVM involves inserting a randomly varying dollar amount into a 
survey question as a type of survey experiment. 15,16 
                                                          
15 CVM has become enormously popular for a number of applications in ecological, environmental and natural 
resource economics. A google scholar search for “stated preference” produced 31,400 results. A similar search for 
“contingent valuation” produced 45,000 results. Applications include climate policy (Berrens et. al. 2004), 
transportation (Lambert et. al. 2001), fisheries (Wattage et. al. 2005), mountain biking areas (Fix and Loomis 1998), 
and forests (Lindhjem 2007). The EPA, USDA, and other government agencies have funded many studies.  
16 Although CVM is very popular within economics, it is not without its critics. Noted economist Jerry Hausman 
dismisses CVM almost entirely (e.g. Hausman 2012).While some economists dismiss CVM completely, others have 
offered more substantive critiques that have improved the methodology. After the controversy surrounding CVM 
and the Exxon Valdez oil spill, The National Academy of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences assembled an expert 
panel to assess the use of CVM in valuation (Arrow et. al. 1993). Ultimately, this panel of experts concluded that 
CVM has a role in understanding environmental valuation.  
Respondents may actually pay less if presented with the choice in the “real world” instead of in a survey—this is 
called “hypothetical bias”. Hypothetical bias may also exist when a respondent does not know much about the 
environmental amenity, ecosystem service, or policy in question, or i  p orly-designed surveys. In particular, 
studies that do not encourage the respondent to consider their own budget constraints may cause hypothetical bias. 
There are two common approaches to address hypothetical bias called ex-post and ex-ante (Aadland and Caplan 
2006; Murphy, Stevens and Weatherhead 2005). The first, called the ex-post approach, involves asking a series of 
questions after the WTP question to provide a sort of robustness check for the CVM instrument. Commonly, a 
respondent is asked to rate their degree of certainty with their WTP response. Another ex-post technique is to ask a 
question similar to, but not identical to, the CVM instrument to see if responses change. For example, after a WTP 
question a study might ask a similar valuation question. Another technique has ben to request actual payment after 
a WTP instrument.  
Ex-ante approaches involve carefully designed survey instruments and other parts of the survey to force respondents 
to contextualize their answer to the CVM question within their personal or household budget constraints. The ex-





The dependent variable assesses willingness to pay for increased inspections of oil and 
gas operations. In Colorado, the understaffed Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(COGCC) is responsible for inspections (Earthworks 2015; Ogburn 2013). While the estimates 
vary, most drilling locations go several years without a visit from an inspector (Earthworks 2015; 
Ogburn 2013). One proposed policy response to the fracking boom is increasing the frequency of 
inspections. Thus, the following question provides the dependent variable: 
“On average, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission inspects each oil and 
gas operation about once every three years. Now, I’d like you to think about a possible 
increase in your state income taxes to hire additional inspectors so that all oil and gas 
sites in Colorado could be inspected at least once per year. Thinking about your 
household’s finances, would you pay $X more in state income taxes PER YEAR to fund 
more frequent inspections of oil and gas operations?” 
The bid amount given by $X was randomly varied across respondents; responses were 
evenly split between “yes” and “no” but varied significantly across bid amounts.17 As shown in 
Table 3.1, at relatively low bid amounts, most respondents said, “yes,” but as cost increased, 
respondents were more likely to say, “no”. The bid amount was adjusted up or down throughout 
                                                          
respondent of their budget constraints and possible substitutes when applicable. Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and 
Gregory (1994) adopt both of these approaches but find no difference in WTP for groups exposed to reminders and 
those not exposed. Another approach to attenuating hypothetical bias, commonly called the “cheap talk” approach, 
stems from the work of Cummings and Taylor (1998; 1999). This approach involves an explicit description before 
the WTP instrument of the hypothetical bias problem. In other words, the study includes a block of text that tells 
respondents that people often overestimate their WTP. Further, hypothetical bias is lower when respondents believe 
that their answers will inform actual policy implementation (Vossler, Doyon and Rondau 2012). Most of these 
methodological issues remain unsettled. An example of cheap talk would be providing a detailed explanation of the 
hypothetical bias problem to the respondent and explaining that prior research has indicated that people tend to 
overestimate their willingness to pay. However, the actual effect of cheap talk scripts is not clear (Aadland and 
Capland 2006). In addition, I pre-tested a cheap talk script was removed after respondents reacted very negatively to 
it. CVM users continue to defend CVM and economists like Hausman, who dismissed CVM over two decades ago, 
continue their opposition.  





survey administration. I used the bid amount variable as a predictor of support in a binary 













                                                          
18 The present study assessed response certainty for respondents who answered “yes” to the inspections question 
using a scale from 1 (not at all certain) to 10 (completely certain). Average response certainty was 8.9. The 
inspections item also correlates moderately too strongly with several other policy items included in the survey 
instrument (polychoric correlations range from .4 to .8).  
19 Other studies which have used CVM to examine unconventional oil and gas policy include Bernstein et. al. 




Table 3.1 Willingness to pay for increased state 
income taxes for Inspections Tax 





2 5 5 10 50 
3 0 1 1 0 
5 6 3 9 67 
8 3 5 8 38 
10 3 7 10 30 
12 8 1 9 89 
15 4 5 9 44 
18 6 3 9 67 
20 17 11 28 61 
25 7 13 20 35 
28 10 8 18 56 
30 14 4 18 78 
35 4 5 9 44 
37 5 3 8 63 
40 10 8 18 56 
42 1 3 4 25 
45 4 5 9 44 
50 7 11 18 39 
55 5 5 10 50 
58 4 2 6 67 
60 10 6 16 63 
65 5 3 8 63 
70 12 6 18 67 
75 2 8 10 20 
80 11 15 26 42 
90 3 5 8 38 
100 6 0 6 100 
110 1 8 9 11 
125 13 19 32 41 
150 5 4 9 56 
175 3 7 10 30 
250 1 7 8 13 








Community Economic Identity. This chapter operationalized community economic 
identity (CEI) via questions that assess the perceived importance of a range of industries to a 
respondent’s local area. These industries include oil and gas activity, agriculture, tourism, 
manufacturing, brewing and distilling, alternative energy (like wind and solar), high technology 
(computers, software and internet-based firms), colleges and universities, and hospitals. These 
indicators allow for a multi-dimensional understanding of community economic identity.  
I utilized factor analysis to understand the underlying dimensions of these items. First, 
because all the relevant survey questions are ordinal, I calculated a polychoric correlation matrix. 
Then I used iterated principal factor extraction to factor the matrix and performed a varimax 
rotation. Tourism and manufacturing did not load strongly and had relatively low correlations 
with the other items. I treat these as standalone variables for the analysis. An additional factor 
analysis indicated that oil and gas activity loaded on a single factor, and colleges and 
universities, hospitals and medicine, wind and solar, high-technology, and brewing and distilling 
loaded on a second item; these were combined i to an additive scale with Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.63; I call this scale CEI-Other. Agriculture, on the other hand, had ambiguous cross-
loadings across factors and I excluded it from further scale development and included it as a 
standalone predictor in the regression models estimated below. I treated the perceived 
importance of the oil and gas industry as a stand-alone item in the analysis reported below. These 
variables tested Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Risk and Benefits. Unconventional oil and gas extraction is associated with a range of 
risks and benefits in the public mind (e.g. Brasier et. al. 2011; Jacquet 2012). The survey 




air and water quality, community quality of life, road traffic, land use, noise pollution, and real 
estate values. Risk perceptions are highest for environmental problems and wildlife/livestock 
health. Both exploratory factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha confirmed that a single latent 
variable underlay these items. An additive scale with Cronbach’s Alpha = .94 was constructed to 
examine Hypothesis 3.  
I captured benefit perceptions using a series of items that included community quality of 
life, job creation, tax revenue, energy independence from foreign oil, investments in 
infrastructure, reducing household energy expenses, and promoting cleaner energy. As with risk, 
respondents perceived many benefits. Like risk, the Cronbach’s alpha for these items was quite 
high (0.89), and exploratory factor analysis indicated a single factor solution. An additive benefit 
scale variable is included as a predictor to test Hypothesis 4.  
Individuals can also become accustomed to living in proximity to potentially harmful 
industrial an extractive activity—familiar risks are less likely to produce a public response 
(Bickerstaff 2004; Song and Schwartz 2009). For this reason, I included a variable for unwanted 
proximity. Respondents were asked: “Do you feel oil and gas activity is too close to where you 
live?” (0=no, 1=yes). This question will facilitate the testing of hypothesis 5. To examine 
hypothesis 6, I calculated each respondent’s distance to the nearest active oil and gas well in 
miles using a GIS shape file from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC 
2014); because I did not have exact street addresses for the anonymous respondents I assigned 
them to the latitude and longitude of their zip code population centroid. Respondents varied quite 
extensively on this variable from .07 to 28 miles. 
Control Variables. Trust in government institutions has been shown to increase support 




Wallin, and Johansson 2015), while persons who trust in industries tend to have lower risk 
perception and potentially lower support for regulatory policy (Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Roth 
2000; Whitfield et. al. 2009). Respondents assessed their degree of trust in the oil and gas 
industry to operate safely (1=no trust, 4= a great deal of trust). The survey also assessed trust in 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC), the primary regulatory body of oil 
and gas development in Colorado. Environmental groups argue that the COGCC favors the oil 
and gas industry (Cook 2014, 2015), and laypeople who have filed complaints against the 
industry with the agency report that the agency is ineffective and favors the side of industry in 
disputes (Shelley and Opsal 2014). Trust in the COGCC was assessed with a survey item where 
1=no trust and 4= a great deal of trust. Respondents who own their own home may believe that 
oil and gas development will threaten its value—thus, I used a variable for homeownership 
(0=respondent did not own their home, 1= respondent did own their home).  
Controls for sex (0=male, 1=female); age in years, education (0= less than high school, 
6=graduate degree); income (0=less than $50,000, 1=$50,000 to $99,999, 2= $100,000 or more); 
race (0=non-white, 1=white); and political affiliation (0=not conservative, 1=conservative) are 





Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables  
Variable Name Description Mean  SD 
Risks 
Scale (Cronbach's Alpha=.94) from the following items: 
community quality of 
life, road traffic, air or water quality, land use, noise pollution, 
human health, wildlife/ livestock health, and housing values 
1.42 0.67 
Benefits 
Scale (Cronbach's Alpha=.89) constructed from following items: 
community quality of life, job creation, tax revenue, infrastructure 
investment, energy independence from foreign oil, the 
development of clean energy, and lower energy costs 
1.93 0.63 
Unwanted Proximity 
Do you feel oil and gas activity is too close to where you live? 
(0=no, 1=yes)  
0.109 0.312 
Distance to Nearest 
Well 
Author's calculation from COGCC data 3.449 4.124 
Trust-Oil and Gas 
Industry 
How much do you trust the oil and gas industry to operate safely? 
(1=no trust, 4= a great deal of trust)  
2.777 0.979 
Trust-COGCC  
How much do you trust the COGCC to provide neutral oversight 
of oil and gas activity? (0=very little to no trust, 1= A great deal to 
some trust)  
0.763 0.426 
CEI-Other 
Scale (Cronbach’s Alpha=.63) constructed from the following CEI 
items: colleges and universities, hospitals and medicine, wind and 
solar, high-technology, and brewing and distilling 
1.64 0.68 
CEI- Oil and Gas 
How important is oil and gas activity to your local area? (0=not at 
all important, 4=very important 
0.503 0.501 
Sex 1=male, 2=female 1.478 0.5 
Conservative 







What is the highest level of education you have received? (0= less 
than high school, 6=graduate degree) 
4.453 1.368 
Income 
What is your total household income before taxes? (0=less than 
$25,000, 6= greater than $150,000)  
1.062 0.799 
Age Age in years (author's calculation)  51.652 16.25 
White What is your race or ethnicity? (0=non-white, 1=white) 0.825 0.381 







Because the dependent variable is binary, I employed binary logistic regression. The 
experimental bid amount was included as a predictor and I adopted a stepwise model building 
strategy to understand the relative contribution of each group of variables. In binary logistic 
regression models, data sparseness can cause bias in the parameter estimates, and in more severe 
cases can lead to separation problems and even non-convergence (Albert and Anderson 1984; 
Peduzzi et. al. 1996). To avoid including unnecessary predictors in the models, I conducted an 
exploratory correlational analysis using polychoric correlations. I used polychoric correlations 
because most of the variables are categorical. Variables that correlated weakly with the outcome 
are not included in the binary logistic regression models. Table 3.3 displays these correlations.  
Bivariate Correlations  
Table 3.3 Polychoric Correlations of Predictor Variables 
with Inspections Tax 
Bid Amount ($) -0.17** 
CEI-Other 0.13 





Distance to Nearest Well 0.01 
Unwanted Proximity 0.58** 
Trust-COGCC -0.25 







Home Ownership  -.11 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01  
 
The bivariate correlations indicated that several possible predictors correlate very weakly 
with Inspections Tax and I excluded them from the regression models. These variables are 




(rho= -0.03) as do education (rho=-0.01), being white (rho=-0.07), female sex (rho=0.12) age 
(rho=-0.13), home ownership (rho=-.11) and distance to the nearest well (rho=0.01). Given their 
lack of correlation, these variables were not included in the regression models. Unsurprisingly, 
the bid amount is negatively correlated with support but the relationship is rather weak (rho=-
0.17). On the other hand, several predictors correlate relatively strongly with Inspections Tax. 
Risk perceptions are associated with increased support (rho=0.58) while benefit perceptions have 
a similar correlation in a negative direction (rho=-0.51).  
Before proceeding with the regression models, it is important to determine if some 
respondents might object to the payment vehicle in question—increased taxes.  A follow-up 
question queried respondent’s support for charging the oil and gas industry a fee to fund 
increased inspections. Seventy-three percent supported this policy and about 23% of the “no” 
responses to the dependent variable supported charging the industry a fee. Thus, a minority of 
respondents appears supportive of increasing oversight yet do not wish to bear the cost. Table 3.4 
provides the average bid amount by support for charging industry a fee. The average bid amount 
is roughly the same in each category, suggesting that protest votes are not sensitive to the size of 
the tax increase.  
Table 3.4 Average Bid Amount by Support for 
Charging fee to Oil and Gas Industry.  
Strongly Support 58.66 
Support 61.52 
Oppose 59.60 
Strongly Oppose 57.21 
 
Regression Models. In this section, I present a series of binary logistic regression models. 
The first model included the controls for trust, income, and political ideology. In the next model, 




economic identity related to the oil and gas industry. The third model tested for the “colliding 
treadmills” hypothesis by adding community economic identity around agriculture to the 
previous model. Finally, the fourth model included the risk and benefit perception scales and 
unwanted proximity, while dropping unnecessary variables from previous models. I then 
estimated predicted probabilities from this final model to understand the regression results more 
fully.  
Table 3.5 reports modelling results. All models adjusted for the complex sampling design 
and included appropriate probability weights. Motivated by concerns about bias due to the 
relatively small sample size and number of predictors, I bootstrapped the standard errors using 
5,000 replications.20 Variance inflation factors did not exceed 2.1, indicating that the models 









                                                          
20 Bootstrapping involves drawing samples with replacement from the sample data. The reported standard error is 




   Table 3.5 Binary Logistic Regression Models for Inspections Tax 
 Model 1 Model 2       Model 3 Model 4 
 b(se) b(se) b(se) b(se) 
Bid Amount ($)  -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.007** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Income (ref. less than $50,000)    
  $50,000-$100,000 -0.993** -0.952** -1.031** -0.827* 
  (0.421) (0.450) (0.470) (0.430) 
  More than $100,000 -0.509 -0.505 -0.458 -0.371 
  (0.406) (0.439) (0.457) (0.413) 
Conservative  -0.910*** -0.884** -0.957*** -0.820** 
  (0.342) (0.354) (0.368) (0.348) 
Trust-Oil and Gas industry (ref. No trust)    
  Very little trust -0.657 -0.512 -0.629 0.105 
  (0.675) (0.699) (0.752) (0.785) 
  Some trust  -1.957*** -1.805*** -1.895*** -0.791 
  (0.609) (0.634) (0.704) (0.783) 
  Great deal of trust -2.819*** -2.594*** -2.736*** -1.303 
  (0.693) (0.718) (0.807) (0.884) 
CEI-Oil and Gas (ref. Not at all important)    
      
  Somewhat important  -0.351 0.017  
   (0.480) (0.596)  
  Important   -0.354 -0.214  
   (0.413) (0.474)  
  Very important  -0.643 -0.611  
   (0.460) (0.551)  
CEI-Agriculture (ref. Not at all important)    
    -1.419*  
  Somewhat important   (0.804)  
    -0.587  
  Important    (0.565)  
    -0.423  
  Very important   (0.617)  
      
Risks     0.848** 
     (0.408) 
Benefits     -0.100 
     (0.410) 
Unwanted Proximity    0.844 
     (1.183) 
N  404 404 404 404 





Results. Model 1 included only the bid amount variable, income, trust, and political 
ideology. As the cost ascribed to more frequent inspections rises, support decreases (b=-0.006)—
though this effect is not significant at conventional alpha levels (p=0.065). Higher income 
persons and political conservatives were less likely to endorse increasing inspections. As trust in 
the oil and gas industry increases, support for Inspections Tax declines.  
Model 2 added the CEI-oil and gas variable and retained all the predictors from the prior 
model. People who believe the oil and gas industry is significant to their area are less likely to 
endorse increased inspections but this effect did not approach statistical significance. The effects 
of the bid amount, income, political affiliation and trust in the industry were remarkably like 
Model 1. For instance, the effect of “great deal of trust” compared to “no trust” is nearly 
identical between Model 1 and Model 2 (b=-2.819 vs. b=-2.594). The relative stability of these 
coefficients suggests that the exclusion of community economic identity regarding the oil and 
gas industry does not induce omitted variable bias.  
Though it was not significant in the prior model CEI-Oil and Gas is included in Model 3 
and I added CEI-Agriculture. Neither of these variables appeared to have important effects in 
this model. The coefficient for the bid amount is roughly the same though its p-value was 
inflated. Income remains relevant; as income increases, people are less willing to pay additional 
taxes, though this effect is strongest for the $50,000-$100,000 group.  
Because models 2 and 3 indicated that community economic identity did not predict 
support for inspections, I dropped these variables in Model 4 and added the risk and benefit 
perception variables. Despite the inclusion of risk and benefit variables, political conservatism 
still had a powerful, downward effect (b= -0.820, p<.05). Prior models demonstrated that trust in 




the risk and benefit variables obliterated this effect; in this model, it appears that trust has almost 
no role.21 Risk perceptions, on the other hand, were positively associated with support, while 
benefit perceptions had a much smaller coefficient that did not reach statistical significance (b=-
0.100, p=0.601). Unwanted proximity also appeared to have negligible effect.  
Logit coefficients are notoriously difficult to interpret, so I calculated predicted 
probabilities derived from model 4 reported in Figure 3.1. The first panel of Figure 3.1 displays 
average predicted probabilities of support for inspections when the risk perception scale is set to 
its lowest value (1), its midpoint (2.5), and its highest value (5) plotted against Bid Amount ($). I 
held all other variables at their observed values. Though conservative political ideology was a 
control variable, its robust effect across model specifications needs further attention. To better 
grasp the effect of conservative political affiliation on support for Inspection, I display 
probabilities of support plotted against Bid Amount ($) for conservatives and non-conservatives 
in panel 2 of figure 3.1. For these calculations, I again held other variables at their observed 
values.  
  
                                                          
21 The attenuation of trust in the oil and gas industry deserves further discussion. One possibility for this null effect 
is that individuals who trust the industry to operate safely may not feel the need for further inspections but are not 
necessarily opposed to additional inspections. That is, trusting individuals may assume that because the industry is 





Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities for Inspections 
The first panel of Figure 3.1 shows that risk perception increases support for Inspections 
Tax independent of the effect of the cost of the policy, but support declines across all risk 
perception groups as cost increases. Indeed, if risk perceptions are high and costs are negligible, 
the predicted probability of support verges upon 1, while if risk perceptions are low and Bid 
Amount ($) is also low, the probability of support is less than 0.6. The second panel shows a 
consistent downward effect of being politically conservative on support regardless of costs. 
Indeed, when the bid amount was especially high, conservatives were extremely unlikely to 





























































In this chapter, I sought to develop an understanding of the factors that drive public 
support for oversight of unconventional oil and gas development, while using an experimental 
technique called contingent valuation to understand how the cost ascribed to a policy effects 
support. The theoretical background included a focus on the political economy of place, 
manifested in the concept of community economic identity, and other possible predictors such as 
risk and benefit perceptions and actual and unwanted proximity to oil and gas drilling.  
The results above suggest that, counter to Hypotheses 1 and 2, community economic 
identity did little to explain support for oil and gas regulation. The correlation between 
Inspections Tax and community economic identity related to industries other than oil and gas 
was so low that I did not include the relevant variable in any of the models. Thus, I find no 
support for Hypothesis 1: “colliding treadmills” did not appear to be a factor in fracking policy 
within Colorado. In other words, there was no evidence that support for regulating the oil and gas 
industry arises because the respondents believed it threatened other industries.  
The bivariate correlation between community economic identity associated with oil and 
gas and Inspections Tax was somewhat stronger, but this variable had little impact when 
controlling for the other variables in Models 2 and 3. Thus, the results lend no support to 
Hypothesis 2. To some degree, the null findings for community economic identity may be a 
function of the operationalization of this concept developed for this project. Bell and York 
(2010) rely on qualitative data to formulate the initial conceptualization of community economic 
identity. The only other quantitative, survey-based study of this topic, Blaacker, Woods and 
Oliver (2012), used a different set of survey questions, a convenience sample of college students, 




the perceived historical and contemporary significance of the oil and gas industry to an area, 
likely has some impact on oil and gas policy preferences, but the present operationalization of 
community economic identity may need improvement. Also, it is possible that community 
economic identity centered on oil and gas extraction might reduce support for highly stringent 
regulation—such as levying heavy fines or restricting drilling in some areas—while it has little 
effect on a relatively noninvasive policy like increasing the frequency of inspection to once per 
year.  
I also hypothesized that risk perceptions have a positive influence on support (Hypothesis 
3), and that benefit perceptions reduce support (Hypothesis 4). There is unambiguous support for 
Hypothesis 3: respondents with heightened risk perceptions were highly supportive of increasing 
the frequency at which oil and gas operations are inspected. Benefit perceptions, on the other 
hand, do not play much of a role in determining whether someone supports Inspections Tax. 
Thus, there was no support for Hypothesis 4. It appears that even individuals who ascribe a great 
deal of benefits to oil and gas development are still willing to regulate the industry, net of other 
predictors. 
Moving forward, I found that actual proximity to oil and gas drilling, operationalized as 
miles to the nearest well, had almost no correlation with Inspections Tax. Indeed, I did not 
include this variable in the regression model because the correlation was so low. Unwanted 
proximity did have some bivariate correlation, as shown in Table 3.2, yet it had almost no effect 
in the regression models presented in Table 3.3. Thus, support for increasing the rate of 
inspections did not hinge upon the closeness of oil and gas operations, or if said operations were 
unwelcome. These findings run counter to Hypotheses 5 and 6 were I hypothesized that both 




I also hypothesized that as the bid amount rose, support for Inspections Tax would 
decline (Hypothesis 7). In all model specifications, the cost ascribed to the policy was negatively 
associated with support; hence, there is strong support for Hypothesis 7. These unique results 
suggest that as a policy becomes commensurate—that is, as its costs rises—support for said 
policy will decline. I suggest that future research attend to questions of valuation, as it appears 
that cost had relatively strong and consistent predictive power in the models; its effect was 
virtually unaltered by the inclusion of various sets of other predictors.  
The controls also reveal important findings. Household income deserves further 
discussion. The bivariate correlation between income and Inspections Tax indicated that higher 
income persons are less willing to pay taxes to improve oversite of oil and gas facilities, and the 
downward effect of income was robust across the logistic regression models. In other words, 
those who had the most ability to pay were the least willing to pay. One possible explanation for 
this surprising finding is that higher-income individuals may be relatively insulated from the 
potential deleterious impacts of fracking and thus have lower willingness to pay. Another 
possibility is that the income group which was most resistant to inspections, those making 
$50,000-$100,000 per year in household income, may believe that they are the most likely to 
benefit economically from oil and gas development via direct employment or oil and gas leases. 
As discussed above, political ideology also has a powerful impact on whether a respondent 
endorses inspections that are more frequent. O her socio-demographics have almost no 
association.  
These results indicated that sociologists should more aggressively grapple with questions 
of environmental valuation. Fourcade (2011) argued that environmental valuation might bolster 




policy—even when it entails a cost to them—may be more committed in their support. People 
undoubtedly face trade-offs between their household finances and environmental protection. By 
accessing CVM from environmental economics, this manuscript is a first step towards 
establishing an empirical sociology of environmental valuation—a d, more broadly, a sociology 
of tradeoffs faced in environmental policy formation. Moving forward, I suggest that sociologists 
devote more attention to environmental valuation and quantifying willingness to sacrifice for 
environmental policy and environmental protection. This chapter also contributes to the 
scholarship on the social aspects of the unconventional oil and gas boom and is one of the first 
quantitative applications of community economic identity. There is a need for more research to 
understand the role of the political economy of place in informing public policy preferences for 
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CH. 4 WHO SHOULD BE IN CHARGE? GOVERNANCE SCALE PREFERENCES FOR OIL 
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 
 
SUMMARY 
 Environmental governance has been increasing devolved from centralized, relatively 
powerful governments to lower levels of government with limited resources. Further, governance 
has been increasing shifted to industry, particularly in the case of oil and gas development, were 
there are significant exemptions from federal oversight. The purpose of this chapter was to 
understand what level of government (i.e. local, state or federal) Coloradoans believed should 
regulate the oil and gas industry (“governance scale preferences”).  A series of exemptions from 
various aspects of federal environmental and health regulations has left oversight primarily in the 
hands of states. The state government of Colorado, in tandem with the oil and gas industry, has 
taken legal action against cities that have passed their own oil and gas development regulations. 
Descriptive results indicated that few Coloradoans support federal exemptions while many 
respondents endorse local regulation. Further, few variables have consistent results in the binary 
logistic regression models.  
INTRODUCTION  
Directional drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has caused an 
unprecedented boom in domestic oil and gas production since the mid-2000s. This boom has met 
with much controversy because of risks to public health (Colborn, et. al. 2011; Hill 2014; 
Kassotis et. al. 2013; Jamieleta et. al. 2015; Perry 2012; Rabinowitz et. al. 2015) and the 
environment (Ferrar et. al. 2013; Holzman 2011; Howarth, Santoro and Ingraffea 2015; Paulik 




it can contribute to job growth (Driessen 2013; Energy from Shale 2015; Lee 2015), lower 
energy prices (Krupnick 2014), and provide tax revenue (Newell and Raimi 2015).22  
 The current regulatory regime for unconventional oil and gas extraction is reflective of a 
broader trend in environmental governance towards neoliberalization, devolution and re-
regulation to protect corporate profitability (Castree 2008; Harvey 2005; Jonas and Bridge 2003; 
McCarthy 2004; Prudham 2003). Unconventional oil and gas development is exempt from many 
federal environmental and health regulations—perhaps the most significant of these is the 
“Halliburton Loophole” embedded in the 2005 Energy Policy Act (Anderson 2012; Nolon and 
Gavin 2013; Kraft, Stephen and Abel 2011; Rabe and Borick 2013; Werner and Shapiro 2013). 
This federal policy vacuum devolved regulatory power to states and municipalities that struggle 
to grapple with how to regulate the rapid expansion of unconventional oil and gas extraction. 
Current regulations vary substantially from state to state (Cook 2014; Davis 2012; Davis and 
Fisk 2012; Fisk 2013; Rabe 2014; Rinfret, Cook and Pautz 2014; Zirogiannis et. al. 2016). For 
instance, Wyoming has encouraged unconventional oil and gas development while 
simultaneously levying high severance taxes while Colorado has a regulatory regime that is 
generally more stringent but with lower taxes (Headwaters 2014).  
 Because of the void in federal regulation, there has been a great deal of contestation 
around what level of government (e.g. federal, state or local) should regulate oil and gas 
development—particularly within the state of Colorado. The official position of the Colorado 
state government and the oil and gas industry is that the state should control all, or most, 
                                                          
22 Kinnamon (2011) reviewed estimates of the economic impact of fracking and found that the industry has over-
stated job growth. Oil and gas development contributes to local job creation and economic growth in the short to 
medium run (Munasib and Rickman 2014; Paredes, Kamorek and Loveridge 2015; Weber 2012) though areas which 




regulations pertaining to development. That is, state regulators and the industry prefer a 
regulatory regime that devolves power from the federal government but does not allow for local 
oversight. Indeed, the state government has pursued legal action against municipalities, such as 
Longmont and Fort Collins, who have passed bans on fracking within city limits or otherwise 
sought to regulate development (Minor 2014). The extent of local efforts to ban or oversee the 
industry indicates that Coloradoans may prefer a flexible governance regime that allows for local 
control. 
 Theoretical inquiry has identified neoliberalization and devolution as two dominant 
trends in governance since the 1980s (Harvey 2005; Castree 2010, 2011) and case study research 
describes the unfolding of these processes (e.g. Fry, Brannsrtom and Murphy 2015; McCarthy 
1995; Prudhom 2004). However, we know relatively little about how publics that are effected by 
neoliberalization and devolution feel about that matter. That is, little research has examined 
public preferences regarding what level of government should oversee regulating the oil and gas 
industry; in other words, we do not understand public preferences for governance scale on this 
topic. Further, we do not know whether the public supports current exemptions for oil and gas 
development from federal environmental and health regulations. The purpose of this chapter was 
to fill this void by using Colorado-wide survey data and outcome variables related to governance 
scale preferences, while accounting for known predictors of policy attitudes. Due to the ongoing 
friction between state and local governments on oil and gas regulations Colorado is an ideal 
location to conduct this research. The next section further describes the regulatory climate for oil 







Neoliberal Environments The late 1970s and early 1980s marked the rise of the “neoliberal” turn 
in governance with the rise of Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the 
U.K. Castree notes that scholars have used conflicting definitions of the term “neoliberalism” 
(Castree 2010; 2011). Broadly, it refers to changing governance regimes in which policy-makers 
pursue “re-regulation” to promote corporate profitability in the name of free markets.  This 
process often occurs in tandem with devolution or the “hallowing out” of the state—that is, 
central regulatory authorities are increasingly defunded or their regulatory capacity is otherwise 
muted (Peck 2001; Jessop 2004). Neoliberalization is a chaotic, uneven process were previously 
stable regulatory regimes are replaced with a disordered, fragmented and conflicted system of 
governance involving multiple stakeholders whose interests are often at odds (Birch and 
Mykhnenko 2009; Pellizoni 2011)  
This process is evident in the current regulatory environment for unconventional oil and 
gas. Federal regulations would apply to fracking if not for a series of exemptions. These include 
partial exemptions buried in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (), as 
well as in loopholes for toxic release inventory reporting requirements (Kraft, Stephen and Abel 
2011). Perhaps the most significant is the so-called “Halliburton Loophole” in the 2005 Energy 
Policy Act, which absolves reporting requirements for chemicals (except for diesel fuel) used in 
the hydraulic fracturing process from the Safe Drinking Water Act (Werner and Shapiro 2013). 
The hands-off approach of the federal government has resulted in a fragmented regulatory 
landscape in which states are primarily in charge of developing and implementing oversight of 




capacity to regulate effectively (Cook 2014; Davis 2012; Davis and Fisk 2012; Fisk 2013; Rabe 
2014; Rinfret, Cook and Pautz 2014; Zirogiannis, et. al. 2016).  
 Within Colorado, the primary state regulatory body for the oil and gas industry is the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC); the agency has a “dual mandate” to 
promote oil and gas drilling, while also safeguarding public health and the environment (Stokols 
2013). COGCC typically creates regulations in a rule-making process that involves receiving ad 
hoc input from stakeholder groups. Cook (2014; 2015) interviewed industry representatives, 
environmental groups, and COGCC officials who participated in rule making. Cook’s research 
characterized the COGCC’s rule-making process as relatively open to a variety of perspectives, 
but, ultimately, the industry holds more influence than other stakeholders (Cook 2014: 2015). 
Opsal and Shelley (2014) conducted an exhaustive analysis of the COGCC’s complaint database 
and interviewed several Colorado residents who had filed formal complaints with the agency 
against the industry. The authors found that the state often “dilutes” complaints against the oil 
and gas industry by minimizing the extent of citizen grievances.  
  Perhaps because of lax state regulations or lack of enforcement, several Colorado 
municipalities have attempted to regulate oil and gas development. In fall 2014, four cities had 
citizen-led petitions to create city ordinances to ban (temporarily or permanently) hydraulic 
fracturing and related activities. In Broomfield, for example, the proposed ordinance banned 
hydraulic fracturing and the storage of waste materials for five years (Broomfield 2015). In 
Boulder, the ordinance extended the preexisting fracking ban until 2018 to allow for more time 
for the city to assess the impacts of local oil and gas development (City of Boulder 2015). 
Earlier, Boulder County had commissioned a study that found that tax revenue generated by oil 




County 2015). Lafayette residents proposed a permanent ban on all oil and gas activity within 
city limits (City of Lafayette 2015). Finally, earlier, in 2012, the city of Longmont voted to ban 
hydraulic fracturing and the storage of waste products within city limits; the Longmont 
regulations served as a template for other municipal oil and gas regulations (Enockson 2014). 
The state government and the oil and gas industry have sought legal action against these cities 
(Minor 2014).  
 In contrast to citizen-led ballot initiatives, Commerce City  enacted a drilling ordinance 
that works on a case-by-case basis, while prohibiting drilling near two wildlife refuges (Robles 
2012). Thus, companies with an interest in drilling in the city must negotiate agreements with the 
city government. Unlike the bans and moratoria passed in Longmont, Broomfield, Lafayette, 
Boulder, and Fort Collins, neither the state regulators nor the oil and gas industry have 
challenged Commerce City’s ordinance.  
 The ballot initiatives all passed. Fifty-five percent of Fort Collins voters and 58% of 
Lafayette voters voted to ban fracking, while the Broomfield initiative passed with only 20 votes 
(City of Broomfield 2015). Support was more resounding in Boulder with 76% voting to extend 
the city’s moratorium on oil and gas development (City of Boulder 2015). The oil and gas 
industry spent an estimated $900,000 to fight these bans (Noon 2013).  
 Hence, the oil and gas industry and local municipalities have waged pitched legal battles 
about strengthening regulations at the local level. Yet residents of some areas of Colorado have 
resisted existing state regulation as overly onerous and damaging to the industry and their local 
economies. In 2013, a group of local politicians from Weld County, CO threatened to secede 




(Whaley 2013).23 This movement was largely symbolic, yet it does highlight the extremely 
divergent response to state regulation of the oil and gas industry within Colorado: some 
municipalities want local control to increase regulation, while others want local control to reduce 
the stringency of current state regulations. Hence, some communities have actively resisted 
neoliberal governance of unconventional oil and gas, while others have embraced neoliberal 
governance. Still, despite the volume of research on neoliberalism and devolution we know little 
about the perspectives of people living under these regimes. The next section considered the 
broader literature on environmental policy attitudes.  
Predictors of Policy Attitudes 
Risks and Benefits. As noted in the introduction, the public perceives a complex array of 
environmental, health, and quality of life risks from fracking, yet associates fracking with several 
benefits such as job creation, tax revenue, and reducing domestic reliance on foreign oil (Brasier 
et. al. 2013; Ceresola and Crowe 2015; Crowe, Silva, Ceresola, Buday and Leonard 2015; 
Jacquet 2012; Jacquet and Stedman 2013; Schaft, Borlu and Glenna 2013; Silva and Crowe 
2015). In the prior research, risk or benefit perceptions are dependent variables, but it stands to 
reason that risk and benefit perceptions also have a role in predicting policy attitudes. To the best 
of my knowledge, no studies have connected risk and benefit perceptions to governance scale 
preferences for fracking. However, risk perceptions do increase support for policies related to 
other environmental problems—such as climate change—in that individuals who think that 
climate change is dangerous are more likely to support policies to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions or adapt to a changing climate system (Leiserowitz 2006; Lubell 2006; Lubell, Zahran 
                                                          
23 Oil and gas regulations were only one of many concerns spurring the secession movement. The state also moved 
towards legalizing gay marriage and started regulating assault rifles—th e changes also helped mobilize local 




and Vedlitz 2006; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; Semenza et. al. 2008; Stoutenborough, 
Sturgess and Vedlitz 2013; Stoutenborough, Vedlitz and Liu 2015). Thus, it is likely that persons 
who believe that fracking is risky are supportive of regulations for the process. On the other 
hand, benefit perceptions have received less attention in the prior literature but it is possible that 
people who believe that fracking is beneficial will be more resistant to policies that might 
threaten the extent of drilling.  
Community Economic Identity. Much research documents public resistance against 
socially or ecologically harmful industries or has grappled with why mobilization does not occur 
(McAdam and Boudet 2012; Wright and Boudet 2012; Zavestovski et. al. 2002; Zavestovski.et. 
al. 2004). Less research has considered mobilization in favor of potentially toxic industrial or 
extractive industries; Bell and York (2010) provided a notable exception. Examining the coal 
industry in Appalachia, the authors argued that West Virginians have developed a collective 
sense of identity around the industry; West Virginians see coal as economically significant and 
important in a socio-cultural sense. Bell and York use the term “co munity economic identity” 
to refer to this perceived collective significance of the coal industry. The authors suggested that 
community economic identity related to coal accounts, at least in part, for why West Virginians 
often rally in support of the industry. Other research, while not invoking the phrase “community 
economic identity,” demonstrated that people will mobilize in support of industries that they 
deem historically, economically, or culturally significant (Cabrejas 2013; Ladd 2013, 2014; 
Malin 2014, 2015). To the best of my knowledge, no studies have asked how community 
economic identity influences policy attitudes. However, it is plausible that communities that have 
adopted a collective identity around the oil and gas industry may be more resistant to regulating 




Political Ideology and Socio-demographics. Political ideology is an important predictor 
of attitudes towards environmental and technological issues (Kahan et. al. 2007; Kellstedt, 
Zahran and Vedlitz 2008; Stoutenborough, Sturgess and Vedlitz 2013; Yeo et. al. 2014; Zia and 
Todd 2010). In recent years, public opinion regarding some environmental issues, particularly 
climate change, has become highly partisan (McCright and Dunlap 2008; 2011). Regarding 
energy, conservatives are less supportive of renewable energy and more supportive of fossil fuel 
extraction (Dietz, Dan and Schwom 2013; Kotchen, Boyle and Leiserowitz 2013) and less likely 
to engage in energy efficiency behaviors (Gromet, Kunreuther and Larrick 2013; Newell and 
Silkamaki 2013). Moreover, environmental and technological attitudes hinge upon socio-
demographic factors such as age, race, education, income, and sex (e. g. Finucane et. al. 2000; 
Shelley,Chiricos and Gertz 2011; McCright 2010; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Xiao and McCright 
2012). While I suspected that socio-demographics and political ideology are likely important 
predictors of governance scale preferences, the literature has not examined this relationship.  
DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS 
 To understand public preferences for who should regulate the oil and gas industry, I 
relied on a random digit dial survey conducted in fall 2014 (n=404). The sample included both 
cell phones and landlines, and purposefully over-sampled rural, high-drilling regions of the state; 
as such, the data is not entirely generalizable to the state population but does represent the views 
of residents who live near fracking operations.24 The research team conducted exhaustive 
cognitive pre-testing, and interviewers delivered the survey in both English and Spanish. Using 
the most conservative calculation possible, the response rate was 9%; for a 5% margin of error; 
                                                          
24 Colorado’s population distribution is spatially skewed; the majority of the state’s population lives in the Denver 
metropolitan area which has very little drilling. Unless the sample size was unusually large, a truly representative 




this response rate is roughly like nationally representative polls related to policy issues (e.g. Pew 
2015a; 2015b; Clarke et. al. 2015). A more expansive response rate—AAPOR RR6—assumes 
that cases of non-response are ineligible. Using this formula, the response rate was 14%.  
Response rates and data quality are distinct issues (Groves 2006; Keeter et. al. 2008; Rosen et. al. 
2014; Wagner 2012)—that is, a low response rate does not mean that sample data is biased nor 
does a high response rate mitigate against biases which results from a poor sample design. The 
completion rate was 95%.  
Evensen et. al. (2014) reported that question wording can bias respondents—they found 
that the word “fracking” elicited much more negative response than the phrase “shale gas 
development”. Alternatively, Stoutenborough, Robinson and Vedlitz (2016) observed no 
difference between the terms “fracking” and “hydraulic fracturing”. The survey instrument for 
this project used the phrase “oil and gas activity” and interviewers explained that this term 
referred to exploration, drilling, and the disposal of waste. Ideally, this wording guarded against 
the biases observed by Evensen et. al. (2014).  
Dependent Variables 
 A series of questions assessed Coloradoans’ governance scale preferences. Respondents 
rated the following statements from strongly agree to strongly disagree: 
• “Towns should be able to relax regulations on oil and gas activity.” 
• “Towns should be able to pass stricter regulations on oil and gas activity.” 
• “The state government should have control over all regulations involving oil and gas 
activity.” 




 The first two of these questions assessed whether respondents believed that 
municipalities should be able to govern the industry, by either reducing or intensifying 
regulations.25 The next question captured whether respondents feel that the state government 
should control all oil and gas regulations. Finally, respondents were asked about federal 
exemptions from environmental and health regulations.  
Table 4.1 displays the distribution of these variables in percentages. A small majority 
(53%) strongly agreed or agreed that towns should be able to relax existing regulations on the oil 
and gas industry, while a larger majority (70%) agreed or strongly agreed that towns should be 
able to pass stricter regulations. On the other hand, there was limited support for centering 
regulatory power in the state; only 47% of respondents “strongly agree” or “agree.” The results 
were even starker regarding federal exemptions. Here, only 12% strongly agreed or agreed that 
oil and gas development should be exempt from federal environment and health laws.  
Table 4.1 Distribution of Governance Scale Items 
 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 % % % % 
Towns-relax regulations 10.77 43.08 30.77 15.38 
Towns-stricter regulations 16.67 52.53 22.98 7.83 
State control  10.29 36.68 43.27 9.76 




                                                          
25 I chose “town” over “municipality” after cognitive pre-testing indicated that “municipality” might be confusing 





 Risk and Benefit Perceptions. As noted earlier, the public perceives an array of risks and 
benefits related to fracking. Interviewers asked respondents about the following benefits: 
community quality of life, job creation, tax revenue, infrastructure investment, energy 
independence from foreign oil, the development of clean energy, and lower energy costs using 
likert-type response categories. These items were combined into a scale with Cronbach’s alpha = 
.89. Risk perceptions included community quality of life, road traffic, air or water quality, land 
use, noise pollution, human health, wildlife/ livestock health, and housing values—th e also 
used likert-type response categories. Benefits perceptions were combined into a scale with a 
Cronbach’s alpha =. 94.26 For both of the scales higher values indicate more of that construct (i.e. 
more risk or benefit perception).  
Proximity. For proximity to oil and gas development, I used two different measures. First, 
I included a measure for unwanted proximity; respondents were asked if oil and gas activity was 
closer to their home than they would like (0=no, 1=yes). Secondly, I calculated distance to the 
nearest well in miles for each respondent. 27 
 Community Economic Identity. People who believe that the oil and gas industry is 
economically, socially, or culturally significant to their area may be less willing to regulate the 
                                                          
26 As a robustness check, I also performed exploratory factory analysis using a polychoric correlation matrix for the 
risk and benefit items. Using different extraction techniques, the exploratory f ctor analysis consistently pointed 
towards a single factor solution.  
27 Distance to the nearest well was calculated by assigning each respondent to their zip code centr id. COGCC shape 
files were scraped for well locations using the Stata command shp2dta (Crow 2013) and distance was then 
calculated using the geonear command (Picard 2012). While this strategy only approximates a respondents local 
experience with oil and gas development it perhaps the best option as I do not have exact street addresses for the 
anonymous survey respondents. Another option is to use county-level w ll counts. However, this is much more 
imprecise as counties vary substantially in geographic area and some respondents might live in an area of a county 




industry. To capture community economic identity regarding the oil and gas industry, 
respondents rated the importance of the oil and gas industry to their local area on a scale from 1= 
not at all important to 4= important. 28 
 Trust. The survey assessed trust in the oil and gas industry with a question worded as 
follows: “How much do you trust the oil and gas industry to operate safely?” Respondents could 
answer on a scale from 1= a great deal of trust to 4= no trust. Trust in the COGCC was captured 
with a survey item which asked about trust in the agency to provide neutral oversight (1= a great 
deal of trust, 4= no trust).  
 Control Variables. Controls for political ideology (1= liberal, 2=moderate, 
3=conservative), income (1= 0-$25,000, 6= $150,000 or more), college (0= less than college, 1= 
college graduate or more), age in years, and sex (1= male, 2= female) were also included. Table 






                                                          
28 Blaacker, Woods, and Oliver (2013) provide the only other quantitative operationalization of community 
economic identity. Relying on a self-administered survey of West Virginia college students, they asked their 
respondents to guess the amount of jobs and tax revenue that the coal industry provides the state; results indicated 
that college students drastically over-estimated the economic significance of coal. Adaptations of their questions 
performed poorly in pre-testing; in particular, the Colorado respondents b came agitated and confused at the 
questions. Perhaps the difference in samples and mode explain why these questions did not do well. Further, coal 
may have a unique socio-historical significance and long-term presence in West Virginia while extractive activity on 





Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables  
Variable Name Description mean  sd 
Risks 
Scale (Cronbach's Alpha= .94) constructed from the following risk 
perception items: community quality of life, road traffic, air or water 
quality, land use, noise pollution, human health, wildlife/ livestock 
health, and housing values 
1.42 0.67 
Benefits 
Scale (Cronbach's Alpha= .89) constructed from the following benefit 
perception items: community quality of life, job creation, tax revenue, 
infrastructure investment, energy independence from foreign oil, the 
development of clean energy, and lower energy costs 
1.93 0.63 
Unwanted Proximity 
Do you feel oil and gas activity is too close to where you live? (0= no, 1= 
yes)  
0.109 0.312 
Distance to nearest well Author's calculation from COGCC data 3.449 4.124 
Trust-Oil and Gas Industry 
How much do you trust the oil and gas industry to operate safely? (1= No 
trust, 4= A Great Deal of Trust)  
2.777 0.979 
Trust-COGCC  How much do you trust the COGCC to provide neutral oversight of oil 
and gas activity? (0= very little to no trust, 1= A great deal to some trust)  
0.763 0.426 
Importance- Oil and Gas 
How important is oil and gas activity to your local area? (0= not at all
important, 1= important or very important)  
0.503 0.501 
Sex 0= male, 1= female 1.478 0.500 
Political Ideology 




What is the highest level of education you have received? (0= less than 
college, 1= college graduate) 
4.453 1.368 
Income 
What is your total household income before taxes? (0= less than $25,000, 
6= greater than $150,000)  
3.609 1.634 
Age Age in years (author's calculation)  51.652 16.250 





 The analysis occurs in three steps. First, motivated by data sparseness and separation 
concerns the dependent variables were recoded so that 0= do not support and 1=support. 
Secondly, I estimated polychoric correlations29 to understand the relationship between the 
outcome and predictor variables; predictors that correlate weakly with the outcomes were not 
included in the statistical models. Lastly, a series of binary logistic regression models examined 
predictors of governance scale preferences.  
Correlational Results. As shown in table 4.2, risks and benefit perceptions correlate 
moderately with each outcome variable other than State Control. Both distance and unwanted 
proximity had a relatively weak association across the outcomes. The bivariate relationship 
between community economic identity related to the oil and gas industry varied significantly 
across dependent variables. It had a mild positive correlation with Towns-Relax and a mild 
negative correlation with Towns-Stricter and Fed-Exemption. However, it had almost no 
correlation with State-Control. Trust in the oil and gas industry followed a similar pattern but 
with stronger correlations; it was associated with increased support for local relaxation of oil and 
gas regulations and federal exemptions, and decreased support for local increases in regulation 
and state control. Trust in the COGCC was associated with increased support for state control 
and local relaxation of regulations, and decreased support for more stringent local regulations 
and federal exemptions. Turning to the socio-demographics, sex had almost no correlation with 
any of the dependent variables. Income barely correlated with any of the outcomes, except for 
State-Control. Compared to other variables, the pattern for education was rather strange; it 
                                                          
29 Polychoric correlations are recommend when correlated ordinal variables or a mix of ordinal and continuous 




correlated negatively with Towns-Relax, Towns-Strict, and State-Control, while it appeared to 
increase support for federal exemptions. Age also had an inconsistent and relatively minor 
association across dependent variables. Being white correlated weakly or not at all with all of the 
outcomes except Towns-Strict. Overall, the correlations suggested that risk and benefit 
perceptions, coupled with trust in the oil and gas industry, education and political ideology were 
associated with governance scale preferences.  











Risks -0.43*** 0.5*** -0.09 -0.28** 
Benefits 0.42*** -0.41*** 0.14* 0.29** 
Distance  0.12 0.16* -0.16* -0.04 
Unwanted Proximity -0.36*** 0.47*** -0.07 -0.15 
Importance-Oil and Gas  0.14*** -0.12*** 0.01 -0.15 
Trust-Oil and Gas Industry 0.52*** -0.51*** 0.28* -0.49* 
Trust- COGCC  0.32 -0.23 0.25** -0.37 
Sex -0.12 0.02 -0.11 -0.06 
Income -0.03 -0.11 -0.19 0.12 
Political Ideology 0.33*** -0.29*** 0.04 -0.43** 
College  -0.24*** -0.17*** -0.13** 0.27*** 
Age -0.02 -0.22 0.1 -0.15* 
White  0.25* -0.43* -0.01 0.12 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
 
Binary Logistic Regression Models. The purpose of the correlational analysis displayed 
above was to locate variables to trim from the regression models to avoid over-fitting. Sex, 
income, distance, and unwanted proximity emerged as mostly uncorrelated with the outcomes, 
and I excluded them from the models. Before estimating the models, I recoded several variables. 
Education was collapsed into two categories (0= less than college, 1= some college or more), as 
was trust in the COGCC (0= no to little trust, 1= some to a great deal of trust). Trust in the oil 
and gas industry (0= no to little trust, 1= some to a great deal of trust), and the perceived 




similarly recoded. Variance inflation factors did not exceed 2.4 in any of the models, indicating 
that multicollinearity is not an issue. Because of the relatively small sample size, I bootstrapped 
the standard errors with 5,000 replications.30  
 Table 4.4 displays the results of the binary logistic regression models. Individuals who 
perceived greater risk were surprisingly supportive of allowing towns to relax oil and gas 
regulations, while trust in the oil and gas industry decreased support for local relaxation. Trust in 
the COGCC, on the other hand, increased support for local relaxation. No other variables reach 
statistical significance in this model. Turning to the second model, risk perceptions increase 
support for allowing towns to pass stricter regulations—that is, respondents with greater risk 
perception prefer local control whether it is to increase or relax regulations. Trust in the oil and 
gas industry reduces support. Other variables do not reach statistical significance—though the 
coefficient for white may have some practical significance.31 For the state control model, none of 
the predictors was statistically significant, and their coefficients are, for the most part, much 
smaller than in other models. For federal exemptions, education was the only statistically 
significant predictor, but the effects of risk, trust in industry, and political ideology may have 




                                                          
30 In this application bootstrapping involved sampling from the master data with replacement 5,000 times and 
averaging standard errors across those replications.  




Table 4.4 Binary Logistic Regression for Governance Scale Preferences 
  
Towns-Relax Towns-Strict 




 b(se) b(se)        b(se)          b(se) 
Risk 0.588* 0.909** 0.161 -0.425 
(0.349) (0.422) (0.339) (0.532) 
 Benefits -0.031 0.006 0.099 0.065 
  (0.392) (0.420) (0.370) (0.703) 
 Oil and Gas Importance 0.115 0.231 -0.134 -0.361 
  (0.321) (0.326) (0.291) (0.468) 
 Trust-Industry  -1.257*** -1.334** 0.460 0.674 
  (0.456) (0.583) (0.436) (0.923) 
 Trust-COGCC  0.730* 0.339 0.602 0.111 
  (0.424) (0.442) (0.393) (0.920) 
 College  0.298 -0.368 -0.606 -1.918*** 
  (0.413) (0.413) (0.381) (0.452) 
 White  0.887** -0.822 0.159 -0.167 
  (0.450) (0.505) (0.372) (0.517) 
Political Ideology (ref. liberal)     
Moderate  -0.208 0.280 0.286 0.527 
  (0.391) (0.463) (0.389) (0.725) 
   Conservative  -0.407 -0.091 -0.108 0.516 
  (0.403) (0.447) (0.401) (0.652) 
N      404    404     404    404 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors bootstrapped with 5,000 replications.   
  
 Figure 4.1 provides average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.32 For the 
Towns-Relax model, college education, while not statistically significant, appeared to increase 
support. Other variables had marginal effects at or near zero, corroborating the null effects 
reported in Table 4.4. Regarding Towns-Strict, two variables that were not statistically 
significant —being white and having a college education—may have some practical 
significance. For state control, the marginal effects confirm the lack of effect reported for any of 
the predictors in Table 4.3. Turning to federal exemptions, the marginal effects suggested that 
political ideology might have more of an effect than implied by the coefficients in Table 4.3; 
                                                          
32 Bergtold, Yeager, and Featherstone (2011) suggested that average marginal effects may be less biased in 
situations of data sparseness; data sparseness is a concern given the relatively small sample size and distribution of 




though again, these variables did not reach statistical significance. Overall, the marginal effects 
underscore the largely null findings from the logistic regression models.  
 
Figure 4.1. Average Marginal Effects 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 The results outlined above reveal several important considerations regarding the views of 
people living under a neoliberalized, devolved governance regime. Most strikingly, the 
descriptive analysis conducted before the estimation of the statistical models indicated broad 
public support for multilevel governance of oil and gas development. Relatively few respondents 
supported concentrating power in the state government, and hardly anyone supported exempting 
the industry from federal regulations. Hence, a key finding was that the public appeared to 
support a regulatory regime that blends different governance scales, while still allowing for local 
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autonomy. Thus, Coloradoans’ preferred governance regime is devolved on the one hand, but 
still has some power centralized in the federal government.  
 The bivariate correlations and to some degree the regression models indicated that trust in 
the oil and gas industry is a key variable for issues of local control. Ladd (2014) argued that his 
Louisiana informants trusted the industry to operate safely and provide economic growth and 
jobs. A similar type of social contract may exist in the minds of some Coloradoans; those who 
trust the industry are willing to relinquish local control and support a policy regime that shifts 
power to industry. Further, trust in industry might explain public acquiesce to neoliberal 
governance.  
 Many variables that are well-known predictors of environmental attitudes had negligible 
effect on governance scale preferences. For instance, political ideology is one of the strongest 
and most consistent predictors of both general environmental attitudes and policy preferences 
related to environmental issues (e.g. Leiserowitz 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2011a; 2011b). Yet 
in my models for governance scale preferences, this variable had relatively little influence. 
Political ideology is a type of social identity that people rely upon as a heuristic to form opinions 
about controversial issues (Cohen 2003; Jost, Frederico and Napier 2009). That is, political 
ideology is not simply a set of political preferences but rather a source of identity that people 
access to make sense of complex problems. It is possible that because fracking is a immediate 
concern for many Colorado residents than other environmental problems (e.g. climate change), 
political ideology may be somewhat less salient. Further, to the best of my knowledge, this was 
the first quantitative study of governance scale preferences for fracking regulations; assuming 
that results from other studies on other topics (e.g. climate change) should generalized to 




 Socio-demographics, such as race and income, may have had little effect because of the 
nature of fracking within Colorado. While the environmental inequality literature suggests that 
toxic facilities are less proximate to higher income groups and/or whites (Ard 2015; Downey 
1998; Downey and Crowder 2010) fracking is not as spatially contained as other types of 
environmentally harmful practices. That is, fracking occurs in relatively affluent, suburban areas 
and is not limited to isolated, impoverished rural communities (Jacquet and Kay 2015). Hence, 
socio-demographics, particularly income, may be less important predictors than for other types 
of environmental dependent variables.  
There is a need for more research to understand whom the public believes should oversee 
regulating the oil and gas industry and environmental governance more broadly. We have a good 
theoretical and empirical understanding of environmental attitudes more generally, but questions 
of governance scale have received less attention. This chapter is an initial foray into this area. 
Few variables reach statistical significance in the models, and many have substantively small 
coefficients. Indeed, my descriptive results suggested that the public favors a multi-level system 
of governance, and subsequent research could work to unpack which level of government should 
perform specific regulatory functions.  
 It is clear from this chapter and many others that the fracking boom is associated with a 
range of threats and opportunities in the public mind (Ladd 2014; Israel et. al. 2015; Jacquet 
2012), and these threats and opportunities are, to varying degrees, confirmed by empirical 
analyses (e.g. Paulik et. al. 2015; Rabinowitz et. al. 2015). Because risk and benefits are complex 
and multi-layered, perhaps a similar multi-layered approach to regulating fracking is appropriate. 




power in the state government, such as Colorado, could lessen their grip on regulatory power to 
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The U.S. is currently experiencing an unprecedented boom in oil and gas production due 
in large part to hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal drilling; and yet, we know little 
about public preferences for fracking regulation. Political ideology is a strong predictor of policy 
support in other arenas. The purpose of this chapter was to clarify the role of political ideology in 
fracking policy. I hypothesized that political ideology has a direct impact on policy support and 
an indirect impact via risk/ benefit perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry. Using the 
KHB mediation technique, I showed that about half of the impact of political ideology is indirect 
via these mediating variables.  
INTRODUCTION 
 Unconventional drilling technologies like hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) and horizontal 
drilling have spurred a boom in oil and gas production in the United States—from 2005 to 2015 
domestic natural gas production increased some 30% (USDA ERS 2016). The fracking boom has 
met with much controversy as it has been associated with an array of negative impacts on public 
health (Colborn et. al. 2011; Hill 2014; Jamieleta et. al. 2015; Kassotis et. al. 2013, 2015; Perry 
2012; Rabinowitz et. al. 2015), environmental quality (Ferrar et. al. 2013; Holzman 2011; 
Howarth, Santoro and Ingraffea 2015; Paulik et.al. 2015; Rozell and Reaven 2012) and quality of 
life (Perry 2012; Opsal and Shelley 2014). In contrast, advocates argue that unconventional 
drilling provides jobs and tax revenue, particularly in economically marginalized rural areas 
(Driessen 2013; Energy from Shale 2015; Lee 2015; Munasib and Rickman 2014; Newell and 




The political response to fracking has been highly divergent with federal policy taking a 
lenient approach to regulating environmental and public health impacts. For example, fracking is 
exempted from key federal regulations—perhaps the most significant of these is the “Halliburton 
Loophole” embedded in the 2005 Energy Policy Act (Anderson 2012; Kraft, Stephen and Abel 
2011; Nolon and Gavin 2013; Rabe and Borick 2013; Werner and Shapiro 2013). These 
loopholes have left the states to fill the regulatory gap, resulting in a patchwork of state 
regulations (Cook 2014; Davis 2012; Davis and Fisk 2012; Fisk 2013; Rabe 2014; Rinfret, Cook 
and Pautz 2014; Zirogiannis et. al. 2016). Some states (e.g. Pennsylvania and Colorado) have a 
regulatory regime that is largely supportive of expanding drilling (Cook 2014; Opsal and Shelley 
2015) while other states (e.g. New York) have passed bans on hydraulic fracturing (Simonelli 
2014; Warner and Shapiro 2013). Local regulation is especially contested, with state 
governments and the oil and gas industry often taking legal action against cities that pass their 
own regulations (Davis 2014; Gulmann 2015; Maqbool 2015; Minor 2014).  
 Risk and benefit perceptions associated with fracking have been well documented 
(Clarke et. al. 2013; Jacquet 2012; Ladd 2014; Schaft, Borlu and Glenna 2013; Theodori 2009) 
as has general support for oil and gas development using fracking (Boudet et. al. 2014; Crowe, 
Ceresola and Silva 2015). However, we know little about what types of policies the public would 
like to see (if any) in place to regulate fracking. This is a significant gap in our knowledge 
because, as noted above, the regulatory regime is highly fragmented and decentralized across 
multiple levels of governance and under constant negotiation. Moreover, because the public 
perceives a complex array of risks and benefits it is likely that their policy preferences are 




 Given that there is little research on public policy attitudes towards fracking, I draw from 
related literature on public opinion on environmental and technological issues. In this literature, 
political ideology has emerged as a key driver of attitudes on a range of issues (Buttell and Flinn 
1978; Leiserowitz 2006; Yeo et. al. 2014). For instance, climate change views have become 
highly polarized in recent years (McCright and Dunlap 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011a, 
2011b). Despite the centrality of political ideology to environmental views, it has received 
relatively little direct attention in the literature on fracking.  
In the section below, I review the literature on risk, political ideology and public support 
for environmental policy. The literature indicates that political ideology is a uniquely important 
variable because it is a predictor of variables that explain policy preferences (e.g. risk 
perceptions) while it also has a direct effect on policy support. Hence, the purpose of this chapter 
was to understand the unique, dual role of political ideology in that it influences risk perceptions 
and other predictors of policy support while it also has a direct effect on policy support. I used 
KHB mediation technique to test this theory (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011). In the next 







Risk, Benefits and Policy Outcomes 
The public perceives an array of risks and benefits from fracking. These include concerns 
about crime and more general social disorganization (Israel 2015; Theodori 2009), threats to the 
environment (Brasier et. al. 2011; Jacquet and Stedman 2013; Theodori 2009), public health 
(Jalbert, Kinchy and Perry 2014; Kriesky et. al. 2013; Poole and Hudgins 2014) and nuisances 
like noise and dust (Jacquet 2012; Stedman et. al. 2013; Willow 2015). Yet fracking is also 
viewed as a source of job growth and economic development—par icularly for economically 
marginalized rural areas (Anderson and Theodori 2009; Ceresola and Crowe 2015; Schaft, Borlu 
and Glenna 2013; Silva and Crowe 2015). Others argue that natural gas and oil extracted via 
hydraulic fracturing burns cleaner than coal, reducing the environmental impacts of energy 
production (Ladd 2013) and some tout fracking’s ability to engender “energy independence” or 
“energy security” (Yergin 2011; Wright 2012).  
A truly vast literature documents the predictors of risk perceptions (see Adam, Beck and 
Van Loon (2000), Boholm (1998) and Boholm and Cevellec (2011), Jaeger et. al. (2013), 
Wildavsky and Dake (1990), and Wilkinson (2000) for reviews). Benefit perceptions have 
generally received less attention but a few studies detail the perceived benefits of emerging 
technologies (e.g. Kahan et. al. 2009; Siegrist 2000; Siegrist, Cvetkovich and Roth 2000). 
Further, less is known about how risk and benefit perceptions might influence policy attitudes. 
Risk society theory (Beck 1992; 2009) suggests that a fundamental challenge facing modern 
societies is responding to socially generated risks like global environmental problems (i.e. 




Thus, risk society theory implies that societies will respond environmental or technological 
issues deemed risky. Policy is one way to respond to risk.  
A small body of literature has empirically investigated the relationship between risk and 
benefit perceptions and policy support. Perceptions of climate change-related risk increase 
support for policy (Leiserowitz 2006; Lubell 2006; Lubell, Zahran and Vedlitz 2006; Lubell 
2006; Lubell, Zahran and Vedlitz 2006; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; Semenza et. al. 2008; 
Stoutenborough, Sturgess and Vedlitz 2013; Stoutenborough, Vedlitz and Liu 2015). On the 
other hand, benefit perceptions related to nuclear power are associated with more favorable 
attitudes towards its use in electricity production (Whitfield et. al. 2009; Visschers, Keller and 
Siegrist 2011; Visschers and Siegrist 2012). Thus, it is very likely that risk and benefit 
perceptions matter for fracking policy outcomes, but this relationship needs study.  
Trust 
Trust is necessary for effective policy implementation (Rothstein 2001, 2005) and, more 
broadly, it is a prerequisite for cooperation in a complex, highly integrated world (Giddens 2013; 
Szomptka 1999; Uslander 2002). Trust in government increases support for environmental policy 
(Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008; Zannakis, Wallin, and Johansson 2015), propensity to 
make personal sacrifices for environmental quality (Harring 2013) and engagement in pro-
environmental behavior (Vainio and Paloniemi 2013). In contrast, if trust is lacking people are 
less likely to believe in the effectiveness of environmental policy (Harring 2014).  
More specific to Colorado, Cook (2014; 2015) interrogated the rule-making process of 
the primary oil and gas regulatory body within Colorado—the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (COGCC)—and found that the agency’s ostensibly neutral rule-




citizens who have filed complaints against the industry view the COGCC as untrustworthy—
their informants believed that the agency consistently favored the oil and gas industry. Further, 
Opsal and Shelley (2014) documented how the COGCC routinely mis-represents citizen 
complaints, often “diluting” their content in favor of the oil and gas industry.  
 As noted above, trust in government is important for understanding public preferences for 
environmental policy but trust in industry is also important. For instance, Ladd (2014) described 
how Louisianans’ trust in the oil and gas industry legitimates a laissez faire regulatory regime. 
Whitfield et. al. (2009) showed that both trust in the nuclear power industry and trust in nuclear 
regulators is positively associated with support for nuclear power; similarly, Ansolabehere and 
Konisky (2009) found that trust in government increases support for nuclear power. Thus, trust 
in both regulators and industry is likely consequential for fracking policy attitudes.  
 Political Ideology as a Social Identity  
 In this section, I accessed research on political ideology as a social identity. Social 
identities, broadly construed, provide a map to help people make sense of their complex 
environments (Hogg 2007) and opinions and beliefs are rooted in said social identities (Taifel 
and Turner 1986; Turner et. al. 1994). Affiliation with a social group tends to generate 
uniformity of attitudes as people reconcile their attitudes with their group affiliation (Ashforth 
and Mael 1989; Hornsey 2008; Taijfel and Turner 1986). Thus, political ideology is an important 
aspect of social identity that people use to inform their views about a range of issues (Cohen 
2003; Malka and Lelkes 2010; Unsworth and Fielding 2014).  
Political identities are established in childhood and they are unlikely to change during 
adulthood. Voluminous literature documents how parents transmit their partisan and ideological 




The effect of parental socialization may wane slightly with age but overall, political affiliations 
are usually formed in adolescence via parental and peer group socialization and are unlikely to 
shift over the life-course (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings, Stoker and Bower 2009; Kitt and 
Gleicher 1950; Stillman, Guthrie and Becher 1960; Tedin 1974). 
“Elite cues” from politicians, media figures and other powerful members of an 
ideological community sway individual opinions. Group elites create a set of socially constructed 
attitudes, orientations and opinions bundled together with ideological identities particular to a 
place or time (Converse 2000; Jost et. al. 2003; Layman & Carsey 2002; McClosky & Zaller 
1984, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1993). Cues from elite members of an in-group provide a 
heuristic for formulating opinions around complex public policy issues (Arceneaux 2008; 
Lewkowicz 2006; Kam 2005). Environmental problems are especially difficult for the public to 
grasp, often leading to a muddled understanding that conflates disparate environmental issues 
(Bostrom et. al. 1994; Gowda et. al. 1997; Huxster, Uribe-Zarain and Kempton 2015; Kempton 
1991; Sterman and Sweeney 2007; Read et. al. 1994). Given the complexity of fracking, elite 
cues may be especially salient.  
Experimental evidence suggests that elite cues can shape beliefs among partisan 
individuals. Cohen (2003) showed that cues drive individuals to support policies that are highly 
inconsistent with their stated ideological beliefs. Using a series of experiments, Cohen 
demonstrated that conservatives who are ideologically opposed to the welfare state will be driven 
to support the expansion of social benefits if they are given an informational prompt that states 
that Republican politicians favor the measure. Democrats had similar results; self-described 




Democratic politicians were in opposition. The control groups did not receive either treatment—
that is, no “elite cues” where given to either the republican or democrat control groups.  
Observational evidence also corroborates the effect of elite cues on public opinion. In the 
early 1990s, there was only a slight partisan difference in attitudes about climate change. 
However, elite conservative organizations and religious leaders increasingly began to challenge 
the notion that the climate was changing because of human combustion of fossil fuels (Farrell 
2015a, 2015b; Hempel, Macilroy and Smith 2014; McCright and Dunlap 2003, 2010; Oreskes 
and Conway 2010). By the late 2010s, this had resulted in a significant gap between conservative 
and non-conservative beliefs in mere existence of climate change (McCright and Dunlap 2008, 
2011a, 2011b).  
Political conservatives tend to have lower risk perceptions across a range of technological 
and environmental risks such as climate change (Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz 2008; Leiserowitz 
2005; McCright and Dunlap 2011) and nuclear power (Peters and Slovic 1996; Yea et. al. 2014). 
Political conservatives also have less trust in science (Gauchat 2012; McCright et. al. 2013; 
Hamilton, Harter and Saito 2015) and government (Cooke and Gronke 2005). Indeed, discourse 
among conservative elites often frames regulation in “apocalyptic” terms that suggests regulation 
threatens to destroy entire industries or unravel the U.S. economy (Peeples. et. al. 2014). 
Moreover, conservatives may have greater trust in the oil and gas industry and lower result 
perceptions because of the large amounts of funding conservative organizations receive from the 
fossil fuel industry (Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2003; Brulle 
2014). More specific to present chapter, conservatives are more supportive of hydraulic 




Proposed Mediation Model. The literature reviewed above suggests that political 
ideology is a uniquely important predictor of policy preferences. Overall, the prior studies imply 
that political ideology is exogenous to other predictors of policy attitudes yet, also, is a predictor 
of policy support. That is, political ideology predicts risk perception and trust—these variables 
are, in turn, key predictors of policy support. Though I am not aware of research that documents 
a connection between political ideologies and the perceptions of benefits the existing research 
implies that conservatives likely perceive more benefits from extractive industries. Hence, this 
chapter tests a mediation model in which political ideology is mediated by variables like risk 
perception, benefit perception and trust in industry. Figure 5.1 displays this hypothesized 























DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS 
I obtained data via a random digit-dial survey of Colorado residents in the fall of 2014. 
As explained above, exemptions from federal environmental and health regulations have left 
states to fill a policy vacuum (Davis 2014; Warner and Shapiro 2013); thus, public attitudes at 
the state level are especially relevant. Colorado is home to roughly 5.3 million people, about 2.7 
million of which live in the metropolitan Denver area (U.S. Census 2015), and another large 
portion of the population lives in cities like Boulder and Fort Collins along the front range of the 
Rocky Mountains. A truly random, representative sample would largely exclude residents of 
rural, high drilling areas and include mostly residents of Denver and surrounding suburbs—area  
which have very little active oil and gas drilling. To militate against this problem, residents of 
drilling-intensive counties were oversampled. To target these drilling-intensive areas I ordered 
all counties in Colorado by active well counts and divided the ordered counties into ten strata. 
From there, I randomly sampled households within county strata. Both cell phones and landlines 
were included to avoid coverage bias and the research team administered the survey in English 
and Spanish.  
 Given the contentious nature of fracking politics, it is not surprising that question 
wording may bias responses. Evensen et. al. (2014) observed sharp difference between the term 
“fracking” and the phrase “shale gas development”—the respondents viewed the former much 
more negatively. However, Stoutenborough, Robinson and Vedlitz (2016) report no difference in 
response between “fracking” and “hydraulic fracturing”. Motived by potential biases the survey 
instrument used the term “oil and gas activity” and the introduction explained that “oil and gas 





The completion rate was 95%. Using the most conservative definition (AAPOR Response 
Rate 1), the response rate was 9% and the margin of error was 5% while a more liberal definition 
(AAPOR Response rate 6) produced a 14% response rate. This response rate parallels other 
telephone polls on energy and environmental issues (e.g. Pew 2014; Clarke et. al. 2015; Boudet 
et. al. 2016). Survey methodologists have noted that there is not a tradeoff between response 
rates and data quality—that is, bias results from poor sampling design, errors in data collection, 
coding problems and the like and not necessarily low response rates (Groves 2006; Keeter et. al. 
2006; Groves and Peytcheva 2008).  
Analytic Strategy 
 The data analysis occurred in three steps. First, I described the dependent variable, the 
exogenous political ideology variable, the mediators, and the control variables and provide basic 
descriptive statistics. In the next section, I used ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to 
understand the relationships between all the predictors and the policy dependent variable. 
Thirdly, I employed the KHB technique for mediation (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011). 
Compared to other mediation techniques KHB performs remarkably well in models using a mix 
of categorical and continuous variables (Karlson and Holm 2011). KHB estimates a total and 
indirect effect and a percentage confounding— if conservative ideology is exogenous to risk/ 
benefit perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry this confounding percentage should be 
substantively large.33  
                                                          
33 Before estimating the models, I conducted exploratory analysis using polychoric correlations between possible 
predictors of policy attitudes and the dependent variables. I found that several theoretically plausible variables, such 
as proximity to oil and gas drilling, trust in regulators, and place attachment had almost no correlation with either 





Dependent Variable: Policy Scale. The dependent variable is a scale constructed from a 
range of policy options for unconventional oil and natural gas extraction. These policies 
included: disclosure of chemicals used in drilling, setbacks from residences and schools, 
prohibiting drilling on public lands, real-time monitoring of air and water pollution, noise 
limitations, and taxes on oil and gas drilling to fund efforts to reduce its impacts or taxes to 
develop renewable energy. Each question used response categories that ranged from strongly 
support to strongly oppose. As shown in Table 5.1, most Coloradoans support an array of 
regulatory policies—many of these policies are more stringent than current policies.At least 60% 
of respondents indicated “support” or “strongly support” for disclosure rules, setbacks, air and 
water pollution monitoring and even special taxes on the oil and gas industry. There is somewhat 
less support for restricting drilling on public lands with only 48% indicating support or strong 
support.  
Table 5.1 Distribution of The Individual Policy Scale Items 
 
Strongly 
Support Support  Oppose 
Strongly 
Oppose 
 % % % % 
Disclosure 44.3 43.04 8.35 4.3 
Residential Setback 33.85 41.1 19.01 5.99 
School Setback 35.2 41.8 17.09 5.87 
Restricting Drilling on Public Land 15.68 32.7 36.22 15.41 
Air Pollution Monitoring 31.61 48.19 16.84 3.37 
Water Pollution Monitoring 40.15 46.21 10.86 2.78 
Noise Limits 17.96 46.41 29.01 6.63 
Tax for problems caused by oil and gas  28.31 47.09 18.25 6.35 
Tax to fund renewable energy  25.59 41.1 21.37 11.87 
  
The dimensionality of these items was examined via an exploratory factor analysis using 
iterated principal factor extraction, this produced a single factor solution (eigenvalue=5.4, all 




mean of 1.9 and standard deviation of .62. This scale, which I call policy, serves as the dependent 
variable. 
Exogenous Variable: Political Ideology. Political ideology is measured using a question 
in which respondents were asked “How would you describe your political beliefs?”; after 
recoding this variable is 0=not conservative and 1=conservative. About 37% of respondents 
identified as conservative; this roughly aligns with voter registration in the state as about 1/3 of active 
voters are registered Republicans (Hutchins 2016). 
Endogenous Variables and Controls. The survey included several questions related to 
risks posed by oil and gas development using a likert type strongly agree to strong disagree scale. 
The following risks were included: real estate values, livestock or wildlife health, human health, 
noise pollution, air or water pollution, land use, traffic and community quality of life. I combined 
these risk perception items into an additive scale with Cronbach’s alpha= .89 and exploratory 
factor analysis provided a single factor solution (eigenvalue=6.1). Higher values on the scale 
indicate more risk perception. The risk perception scale has a mean of 1.42 and a standard 
deviation of .62.  
Benefit Perception. Respondents rated their perception of the following benefits: 
reducing household energy bills, the development of clean energy, energy independence from 
foreign oil, investment in infrastructure, tax revenue, jobs, and community quality of life using a 
likert type scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Exploratory factor analysis using 
iterated principal factor extraction provided strong evidence of an unambiguous single factor 
solution with an eigenvalue of 4.6 and factor loadings more than .6 for all variables; indeed, 




(Cronbach’s alpha=.94, mean=1.07, standard deviation=.63). Higher scores on this scale 
corresponded to more benefit perception.  
 Trust. Trust in the oil and gas industry was captured with an ordinal indicator 
constructed from a survey question that asked: “How much do you trust the oil and gas industry 
to operate safely?” (1=a great deal of trust, 4= no trust). Forty-one percent of respondents said 
“Some Trust”.  
 Controls. I also included controls for sex (0=male, 1=female), education (1=high 
school or less, 6=graduate degree or more), age in years, and income (1=$0-$25,000, 
6=$150,000 or more).  
 Earlier I suggested that political ideology is likely exogenous to a range of variables 
that predict policy support—such as risk perception, benefit perceptions and trust. To understand 
how conservatives differ from other respondents, Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for 
conservative respondents and those who did not identify as conservative. The table demonstrates 
that conservatives have somewhat lower risk perceptions and somewhat higher benefit 
perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry.  










 Mean SD  Mean SD  
Risk Scale 1.6 0.64  1.1 0.58 0.597 
Benefit Scale 1.77 0.62  2.22 0.56 -0.534 
White 0.79 0.41  0.88 0.33 0.103 
Education 4.52 1.38  4.34 1.34 0.171 
Income 3.56 1.68  3.71 1.55 -0.074 
Age 49.28 15.86  55.94 15.95 -0.008 






OLS regression. Table 5.3 shows OLS regression results for the policy scale dependent 
variable. Because of the modest sample size, I report bootstrapped standard errors estimated via 
5,000 replications for both the OLS regression and mediation model.34 I assessed 
multicollinearity via variance inflation factors (vif): the averaged VIFs were 2.2 in the OLS 
model, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem.  
As shown in Table 5.3, the effect of political conservativism is statistically significant 
and powerful (b=-0.225, p<.05). Risk and benefit perceptions are strong predictors while trust in 
the oil and gas industry has relatively little influence in both models. Socio-demographic controls 
such as sex, age, race, education and income did relatively little to explain policy support. For 
instance, high-income individuals were less supportive of restrictive fracking policy but the 
effect of very high income (i.e. above $150,000) referenced to low income ($25,000 or less) was 







                                                          
34 Bootstrapping involves resampling with replacement from the data and developing an average standard error from 




Table 5.3 OLS Regression for Policy Scale 
 b bootstrap se p-value 
Conservative -0.225 0.058 0.000 
Risk Scale 0.264 0.067 0.000 
Benefits -0.159 0.070 0.023 
White 0.052 0.076 0.495 
    
Education (ref. less than High School)  
High School 0.281 0.274 0.305 
 
          Trade School 0.318 0.289 0.271 
Some College 0.574 0.268 0.032 
BA/BS 0.436 0.270 0.107 
Graduate Degree 0.475 0.267 0.076 
    
Income (ref. less than $25,000) 
$26,000-$50,000 
0.036 0.119 0.758 
$51,000-$74,000 
0.012 0.102 0.903 
$75,000-$100,000 -0.087 0.104 0.403 
$100,000-$149,000 
0.071 0.107 0.504 
$150,000 or more -0.110 0.115 0.339     
Age 0.003 0.002 0.043 
    
Trust-Oil and Gas (ref. no trust) 
Very little trust -0.014 0.085 0.870 
Some trust -0.211 0.094 0.024 
Complete trust -0.319 0.120 0.008 
    
Intercept   1.513   
Adjusted R2  0.476  
N   334   
                       Standard errors bootstrapped with 5,000 replications 
KHB mediation. Table 5.4 provides the results of the KHB mediation results. In these 
models, political ideology is exogenous to risk perceptions, benefit perceptions, and trust in the 
oil and gas industry. The mediation model also included controls for age, white, sex, education 




indirect and direct effect while the indirect effect represents the portion of the effect of political 
ideology mediated by the intervening variables of risk perceptions, benefit perceptions, and trust 
in the oil and gas industry. The direct effect represents the impact that political ideology has on 
policy independent of the mediators.  
The total effect of conservative was b= -51. Here, about 61% of the effect of being 
conservative is mediated by the intervening variables; after using risk perceptions, benefit 
perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry as mediators the direct effect of conservative 
becomes b= -20. Risk perception has a particularly strong intervening effect—about 29% of the 
mediated effect of conservative is via risk perceptions. Benefit perceptions mediate about 13% of 
the effect of political ideology while trust in the oil and gas industry mediates about 18% of the 
effect.  
Table 5.4 KHB mediation analysis for Policy Scale  
Conservative  Coef Bootstrap SE Confounding (%)  
Total Effect -0.51 0.08 NA 
Direct Effect -0.20 0.07 NA 
Mediated Effect -0.31 0.05 60.56 
    
Through    
Risk Scale -0.15 0.05 28.57 
Benefit Scale -0.07 0.03 13.05 
Trust-Oil and Gas  -0.10 0.04 18.94 
    
Control variables: Income, Education, Sex, Age and White, R2=.47, 
n=334. Standard errors bootstrapped with 5,000 replications. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to expand sociological inquiry into public support for 
restrictive fracking policy—an area which has received relatively little attention. As such, this 
chapter is an extension of previous work on perceptions of hydraulic fracturing (e.g. Boudet et. 
al. 2014; Ladd 2014; Jacquet 2012) while also contributing to literature on the role of political 




Dunlap 2011a; 2011b; Whitfield et. al. 2009). This research also adds to scholarship on the social 
response to energy development more broadly (e.g. Devine-Wright 2005; 2009; McAdam and 
Boudet 2012; Malin 2015).  
The OLS models presented above indicated, unsurprisingly, that support for fracking 
regulation is partisan in that conservatives were less likely to support restrictive fracking policy. 
Risk perceptions increased support while those who trust in the oil and gas industry were less apt 
to endorse restrictive regulation. Benefit perceptions had a less pronounced role. 
 I argued that the literature strongly suggests that political affiliation is exogenous to trust, 
risk, and benefit perceptions because people form their political affiliation at a young age and it 
acts as a combined social identity and cognitive heuristic. The mediation results largely confirm 
that political ideology is exogenous to other predictors of policy support. In the case of fracking, 
political ideology has a two-fold influence on policy outcomes. First, conservatives have lower 
risk perceptions, higher benefit perceptions and greater trust in the oil and gas industry—the 
combination of these variables reduces policy support. Secondly, there is a direct effect of 
affiliation on policy attitudes; still, slightly more than half of the effect of political affiliation 
occurs via risk perceptions, benefit perceptions, and trust in the oil and gas industry while less 
than half is direct. Hence, results indicate that people rely on their politics to inform more than 
just their policy attitudes; rather, it also influences risk/ benefit perceptions and trust. 
Conservative resistance to oil and gas regulation is due, in large part, to lower risk perceptions, 
greater benefit perceptions, and more trust in the oil and gas industry—not policy preferences per 
se.  
In Colorado, fracking often occurs near homes or schools and is, for many Coloradoans, 




controversies around energy development attend to the question of political ideology. Local 
resistance, acquiesce or acceptance of potentially harmful industrial or extractive activity might 
be impacted by political ideology more substantially than previously thought. Moving forward, 
the literature on political ideology and environmental public opinion (e.g. McCright and Dunlap 
2011a; 2011b) should be more thoroughly integrated with the literature on mobilization (or lack 
thereof) regarding energy (e.g. Bell and York 2010; Malin 2015; McAdam and Boudet 2014).  
 Several socio-demographic control variables that are known predictors of environmental 
attitudes did not reach statistical significance and had substantively small effects. Gender, for 
instance, is often associated with environmental attitudes (Mobley and Kilbourne 2013; Mohai 
1992; Xiao and McCright 2012). There are several reasons why these socio-demographics may 
have relatively little influence in these models. Regarding gender, it is unclear if findings about 
broader environmental concerns can generalize to the more specific, intimate question of 
fracking policy support. Opposition to extractive industries in Appalachia is highly gendered 
(e.g. Bell 2014; Bell and Braun 2010; Smith 2014) yet there is some evidence that resistance to 
fracking in Colorado skews less female than in Appalachia (Kizewksi 2015).  
  While I identified a large body of literature which suggests that political affiliations are 
exogenous to variables like risk perception, I cannot fully rule out reverse causation. For 
instance, it is possible that some people will first develop risk perceptions and subsequently seek 
out an ideological affiliation that is reflective of those risk perceptions. The literature cited above 
(e.g. Jennings, Stoker and Bower 2009; Stillman, Guthrie, & Becher, 1960) suggests that this 
circumstance is unlikely because people are socialized into a political affiliation at a young age, 
but it certainly is not impossible. As such, the mediation models may contain some small degree 




control studies to uncover if individuals are likely to change political affiliation based upon their 
risk perceptions. Still, individuals who change their political affiliations (i.e. from liberal to 
conservative or vice versa) are likely very rare in the population and establishing causality in this 
way could be daunting.       
 The findings of this chapter largely corroborate a social-psychological understanding of 
political ideology. Political ideology is a uniquely important variable in environmental 
controversies because it holds influence on policy outcomes and predictors of policy support like 
risk perceptions, benefit perceptions and trust. This analysis suggests that, even with highly 
intimate local issues like fracking, political ideology acts as a combined heuristic and social 
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CH 6. CONCLUSION  
 
Unconventional oil and gas extraction via hydraulic fracturing has changed the energy 
landscape within the U.S. The purpose of this dissertation was to provide a comprehensive 
account of fracking policy preferences using a statewide sample of Colorado residents. I 
considered a range of plausible theoretical explanations related to place, risk and community 
economic identity, trust and political ideology, for why people support or do not support 
restrictive oil and gas policy while also “borrowing” some valuation techniques from 
environmental economics. This dissertation is the first thorough assessment of fracking policy 
attitudes, the first quantitative operationalization of “community economic identity” and one of 
the few sociological applications of non-market valuation techniques. As such, this research 
should make empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions.  
 In this concluding chapter, I will first offer conclusions from each chapter considering the 
data analysis and the theories that informed the models. Then, I will provide conclusions that are 
more general, explain the contribution of this research and suggest directions for future research.  
 Chapter 2 set out to understand how variables related to place and risk impact policy 
support. Theoretically, I suspected that policy support would be a function of risk perceptions, 
benefit perceptions and place variables. However, I found that place-related variables—such as 
place attachment, distance to the nearest active well, and unwanted proximity to oil and gas 
activity—have almost no effect on support for more restrictive policy. Subjective risk 
perceptions were a relatively powerful predictor while benefit perceptions did not reach 
statistical significance and community economic identity played little role. Interestingly, trust in 




emerged as important factors over the course of analysis. Political ideology, unsurprisingly, was 
also a significant factor in policy support. Many of the socio-demographic controls had relatively 
little impact.  
 In Chapter 3, I considered if willingness to pay for more frequent inspections of oil and 
gas facilities—assessed via contingent valuation—was informed by variables derived from risk 
perception (e.g. O’Connor, Bord and Fisher1999) and place-based theories (e.g. Stedman 2003). 
As in Chapter 2, the place related variables and community economic identity had little to no 
association with support for increasing inspections while heightened risk perceptions did 
increase support. Further, political affiliation was a powerful predictor. As the cost associated 
with increasing inspections rose, public support declined. Though this result is not entirely 
surprising, sociologists have rarely considered how the features of a policy—su h as its cost—
influences whether people support it. In particular, semi-structured interviews might be 
especially useful here given the apparent complexity of public views.  
 Chapter 4 examined what I called “governance scale preferences”—that is, beliefs about 
what level of government should oversee regulating the oil and gas industry. Prior research that 
had examined neoliberalization and devolution in environmental governance informed this 
chapter. While much as been written on these topics, we know relatively little about how publics 
living under a neoliberalized governance regime feel about it. This chapter indicated that there 
was almost no support for fully exempting fracking from federal regulations. The public does 
also not endorse the state governments’ position that it should have sole regulatory authority 
(Minor 2014). Rather, the results suggested that Coloradoans would like to see a complex, multi-
layered approach to oil and gas governance that allows significant local control to either reduce 




form of local control but not neoliberalization in the form of little to no regulation. The logistic 
regression models showed that there were relatively few consistent predictors of governance 
scale preferences—there is a need for more research to understand what level of government 
people believe should regulate oil and gas development.  
 Chapter 5 sought to clarify the role of political ideology in oil and gas policy. I relied on 
theoretical and empirical analyses from social identity theory that suggest political ideology is 
about far more than just policy preferences. Rather, political ideology is a sort of group identity 
that people use to inform a range of viewpoints, many of which have little to do with actual 
policy (e.g. Cohen 2003; McCright and Dunlap 2011). Using mediation techniques, I found that 
risk perceptions, benefit perceptions and trust in the oil and gas industry are endogenous to 
political ideology. That is, politically conservative individuals have lower risk perceptions, 
higher benefit perceptions, and more trust in the oil and gas industry. These variables act to 
reduce policy support and political ideology has a direct effect on policy support. This chapter 
largely corroborates a social psychological understanding of political ideology as a type of social 
identity—an identity that informs more than just policy preferences.  
While it is helpful to examine the finding of each chapter independently, it is equally 
important to consider some of the overarching conclusions derived from this work. The next 
several paragraphs describe some over-arching conclusions considering the research questions 
listed in the introduction.  
One of the purposes of this dissertation was to quantify the theoretical concept of 
“community economic identity” as developed by Shannon Bell and alluded to by many others. 
Interviewers asked respondents to assess the importance of various industries to their local area. 




dependent variables using multiple regression models, though some bivariate relationships may 
have been statistically or substantively important. I suspect that community economic identity 
(CEI) is likely relevant for oil and gas policy formation, but we need a better scale to measure 
this construct.  
For example, the scale developed in this dissertation did not consider the historical roots of 
community economic identity. Perhaps a future CEI scale could assess how respondents 
understand the history of their place and how it relates to extractive industries. In addition, my 
CEI scale assessed how important people perceive various industries to be but did not assess 
views about that importance. For instance, it is possible that someone might believe that oil and 
gas development is important to their place but prefer that it was less important. This could be 
especially true of individuals who live in extractive communities but would like to see their local 
economy diversity or limit economic development altogether.  
 Another possible explanation for the null findings of community economic identity is that 
Colorado’s population consists of many in-migrants. Bell and York (2010) describe how the 
historical significance of coal is leveraged by the industry in West Virginia—a state with little 
population growth. Colorado’s more transient population may be less apt to develop a strong 
identification with an industry because of the lack of deep historical and cross-generational 
connects to any industry within the state. Comparing two areas—one with little in-migration and 
one with a great deal of in-migration—might be one way to test this notion.  
I began this project with the assumption that risk and benefit perceptions were likely strong 
predictors of policy attitudes. In doing so, I relied on an implicit rational choice explanation of 
this relationship; if fracking is perceived as risky people are more willing to regulate it, whereas 




empirical chapters largely corroborate this understanding. Risk perceptions were a powerful 
predictor of a range of policy preferences. Perceived benefits, on the other hand, had a less 
consistent effect but were still an important predictor of policy preferences. Overall, benefit 
perceptions have received little attention in the literature, suggesting future research on risk 
should include greater consideration of benefit perceptions.  
The formation of community economic identity also involves the social construction of 
benefits to a place and time. That is, the concept of community economic identity suggests that 
sometimes groups of people come to believe that an industry is economically or culturally 
important to them. Community economic identity and benefit perceptions may be overlapping 
constructs. Alternatively, perhaps, the type of “identity construction” discussed in Shannon 
Bell’s work is one way that benefit perceptions are socially constructed. While benefit, 
perceptions do not perfectly track community economic identity around the oil and gas industry, 
they may both be facets of the same underlying theoretical construct. Future research, ideally 
with mixed methods, might be able to disentangle the complex relationships between benefit 
perceptions and the cultural significance of an industry. One possibility is to study attitudes 
towards an employer before or after an expansion.  
Political events around oil and gas within Colorado led me to believe that “place” also 
accounted for fracking policy attitudes as the public response to fracking seemed to be so 
different in different places. This led me to the “sense of place” literature and concepts like place 
attachment (e.g. Scannell and Gifford 2010). However, I found that place attachment had little 
effect in multiple regression models nor did other place related variables like proximity to 
drilling. This is not to say that “places” have no relevance for oil and gas policy formation. 




While I did not investigate this issue, I suspect that one possible explanation is that the spatial 
distribution of strong predictors—like risk perception and political ideology—is highly unequal. 
In other words, the reason why some places seem so resistant to fracking while others seem so 
receptive may related to the fact that people in those different places have divergent levels of risk 
perception, political ideology, benefit perceptions and the like. The spatial pattern in the public 
response to fracking may not have as much to do with how people relate to a place (i.e. place 
attachment) but rather how viewpoints (e.g. political ideologies, trust or risk perception) tend to 
cluster spatially. This project cannot answer this question but future researchers should look for 
spatially clustering of attitudes to explain oil and gas policy outcomes.  
I also examined how proximity to oil and gas activity relates to various policy attitudes.  I 
found a null relationship across every dependent variable—actual proximity seemed to have no 
association with support for regulation. As noted throughout the chapters, the measurement for 
proximity was a rough proxy calculated by assigning respondents to their zip code centroids.  I 
suspect that risks related to fracking involve a great deal of “social construction” in which the 
actions of regulators, media figures, local movements, and other social factors heighten or dull 
risk perceptions. However, it is important to remember that the measurement of proximity used 
in this dissertation is inexact.  
Except for governance scale preferences, I found that political ideology is a rather powerful 
predictor of policy preferences. Further, the medication chapter (Ch. 5) indicated that political 
ideology informs far more than just individuals’ policy preferences—rather, people rely on their 
political ideology to answer questions like “is fracking a health risk?”. This chapter suggests that 
political ideology may be a uniquely significant predictor of regulator policy attitudes because of 




This dissertation is also one of the first sociological applications of contingent valuation. My 
interest in this technique was motivated by a concern that sociologists need to consider how the 
characteristics of a policy—not just the attributes of an individual or their social environment—
lead to policy support. Chapter 3 showed that the cost associated with a policy is a robust 
predictor of support across model specifications. Future research, especially qualitative 
interviews, could be very useful in figuring out how people interpret the commensuration of a 
policy. 
There are some broad policy implications from this research. Perhaps the most significant is 
that Coloradoans support a relatively stringent regulatory regime, though there are differences 
based upon variables like risk perception and political ideology. The challenge for policy-makers 
is to develop a regulatory regime that: (1) safeguards public health and the environment and (2) 
allows for energy development all while simultaneously developing a multi-level system of 
governance.  
While I provided some specific limitations in each chapter, there are some general limitations 
to this entire project. First, resource limitations hampered the sample size and the number of 
Spanish language interviews. A larger sample would have been ideal. A second limitation is this 
data is observational and cross-sectional and thus, any results reported here are associational and 
not causal. A third limitation is generalizability. This study examined Colorado residents at a 
point in time. They may not generalize to other regions of the country and other times. Indeed, 
the policy regime for fracking is ever shifting so it is likely that public opinion on fracking policy 
issues will change accordingly. Further research should attend to shifting public opinion on oil 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX  
 
Sample 
Before data collection, I established 400 as the goal sample size. I selected this figure 
because it represents roughly a 5% margin of error and because, given the limited resources 
available for this project, achieving a larger sample size was unlikely.  
I considered and rejected several possible sampling strategies. For instance, one strategy 
common in rural sociology is to select a handful of counties and compare responses across 
counties to ascertain the effect of contextual-level variables, such as the extent of drilling (e.g. 
Kriesky et. al. 2014; Theodori 2012). This strategy is not optimal primarily because it does not 
provide much variance on the extent of drilling, a key contextual level-variables. As such, 
contextual variables cannot be used as predictors in a regression modeling framework and 
ascertaining their causal inference from this sampling design is dubious at best.  
 This project uses an alternative strategy which seeks to maximize variance on a key 
contextual variable—the extent of local drilling. I describe this approach in depth below. 
Initially, I considered using a statewide sample proportional to the state population. Because 
place and the extent of local drilling is important, a statewide sample proportional to population 
is inappropriate. Ultimately, this sampling strategy would poorly represent populations exposed 
to oil and gas activity because Colorado’s population is concentrated in the Denver metro area 
and along the front range of the Rockies— areas with relatively little drilling. To produce a 
sample representative of populations exposed to oil and gas activity, I accessed county-level well 
counts from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC 2014). County well 




while sizable portions are also in Garfield (10,547) and Yuma County (3,885) counties. Indeed, 
74% of all wells are within only 4 of Colorado’s 64 counties. As a further complication, county-
level well counts could vary because counties are of different geographic sizes—to deal with this 
issue, I calculated wells per square mile. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of this variable:  
 
Figure A.1. Wells per square mile 
 
Because of this highly skewed distribution, I performed a fourth-root transformation to produce a 











Figure A.2 Fourth Root wells per square mile 
 
 Then, I created10 strata of fourth-rooted county well counts per square mile by dividing 
this variable into 10 intervals. Each stratum was than assigned 1/10 (i.e. 40 observations) of the 
targeted sample size of 400. Within each stratum, I assigned projected sample size in proportion 
to county population. Because of this sampling strategy, the data retains some degree of 
generalizability to the entire state while better representing the views of those who live near oil 
and gas activity. In addition, this approach maximizes the amount of variation on the degree of 
individual exposure to oil and gas activity and, as such, is superior to other sampling strategies 
used in the extant literature that compare two or more communities (e.g. Kriesky et. al. 2014). 
However, the sample is likely least generalizable to counties which have both a small population 






0 .5 1 1.5




 Survey Sampling International (SSI) provided the sample.35 I gave SSI a list of counties 
and asked to produce a sample of both cell phone and landline numbers to achieve the targeted 
sample for that county and avoid problems of coverage bias. SSI representatives explained that 
targeting specific counties could be inexact because not all phone exchanges are contained 
within one county (Personal Communication 2014). In addition, some people might live in a 
county but use a cell phone listed in another county. SSI representatives also explained that 
county-level estimates of cell-phone only households do not currently exist. Ideally, I could have 
calibrated the sample with such information but this is not possible. The sample included 4,762 
wireless numbers and 2,334 landlines. 
 Data Collection 
Following Institutional Review Board approval, the research team collected data during 
the fall semester of 2014 by sociology undergraduate students enrolled in a senior capstone 
course specifically designed to incorporate a service learning research experience with financial 
support and endorsement of The Institute for Teaching and Learning (TILT) at CSU and the 
Rural Sociological Society (RSS). All service-learning students had completed, or were currently 
enrolled, in research methods and statistics courses. For the first third of the semester, students 
were required to read and respond to articles and book chapters about survey research including 
survey design, implementation and human subjects and informed consent. Following this 
academic preparation, Dr. Shelley and I trained students in appropriate interview techniques. 
This included the operation of the call center, the logic of the survey instrument, the informed 
consent statement, and a standardized prompt sheet. We did not incentive students, via grades or 
compensation, to complete interviews to produce the highest quality data. Dr. Tara Shelley or I 
                                                          




managed the call center approximately five days per week with the exceptions of Friday and 
Tuesday evenings.  
Survey Introduction. Following the ethical guidelines of the AAPOR (2015) and the 
National Council on Public Polls (NCPP 2015), the introduction included the interviewers’ 
name, the sponsoring parties, referenced CSU as the affiliated institution, an explained that the 
survey was voluntary, and stated risk and benefits to participation.  
 Margin of Error and Methods to Improve Response Rate. Colorado has an adult 
population of about 4,030,301. To achieve a 3% margin of error would require 1,050 interviews. 
Given the limited resources associated with dissertation research project, I believed that it was 
highly unlikely that I would be able to achieve this margin of error. Based on the projected time 
spent in the call center, I expected to collect about 400 surveys for a margin of error of 4.9%. 
Similar studies have produced roughly the same sample size (e.g. Crowe et. al. 2015). 
To increase response rates, I used proven methods like tracking calls, scheduling 
callbacks, calling at different times of day and on weekends, and using a tight, short introduction 
with the interviewers’ name and the name of the affiliated institution; Dillman, Gallegos and 
Frey 1976; Holbrook, Krosnick and Pfent 2007). In addition, because the survey involves a 
highly salient and timely topic, potential respondents were probably more likely to participate in 
the research and provide higher quality answers (Adua and Sharp 2010; Dillman et. al. 2014; 
Vossler and Watson 2012; Carson et. al. 2013). We called each number up to eight times before 
receiving its final disposition.  
Spanish Survey. Per the American Community Study (ACS 2013) roughly 6.5% of the 
total state population in Colorado speaks English with less than “very good” proficiency and 




respondents the choice of taking the survey in Spanish or English. For those opting Spanish, a 
fluent Spanish speaker administered the survey. 
A team of undergraduate students from Colorado State University translated the survey 
instrument. Each is a native Spanish speaker who has spent many their lives in Colorado—the 
translators are members of the target population. Translation occurred in three waves. One 
student performed the initial translation; then, we passed the translated instrument on to another 
student to validate. Next, this translation to the third student to be double-checked. At the end of 
this process, the translators and I met as a group to work out any remaining issues. For instance, 
the translator explained that there was no Spanish analogue t  “noise pollution” so we used the 
phrase “El aumento de ruido causado”. The translators also administered the survey in Spanish.  
 Survey Development and Content 
 This section outlines the operationalization of key concepts described earlier as well as 
questions from the survey instrument. I replicated most the questions from previous research. 
Capstone students pre-tested the instrument on 60 adults residing in Colorado, and revised as 
needed based on results of the pre-test.  
 The phrase “oil and gas activity” is used throughout the survey as the word “fracking” 
may generate more negative responses than more ambiguous and softer phrases like “shale gas 
development” (Evenson et. al. 2014). However, other research has found no difference in 
response between “fracking” and “hydraulic fracturing” (Stoutenborough, Robinson and Vedlitz 
2016). In addition, an industry spokesperson spoke to the capstone course and pointed out that 
the actual process of fracking only lasts a few days. Thus, “fracking” appears to have become an 
inaccurate catchall term for oil and gas development. Because of this, few of the survey 




development” because it I judged it too ambiguous and because a substantial portion of the 
drilling within Colorado is for oil, not just shale gas. Given these considerations, I deemed the 
phrase “oil and gas activity” an acceptable compromise. At the beginning of the survey, 
interviewers supplied respondents with a definitio  of “oil and gas activity” it was re-read as 
needed during survey administration:  
 “Oil and gas activity could refer to exploration, drilling using hydraulic fracturing or 
“fracking”, the transfer or oil and gas, and the storage of byproducts and waste.” 
Ideally, this holistic definition of “oil and gas activity” did not produce the emotional 
reaction of simply using the phrase “fracking” while also being more specific than “shale gas 
development.” 
Response Rate and Completions. 404 interviews were completed, slightly exceeding the 
targeted number of completions (400).  There are several different ways to calculate response 
rates. I used AAPOR Definition #1 in which the number of completed interviews is divided by 
the number of completed interviews, partial interviews, non-interviews (which includes refusals 
and non-contacts) and cases of unknown eligibility. The “minimum” response rate is another 
name for this definition. Using this definition, the response rate was 8.6%. For cell phones, the 
response rate was 7.6% and for landlines it was 8.9% using AAPOR definition 1. This response 
rate is lower than other phone-based surveys of oil and gas policy attitudes (e.g. Rabe and Borick 
2011) and much lower than mail surveys on this topic (e.g. Jacquet 2012) but is consistent with 
recent studies of energy policy attitudes conducted by Pew Research (Pew 2014a; 2014b) and 
several studies published in leading journals (Boudet et. al. 2014; Clarke et. al. 2015). However, 
few researches explain how response rates were calculated; that is, it is possible that some prior 




Using AAPOR definition 2—which excludes units with no contact— he response rates was 
9.4%. Using AAPOR definition 6, which assumes that cases are unknown eligibility are not 
eligible, the response rate jumps to 14%. In addition, in technical reports and journal articles 
researchers rarely provide the number of attempts for a given case. It is possible, for example, 
that if the research team called each number 15 times instead of 8 times the response rate would 
have been higher.  
 Still, this low response rate is reflective of a long-term trend of increased non-
participation in phone surveys (Desilver and Keeter 2015; Keeter et. al. 2008). While it has been 
demonstrated that low response rates do not necessarily bias data (Groves 2006; Keeter et. al. 
2008; Rosen et. al. 2014; Wagner 2012) more participation would have been ideal. However, 
biased data results from poor sampling designs, rampant non-response bias, coverage bias and 
the like—not low response rates per se.  
Sample Size by County 
This section compares the sample size per county by the ideal sample size provided to 
SSI and the actual sample. As Table A.1 below reveals, the collected data does not completely 
reflect the targeted sample size per county—the counties listed in bold font on the top four in 
terms of wells per square mile. There are several reasons why we did not reach the targeted 
sample size. As noted above, representatives from SSI explained that targeting respondents by 
county is inexact and including cell phones in the sample further exacerbates this geographic 
inexactness.36 To some degree, the difference between target n and actual n per county could be 
because of these problems. Some respondents may also have recall problems. For example, 
                                                          
36 The central problem with targeting by county is that phone exchanges are not always contained within county 





Denver County is over-represented while nearby Douglas County is under-represented. Because 
both counties are in the Denver metro area, some residents of Douglas County may believe that 





















Table A.1 Comparisons of Target n and Achieved n 
 target n achieved n Diff 
Adams County 39 25 14 
Alamosa County 2 4 -2 
Arapahoe County 14 34 -20 
Archuleta County 1 0 1 
Baca County 1 0 1 
Bent County 1 1 0 
Boulder County 7 11 -4 
Broomfield County 20 6 14 
Chaffee County 2 3 -1 
Cheyenne County 1 0 1 
Clear Creek County 1 1 0 
Conejos County 1 1 0 
Costilla County 1 0 1 
Crowley County 1 1 0 
Custer County 1 0 1 
Delta County 6 7 -1 
Denver County 15 21 -6 
Dolores County 0 1 -1 
Douglas County 35 18 17 
Eagle County 6 1 5 
Elbert County 21 3 18 
El Paso County 5 32 -27 
Fremont County 10 7 3 
Garfield County 20 13 7 
Gilpin County 1 0 1 
Grand County 2 2 0 
Gunnison County 3 3 0 
Hinsdale County 1 1 0 
Huerfano County 1 2 -1 
Jackson County 1 3 -2 
Jefferson County 17 36 -19 
Kiowa County 1 1 0 
Kit Carson County 1 0 1 
Lake County 34 3 31 
La Plata County 1 15 -14 
Larimer County 31 40 -9 
Las Animas County 1 4 -3 
Lincoln County 1 0 1 
Logan County 2 2 0 
Mesa County 3 14 -11 
Mineral County 0 0 0 
Moffat County 1 2 -1 
Montezuma County 3 2 1 
Montrose County 1 5 -4 
Morgan County 1 3 -2 
Otero County 2 0 2 
Ouray County 1 0 1 
Park County 1 0 1 
Phillips County 1 1 0 
Pitkin County 4 1 3 
Prowers County 3 1 2 
Pueblo County 18 24 -6 
Rio Blanco County 15 0 15 
Rio Grande County 1 0 1 
Routt County 5 2 3 
Saguache County 1 1 0 
San Juan County 1 0 1 
San Miguel County 1 1 0 




Summit County 3 2 1 
Teller County 3 0 3 
Washington County 0 1 -1 
Weld County 40 41 -1 
Yuma County 6 1 5 
Sum 400 404  
 
Response rates might possibly vary by county for other, locally specific reasons. Larimer 
County, the home of Colorado State University, is somewhat over-represented in the sample 
data. It is possible, though unverifiable, that residents of this county may be more apt to respond 
to a survey given by Colorado State University students due to the economic and socio-cultural 
significance of the university in the area. The degree of oil and gas activity within a county might 
also influence a respondents’ propensity to respond to a survey about oil and gas activity, but 
there is little evidence for this position. Among the counties with the most intensive drilling La 
Plata county is over-represented while Garfield, Yuma and Broomfield are underrepresented. 
Another possibility is that respondents who live in counties with rapidly increasing drilling might 
have been more apt to take the survey while respondents in areas with a long history of drilling 
might be less apt because of the normalization of development. Also, the spatial distribution of 
drilling within some counties may be such that drilling is far removed from population areas 
within the county, rendering oil and gas development less salient. However, I cannot test for 
these explanations with the existing data. At a minimum, the lack of a consistent pattern suggests 
that intensity of local oil and gas activity is not a strong determinant of a respondent’s propensity 
to complete the survey.  
Comparing the Sample to Colorado Demographics  
Table A.2 compares the sample data (both weighted and unweighted) to the state of 




data—uses different categories than the sample data. Probability weights that adjust for each 
respondent’s probability of selection within county were calculated and applied when estimating 
the descriptive in the second column of this table. The third column provides the Census data.  
Between 3-4% of the sample, whether unweighted or weighted, had a high school 
education. Individuals with some college represented about 25-26% of the sample and about 
31% had a college degree. Regarding race, about 10% of the respondents identified as Hispanic/ 
Latino, 80% identified as weight, and there were relatively few respondents of any other race. 
Turning now to income, the modal category was $51,000-$74,000 while a sizable number 
exceeded $150,000 in annual household income.  
The sample missed the mark in several instances. For instance, the sample over-
represented education individuals. In the statewide population, about 22% are High School 
Graduates and 31% have a Bachelor’s degree. Regarding race, 21% of the Colorado population 
identifies as Latino. Income skewed higher in the sample data. Household incomes over 
$150,000 per year represent about 11% of the state population.  
I suspect that higher educated, more affluent and white respondents had a higher 
propensity to respond—a well-documented problem in survey research (Remler and Van Ryzin 
2010). The divergence between the sample data and the census data is also likely a result of the 
sample design. Recall I designed sample so that it would be representative of counties with 
extensive oil and gas drilling. These counties, such as Garfield, have relatively small populations 
and a fully representative, random sample of the Colorado population might not include 
respondents from these areas because the population of the state in concentrated in the Denver 
metropolitan area. As such, the novel sampling design explains some of the non-




 Race is somewhat better represented, though these categories are less comparable 
because the census conceptualizes “Hispanic/ Latino” as an “ethnicity” using an additional 



























 % %   % 
Education 
   
Education (25 years of age and 
older) 
Less than HS 0.5 0.74 
 
                                   Less 
than High School 
10 
Some HS 2.23 1.49  High School Graduate 22 
HS 11.88 10.92 
 
Some College or 
Associates 
31 
Trade/ Vocational School 3.96 2.91  Bachelor's Degree 24 
Some College  25.25 26.38 
 
Graduate or Professional 
Degree 
14 
College 31.19 31.29    
Post Grad 25 26.27    
      
Race    Race  
Hispanic/ Latino 9.64 10.82  Hispanic/ Latino 21 
White 82.49 80.12  White 88 
Black of African-American 2.03 2.84  White alone 69 
Native American 0.51 0.51  Black of African-American 4 
Asian or Pacific Islander 1.52 2.4  Native American 1 
Multi-Racial 1.02 1.14  Asian or Pacific Islander 3 
Other 2.79 2.17  Multi-Racial 3 
      
Income        Income  
                              Less than $25,000 11.61 11.21     Less than $10,000 6 
$26,000-$50,000 17.28 17.24     $10,000 to $14,999 4 
$51,000-$74,000 21.81 19.83     $15,000 to $24,999 10 
$75,000-$100,000 14.16 11.88     $25,000 to $34,999 10 
$100,000-$149,000 18.13 21.43     $35,000 to $49,999 13 
$150,000 or more 17 18.4     $50,000 to $74,999 18 
       $75,000 to $99,999 13 
       $100,000 to $149,999 14 
       $150,000 to $199,999 6 
       $200,000 or more 5 
      
Age    Age  
mean 50.9 50.1  18 to 24 10 
    25 to 29 15 
    30 to 34 14 
    35 to 44  14 
    45 to 54 14 
    55 to 64 13 
    65 to 74 7 
    75 years or older 5 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT  
Oil and Gas Policy Preferences among Coloradoans  
“Hello my name is ____________ and I am a student in the Sociology Department at Colorado State 
University. Colorado State University is conducting a brief public opinion survey on oil and gas activity 
and public policy.  
“Do you have approximately 12 minutes to complete the survey?”  
[If no, ask if there is a better time to call and record their preference on the call disposition sheet.]  
If yes—“Thank you. Your participation is voluntary and you may stop answering questions at any time. 
There is no direct benefit for your participation; however, by participating in the survey you will provide 
Colorado State University with information that may help improve research in the field of public opinion. 
There are NO KNOWN RISKS in participating and your responses will be treated 
CONFIDENTIALLY. As part of this confidentiality guarantee, we do not have access to your name or 
associate your telephone number to your survey responses. Are you ready to take the survey?” 
(Don’t read) Date ____________________________ 
 
(Don’t read) Record Student Name ____________________________ 
 
(Don’t read) Record Start Time ____________ 
 
(Do Not Read) SCREENING QUESTIONS  
Are you 18 years of age or older? (If the respondent is under 18, ask if someone 18 or older is available 
to complete the survey. If no person age 18 or older is available, state that survey respondents must be 18 
or older. Thank them for their time, abort the survey, & record INE on the call sheet.) 
 (Don’t read)Yes  









 (Do Not Read) Oil and Gas Policy  
These first questions concern policies regarding oil and gas activity in Colorado. Oil and gas activity 
could refer to exploration, drilling using hydraulic fracturing or “fracking”, the transfer of oil and gas, and 
the storage of byproducts and waste. We are interested in public opinion on these issues. There are no 
right or wrong answers to these questions.  
Q1. Thinking about the current amount of state regulation of the oil and gas industry, would you say the 
current amount of regulation is: too much, too little or about right?  
  (Don’t read) Too much 
 (Don’t read) Too little 
 (Don’t read) About right 
 (Don’t read) Don’t know 
 (Don’t read) Refused 
 (Don’t read) Neutral 
 
Q2. I am going to read you a list of policies that have been suggested for regulating the oil and gas 
industry. Please consider each of these policies individually. Do you strongly support, support, oppose or 


















a) Requiring oil and gas 
companies to fully 
disclose the chemicals 
used in drilling to the 
public before it begins? 
              
b) Prohibiting oil and gas 
activity within 1000 feet 
of residential properties? 
              
c) Prohibiting oil and gas 
activity within 1000 feet 
of schools? 
              
d) Prohibiting oil and gas 
activity on public lands? 
              
e) Requiring the state to 
conduct real-time 
monitoring of potential air 
pollution at the drilling 
location?  
              
f) Requiring the state to 
conduct real-time 
monitoring of potential 
water pollution at the 
drilling location? 





Q3. Another policy that has been suggested is a 3-year temporary, statewide ban on fracking so that more 
research can be conducted on its potential environmental or health impacts. Do you strongly support, 
support, oppose or strongly oppose a temporary, statewide ban on fracking?  
 Strongly Support (Go to Q4) 
 Support (Go to Q4) 
 Oppose (Go to Q5) 
 Strongly Oppose (Go to Q5) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know (Go to Q5) 
 (Don’t read) Refused (Go to Q5) 
 (Don’t read) Neutral (Go to Q5) 
(CALLER NOTE: only ask Q4 if the respondent answered strongly support or 
support to Q3):  
Q4. (Only ask if respondent said SS or S for Q3): Some argue that a statewide ban on fracking would 
reduce the supply of oil and gas, which could lead to higher monthly utility or energy bills. Thinking 
about your household finances, would you still support a fracking ban if your household utility and 
energy bills increased by $X per month?  
 (Don’t read)Yes (Go to Q4a) 
 (Don’t read) No (Go to Q5)  
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know (Go to Q5)  
 (Don’t read) Refused (Go to Q5)  
 
Q4a. Now, please think about your response to that last question: How certain are you? Use a scale of 1-
10, where 1 means you are not at all certain and 10 means you are completely certain.  
  
g) Setting stronger limits 
on noise that can come 
from oil and gas 
operations? 
              
h) Taxing oil and gas 
companies on the amount 
of oil or gas they extract 
and using those revenues 
to deal with potential 
problems caused by oil 
and gas activity? 
              
i) Taxing oil and gas 
companies on the amount 
of oil or gas they extract 
and using those revenues 
for the development of 
renewable energy?  








Q5. On average, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission inspects each oil and gas operation 
about once every three years. Now, I’d like you to think about a possible increase in your state income 
taxes to hire additional inspectors so that all oil and gas sites in Colorado could be inspected at l ast once 
per year. Thinking about your household’s finances, would you pay $X more in state income taxes PER 
YEAR to fund more frequent inspections of oil and gas operations? 
 (Don’t read)Yes (Go to Q5a) 
 (Don’t read) No (Go to Q5b)  
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know (Go to Q5b) 
 (Don’t read) Refused (Go to Q5b) 
 
Q5a. Now, please think about your response to that last question: How certain are you? Use a scale of 1-
10, where 1 means you are not at all certain and 10 means you are completely certain. 
 
(Don’t read)  1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8          9           10   DK   REF    Neutral 
 
Q5b. Please indicate if you would strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose charging oil and 
gas companies an annual fee so that inspections can occur at least once per year?  
 (Don’t read) Strongly Support  
 (Don’t read) Support 
 (Don’t read) Oppose 
 (Don’t read) Strongly Oppose  
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  





Q6. People have different perspectives about federal, state or local oversight of the oil and gas industry.
Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these differ nt 
















should be able 
to relax 
regulations on 
oil and gas 
activity. 
              
b) Towns 
should be able 
to pass stricter 
regulations on 
oil and gas 
activity. 
              









              







              
 
(Do Not Read) Benefits, Risks and Impacts 
Q7. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that oil and gas activity has 

















a) Community quality of 
life 




b) a positive impact on job 
creation 
              
c) a positive impact on 
generating tax revenue 
              
d) Investment in 
community infrastructure 
              
e) Energy independence 
from foreign oil 
              
f) The development of 
clean energy 
              
g) Reducing household 
energy bills 
              
 
Q8. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that oil and gas activity has 




























air or water 
quality 
              
d) Land use               
e) Noise 
pollution 
              
f) Human 
health 












(Do Not Read) Risk Proximity 
 
Q9. Do you have oil and gas activity located on your land? 
 (Don’t read) Yes (Go to Q10) 
 (Don’t read) No (Go to Q9a) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know (Go to Q9a) 
 (Don’t read) Refused (Go to Q9a) 
 
Q9a. Do you have oil and gas activity in your local area? 
 (Don’t read) Yes (Go to Q10) 
 (Don’t read) No (Go to Q10) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know (Go to Q10) 
 (Don’t read) Refused (Go to Q10) 
 
Q10. Please answer yes or no: Do you feel oil and gas activity is too close to where you live? (on y read 
categories if absolutely necessary).  
 (Don’t read) Yes, (read if needed: oil and gas activity is too close to where I live) 
 (Don’t read) No, (read if needed: oil and gas activity is not too close to where I live) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t know 
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q11. Have you, or a family member, experienced any negative health effects resulting from oil and gas 
activity? 
 (Don’t read) Yes  
 (Don’t read) No 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  






(Do Not Read) Community Economic Identity 
Q12. Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about your local economy and the place where you live. I 
am going to read you a list of different industries that may be in your area. Please tell me if thes
industries are very important, important, somewhat important, or not at all important to your area...(Read 



















a) Tourism               
b) Oil and gas 
activity 
              
c) Agriculture               
d) Colleges and 
universities 
              
e) Hospitals                
f) Alternative 
energy sources 
like wind and 
solar 




software or the 
internet 
              
h) Brewing and 
distilling 
              
i) Manufacturing               
 
(Do Not Read) Place Attachment  
Now, I'd like for you to think again about the area where you live. 
Q13. How long have you lived in this area? (Record Verbatim, probe for a specific time in years, days or 
months if needed)___________________________________________ 
 
Q14. Thinking again about the area where you live, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, 

















a) You feel 
connected  to your 
community 
              
b) You are attached 
to the natural areas 
in your area 





READ: We are almost finished.  
 
(Do Not Read): Trust 
Q15. How much do you trust the oil and gas industry to operate safely? Do you have a... (R ad list) 
 Great deal of trust 
 Some trust  
 Very little trust 
 No trust  
 (Don’t Read) Don’t know 
 (Don’t Read) Refused 
 (Don’t Read) Neutral 
  
Q16. I am going to read you a list of organizations that may have oversight of the oil and gas industry. 
Please tell me if you have a great deal of trust, some trust, very little trust or no trust in the following 
organizations to provide neutral oversight of the oil and gas industry? (Read response list again after item 

























              
b) The Colorado 
Department of 
Public Health and 
Environment 
 




              
d) Members of the 
State legislature 
 
              
e) The governor’s 
office 
 







(Do Not Read) Demographics and Controls  
 
READ: The following demographic questions are for statistical purposes only. 
These questions will only take a moment. 
Q17. What county do you live in? (Record Verbatim)__________________________ 
Q18. What is your zip code? _________________________ (Caller note: Make sure it is five digits) 
Q19. What is the highest level of education you have received? Please stop me when I reach the highest 
level of education that you have received. 
 Some high school 
 High school graduate or GED 
 Vocational or trade school 
 Some college or associates degree 
 College graduate 
 Post graduate work or degree 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q20. What year were you born? (Record Verbatim)_____________________ 
Q21. For demographic purposes, I am required to ask all respondents to report their sex. (CALLER 
NOTE: Pause so they can respond. If they are expressing confusion you may offer the categories) 
 (Don’t read) Male  
 (Don’t read) Female  
 (Don’t read) somewhere else on the gender spectrum (Record 
Verbatim):_______________________________________________________ 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  







Q22. What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself? (Don’t read categories) 
 (Don’t read) Latino or Hispanic  
 (Don’t read) White  
 (Don’t read) Black or African-American  
 (Don’t read) Native American 
 (Don’t read) Asian or Pacific Islander 
 Multi-racial (write down what they 
say:____________________________________________________)  
 Other (write down what they 
say:_________________________________________________________) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q23. How would you describe your political beliefs? (Read List) 
 Very conservative 
 Somewhat conservative 
 Moderate 
 Somewhat liberal 
 Very liberal 
 (Don’t read) Other (write down what they say___________________________________) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  





Q24. Do you rent or own your home? 
 (Don’t read) Own  
 (Don’t read) Rent 
 (Don’t read) Other 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q25. Do you get your drinking water from a well?  
 (Don’t read) Yes  
 (Don’t read) No 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q26. Do you own the mineral rights under the land where you live?  
 (Don’t read) Yes 
 (Don’t read) No 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q27. Which of the following best describes your current work situation?  
 Self-employed 
 Employed full-time 
 Employed part-time 
 Not employed, but looking for work (Go to Q29) 
 Not employed, not looking for work (Go to Q29) 
 Retired (Go to Q29) 
 (Don’t read) Other (write down what they say___________________________________) 
 (Don’t read) Don’t Know  
 (Don’t read) Refused 
 
Q28. What is your occupation? __________________________________ 
Q29. Looking ahead, do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now 
or worse off than now? 
 (Don’t read) Better  
 (Don’t read) Worse 
 (Don’t read) The same 
 (Don’t read) Don’t know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
Q30. What is your total household income before taxes? Please stop me when I reach your income 









 More than $150,000 
 (Don’t read) Don’t know  
 (Don’t read) Refused  
 
READ:  Do you have any questions for me regarding this research project? 
[CALLER NOTE: If yes, read respondent the related prompts about how to obtain 
results, researcher contact information, confidentiality, rights as participant in research, 
etc., then read statement below.] 
READ:  By completing this survey you have helped us understand public 
attitudes about oil and gas policy. On behalf of Colorado State University, we 
appreciate your help and thank you for your time. Have a good 
__________(select: day/night/ weekend).  
Record End Time: _____________ 
       Type of Phone: 
 Landline/ Residential  
 Cell Phone 
 
 
